Schoenberg v. Rose
145 N.Y.S. 831 (1914)
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Rule of Law:
Where a physician renders necessary emergency medical services to an unconscious person who is unable to consent, a contract is implied by law (quasi-contract), creating an obligation for the person or their estate to pay the reasonable value of those services.
Facts:
- Mr. Max E. Bernheimer was attending a trial where his corporation was the defendant.
- During the proceedings, Mr. Bernheimer collapsed in the courtroom and became unconscious.
- The plaintiff, a physician who was testifying as a witness, offered his assistance.
- Mr. Freeland, Bernheimer's colleague, initially rejected the plaintiff's help, stating they needed a 'physician, not an oculist.'
- Despite Freeland's comments, the plaintiff and another physician proceeded to administer emergency medical treatment to the unconscious Mr. Bernheimer.
- The treatment, including artificial respiration, continued for approximately 30 to 45 minutes, but Mr. Bernheimer never regained consciousness and died.
- A few days later, the plaintiff sent a bill for $500 for his services to Mr. Bernheimer's estate.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff physician brought an action against the executors of Mr. Bernheimer's estate in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, a trial court.
- The action sought to recover $500, the amount the plaintiff claimed as the value of the emergency medical services he rendered to the deceased.
- The defendants, the executors of the estate, refused to pay the bill, leading to the trial.
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Issue:
Does an unconscious person's estate have a legal obligation under a theory of quasi-contract to pay for emergency medical services rendered by a physician, when those services were provided without a request from the patient and over the objection of a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Marks, J.
Yes. An unconscious person's estate is liable for necessary emergency medical services under the theory of a contract implied by law. The law creates a legal fiction of a promise to pay for necessaries furnished to a person incapable of contracting for themselves in order to prevent unjust enrichment. This principle applies regardless of who summoned the physician or whether a legally unauthorized third party objected. The physician-patient relationship was established by operation of law the moment the plaintiff began treating the unconscious Bernheimer, as the services were immediately necessary to preserve life. Mr. Freeland, having no legal relationship or authority over Mr. Bernheimer, could not prevent the formation of this legal obligation. While the estate is liable, the compensation is limited to the reasonable value of the services, which the court determined was $15, not the $500 billed, based on the simplicity of the procedures performed.
Analysis:
This case serves as a foundational example of a contract implied-in-law, or quasi-contract, in the context of emergency medical care. The court's decision solidifies the principle that a legal duty to pay for necessaries can arise without consent or a 'meeting of the minds' to prevent the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another. It establishes that a professional's expectation of payment for emergency services is legally protected, even when rendered to an incapacitated individual. The ruling also importantly separates the question of liability from the determination of damages, clarifying that recovery is based on the reasonable value of the services, not necessarily the amount billed by the provider.
