Schmidt v. Bishop
1991 WL 256408, 779 F.Supp. 321, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17878 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
New York law does not recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice, as adjudicating such claims would require courts to define a theological standard of care, resulting in excessive government entanglement with religion in violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, intentional torts may not be re-pleaded as negligence or fraud to circumvent the statute of limitations, and New York does not judicially recognize a 'delayed discovery' rule for claims of sexual abuse.
Facts:
- In 1960, when Ms. Schmidt was twelve years old, her parents brought her to the defendant, Reverend Joseph P. Bishop, for 'emotional, spiritual and familial counseling' at the Rye Presbyterian Church.
- Shortly after the counseling relationship began, Schmidt alleges that Bishop initiated 'sexual contact' with her.
- Bishop allegedly told Schmidt that their relationship was 'special and acceptable in the eyes of the Lord' and that she could not share it with others.
- The counseling relationship between Schmidt and Bishop, which included the alleged sexual contact, continued until June 17, 1989, even after Schmidt moved away in 1977.
- Schmidt began psychotherapy in January 1988.
- In the fall of 1989, as a result of her therapy, Schmidt alleges she first came to understand that Bishop's conduct constituted sexual abuse and that she had suffered severe damage as a result.
- A licensed clinical social worker averred that Schmidt was emotionally dependent on Bishop and was 'incapable of pulling away' from him.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Ms. Schmidt filed a complaint against Joseph P. Bishop and several 'Church Defendants' in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, based on diversity jurisdiction.
- The complaint alleged counts of negligence, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud against Bishop, and counts of respondeat superior, negligent placement/supervision, and negligence against the Church Defendants.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- Because the court considered affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings, it converted the defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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Issue:
Does New York law recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice, and can a plaintiff's untimely claims for sexual abuse by a clergyman proceed by framing them as negligence, malpractice, or fraud, or by tolling the statute of limitations under a 'delayed discovery' rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Brieant, Chief Judge.
No, New York law does not recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice, and a plaintiff's untimely claims cannot be revived by re-characterizing them or invoking a delayed discovery rule. The court first held that Schmidt's claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud were improper attempts to 'transmogrify' an intentional tort (battery/sexual abuse) into other causes of action to avoid the one-year statute of limitations. The court stated it is 'legally impossible to claim that the alleged perpetrator of deliberate sexual abuse injured the plaintiff negligently.' The court then addressed the core issue of clergy malpractice, concluding that New York has never recognized such a tort. The primary reason for rejecting it is the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, as articulated in the 'entanglement' prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. Adjudicating a clergy malpractice claim would unconstitutionally require a secular court to define the standard of care for a 'reasonably prudent Presbyterian pastor,' necessarily entangling the court in the beliefs, practices, and doctrines of a specific religious denomination. Finally, the court rejected Schmidt's arguments to toll the statute of limitations, holding that New York courts have consistently refused to judicially adopt a 'delayed discovery' rule, that equitable estoppel requires active concealment separate from the underlying tort, and that the duress toll is not applicable. Because all claims against Bishop were dismissed, the vicarious liability and negligent supervision claims against the Church Defendants also failed.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a strong precedent in New York against recognizing the tort of 'clergy malpractice,' grounding its refusal in the First Amendment's prohibition against excessive government entanglement with religion. The ruling significantly limits the legal avenues for victims of abuse by clergy, particularly where the short statute of limitations for intentional torts has expired. It reinforces the legal principle that plaintiffs cannot re-characterize an intentional tort as negligence or fraud to gain a more favorable limitations period. The court's explicit refusal to judicially create a 'delayed discovery' rule for sexual abuse cases underscores judicial deference to the legislature on statute of limitations issues, placing the onus on lawmakers to create such exceptions.
