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Schramm v. Lyon

Supreme Court of Georgia
285 Ga. 72, 673 S.E.2d 241 (2009)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under Georgia's five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice, each separate and independent negligent act or omission by a physician triggers its own five-year period, rather than the period commencing only from the physician's first negligent act.


Facts:

  • In 1982, Betty Lyon underwent a splenectomy (spleen removal) following an automobile accident, which left her vulnerable to certain infections.
  • Prior to August 29, 2001, Lyon began seeking medical treatment from Doctors Schramm, Barnes, and Sharon for various conditions.
  • Within the five years preceding her lawsuit (i.e., between August 29, 2001, and August 29, 2006), Lyon continued to see these doctors for new and unrelated medical issues.
  • During these later visits, the doctors allegedly failed to warn Lyon about the risk of overwhelming post-splenectomy infection (OPSI), advise her on preventative measures, or prescribe appropriate medications and vaccinations.
  • Medical protocols for treating post-splenectomy patients had reportedly changed during this same time period.
  • In September 2004, Lyon developed OPSI, which resulted in significant injuries, including the amputation of parts of her arms and legs.

Procedural Posture:

  • On August 29, 2006, Betty Lyon filed a medical malpractice action in a Georgia trial court against several physicians, including Doctors Schramm, Barnes, and Sharon.
  • The defendant doctors filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Lyon's claims were barred by the state's five-year statute of repose because their initial treatment of her began before August 29, 2001.
  • The trial court granted the doctors' motion to dismiss.
  • Lyon, as appellant, appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding the claims were not barred.
  • The doctors, as appellants, were granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Georgia to review the Court of Appeals' decision.

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Issue:

Does Georgia's five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice bar a claim where the initial treatment occurred more than five years before the lawsuit was filed, but the complaint alleges separate and subsequent negligent acts or omissions by the same physicians occurred within the five-year period?


Opinions:

Majority - Thompson, Justice

No. Georgia's five-year statute of repose does not bar a claim based on separate negligent acts that occurred within the five-year period, even if the patient's first consultation with the doctor was outside that period. The statute, OCGA § 9-3-71 (b), states that the repose period begins on 'the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred,' not on the date of the first such act. Lyon's complaint alleges new, separate acts of negligence—such as failing to warn or vaccinate during recent visits for new conditions—all occurring within the five years prior to filing her lawsuit. The court reasoned that multiple breaches of the standard of care can constitute new and separate instances of professional negligence, each triggering its own period of repose. This holding is distinguished from misdiagnosis cases like Kaminer v. Canas where the injury and negligent act occur simultaneously, and it does not adopt the 'continuing treatment doctrine' to toll the statute.



Analysis:

This decision clarifies a critical aspect of Georgia's statute of repose for medical malpractice, preventing physicians from being shielded from liability for recent negligence simply because their relationship with a patient began long ago. It establishes that the statute of repose is act-specific, meaning each alleged negligent omission or act is analyzed on its own timeline. This prevents a rule that would effectively immunize doctors from ongoing failures to meet the standard of care, ensuring that the repose period targets stale claims based on distant events, not fresh breaches of duty that occur within the five-year window.

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