Schlup v. Delo

United States Supreme Court
513 U.S. 298 (1995)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A federal habeas petitioner who has been sentenced to death and raises a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar must meet the standard from Murray v. Carrier, not the more stringent standard from Sawyer v. Whitley. The petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.

Facts:

On February 3, 1984, inmate Arthur Dade was stabbed to death in a high-security area of the Missouri State Penitentiary.
Two corrections officers, Roger Flowers and John Maylee, identified inmate Lloyd Schlup as one of three white inmates who attacked Dade, a black inmate.
The State produced no physical evidence connecting Schlup to the killing.
Schlup's defense was that he was the wrong man, supported by a prison dining room videotape.
The videotape showed Schlup entering the dining room 65 seconds before guards ran out of the room, apparently responding to a distress call about the attack.
The prosecution argued that a delay of several minutes occurred between the attack and the distress call, which would have given Schlup time to participate and then walk to the dining room.
After his conviction, Schlup's new counsel obtained new affidavits from inmates and a former corrections officer.
One new affidavit, from inmate John Green, stated that he was told to call for help almost immediately after the attack began. Another, from Lieutenant Robert Faherty, described Schlup walking at a leisurely pace just before entering the dining room.

Procedural Posture:

Lloyd Schlup was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in a Missouri state trial court.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
Schlup's state postconviction relief motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court.
Schlup filed his first federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court, which denied the petition.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the first habeas petition.
Schlup filed a second federal habeas corpus petition, raising a gateway claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default on other constitutional claims.
The District Court dismissed the second petition without an evidentiary hearing, applying the standard from Sawyer v. Whitley.
A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that the Sawyer standard applied and had not been met.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate legal standard for a gateway claim of actual innocence of the crime.

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Issue:

Does the standard from Sawyer v. Whitley, which requires a habeas petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty, also apply to a petitioner who makes a gateway claim of 'actual innocence' of the crime itself?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

No. The standard from Sawyer v. Whitley does not apply to a petitioner making a gateway claim of actual innocence of the underlying crime; instead, the standard from Murray v. Carrier governs. A claim of actual innocence of the crime itself implicates the 'quintessential miscarriage of justice,' which is the execution of a person who is entirely innocent. This individual interest is more compelling than a claim of being innocent of the death penalty. Therefore, a less exacting standard of proof is warranted. The Carrier standard, which requires the petitioner to show that a constitutional violation has 'probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,' properly balances society's interest in finality with the individual's interest in avoiding a fundamental injustice. To meet this standard, a petitioner must show that it is 'more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.'

Concurring - Justice O’Connor

Yes, I agree with the Court's holding. The Court correctly holds that a petitioner must show 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him' in light of the new evidence. This standard is higher than the 'prejudice' standard from Strickland but is substantively different from the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in Jackson v. Virginia. This approach properly balances the need for justice with the goal of ensuring the actual innocence exception remains a narrow 'safety valve' for the 'extraordinary case.' The lower courts abused their discretion by applying an erroneous view of the law, making it unnecessary to decide whether the miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary remedy.

Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the 'actual innocence' gateway for federal habeas petitioners whose claims are otherwise procedurally barred. The Court created a two-tiered framework for innocence claims: the extremely high 'clear and convincing' standard from Sawyer applies to claims of being innocent of the death penalty (i.e., sentencing eligibility), while the lower 'more likely than not' standard from Carrier applies to claims of being innocent of the crime itself. This holding makes it more feasible for petitioners with compelling new evidence of innocence of the underlying offense to have their defaulted constitutional claims heard on the merits. It reaffirms the Court's profound concern with preventing the execution of a factually innocent person, treating it as a more fundamental error than an improper sentence.

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