No. A judge cannot force someone to become business partners with their ex-spouse's partner. The law protects the business and the other partner (Herman) from being disrupted. A partnership is a personal agreement, and you can't just swap people in and out. The correct way to handle this is for the court to figure out how much money Karl's half of the partnership is worth. Then, the court gives Ann a legal claim, called a 'charging lien,' for her share of that money. This means that whenever the partnership pays Karl his profits, that money must first go to Ann until her share is fully paid.

Yes, the court made a mistake. I think this because in Florida, we have special rules about business partnerships. You can't just take someone's share of a partnership and give it to someone else, even in a divorce. This is to protect the other business partners and keep the business running smoothly. Instead, the court should have figured out how much Karl's share of the business was worth in dollars, and then said Ann could get that much money from Karl's share of the business profits. Also, the court shouldn't have made Karl pay all of Ann's lawyer fees. We usually only do that if one person has a lot more money than the other after the divorce. In this case, it looks like Karl and Ann ended up with about the same amount of money and stuff after the divorce, so it's not fair to make Karl pay all the lawyer fees. We're sending this case back to the lower court to fix these mistakes.

I agree with the final decision but see things a bit differently because I believe the court made a mistake by trying to hand over Karl’s business share directly to Ann. Instead, the proper fix is to use a charging lien—this means setting a specific dollar amount for Karl’s share so that Ann gets what she’s entitled to, while keeping the business rules intact. I also worry about how the lawyer fees were handled because both parties ended up almost equal, so giving all fees to one side wasn’t fair. I support the result because following the proper legal method protects everyone involved.

I agree with the decision because the court should not take Karl’s share in the business and give it directly to Ann, since the law protects that share. Instead, the right way is to decide on a specific dollar amount for Karl’s share using a charging lien, which keeps things fair for everyone. I also see the lawyer fee issue a bit differently because even though both sides ended up with almost equal amounts, the way the fees were handled could have been adjusted more precisely rather than just being completely reversed. I support the overall result because the proper legal protections must be observed to ensure fairness for all parties.

No. Florida law does not permit the direct transfer of a partner's partnership interest or specific partnership assets as part of an equitable distribution in a divorce. The Uniform Partnership Act protects non-debtor partners and the partnership's ongoing business from disruption caused by a partner's individual creditor. A partner's interest is defined as personal property consisting solely of the right to receive a share of profits and surplus. The exclusive statutory remedy for a creditor, including a former spouse, is to obtain a charging lien for a specific dollar amount against the partner's interest. Therefore, the trial court erred by awarding Ann Karl's 50% interest in S & S Associates directly. The case must be remanded for the trial court to award Ann a specific monetary sum representing the value of Karl's interest and to impose a charging lien to secure that award, which requires giving notice to the other partner, Herman Schiller.

Yes, the trial court erred in its distribution of Karl's partnership interest and award of attorney's fees. I hold that under Florida law, a partner's interest in a partnership cannot be levied directly to satisfy personal debts or obligations. This is because we need to protect the partnership and the interests of non-debtor partners. Instead, the court should impose a charging lien on the partner's interest, specifying a dollar amount that can be pursued by the creditor. In this case, the trial court should award Ann a specific dollar amount for the value of Karl's interest in S & S Partnership, likely $221,153 if the court chooses to distribute to Ann the total value of Karl's interest. The court may retain jurisdiction to enforce the charging lien by sale of the partnership interest, appoint a receiver to obtain payments Karl would be entitled to receive, or take such other actions as Karl could take to obtain payment of the debt owed to Ann. Regarding attorney's fees, I find that the trial court erred in awarding Ann all of her attorney's fees without sufficient justification. We have repeatedly held that when a dissolution decree leaves the parties in substantially equal financial circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion to award one party attorney's fees against the other. In this case, the trial court split the marital assets roughly equally and awarded the former wife close to one-half of her former husband's gross income. Neither has any nonmarital assets or nonmarital sources of income, and neither has substantial liquid assets of any kind. Therefore, if the parties are left in substantially equal financial circumstances after the dissolution awards, no attorney's fees should be awarded. We reverse and remand this cause for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

I concur in the judgment reversed and remanded because the trial court erred in attempting to directly assign Karl’s 50% partnership interest in S & S Associates to Ann, a misstep that violates the protective provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act. While I agree with the majority that a charging lien is the appropriate remedy to secure Ann’s awarded interest, my reasoning differs because I place greater emphasis on preserving the integrity of the partnership and safeguarding the non-debtor partner’s rights—especially those of Herman Schiller. Moreover, I contend that the handling of attorney’s fees, though flawed because the roughly equal distribution of marital assets makes a full fee award unjustified, should be reassessed with careful attention to the nuances of each party’s contributions and circumstances. In sum, I join the judgment but write separately to highlight these distinctions because they bear importantly on how similar cases should be remedied in the future.

I concur in the outcome because the trial court’s direct allocation of Karl’s partnership interest to Ann conflicts with the statutory safeguards designed to protect non-debtor partners under the Uniform Partnership Act. However, my approach differs from the majority’s reasoning in that I favor a more refined analysis of the attorney’s fee award. I believe that, although reversing the fee award is appropriate given the nearly equal distribution of marital assets, the court should consider a tailored adjustment, rather than a wholesale cancellation, to reflect the unique financial dynamics at play. I therefore join the judgment but write separately because a flexible remedy—one that secures Ann’s award through a charging lien while readdressing fee allocation—better serves the interests of all parties.

Schiller v. Schiller

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