Schilb v. Kuebel
1971 U.S. LEXIS 157, 92 S. Ct. 479, 30 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A state bail system that imposes a small administrative fee on defendants who are released after depositing a percentage of the full bail amount, while not charging a fee to those released on personal recognizance or those who deposit the full bail amount, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long as the classification is not arbitrary and is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Facts:
- John Schilb was arrested in Illinois and charged with leaving the scene of an accident and obstructing traffic.
- A judge set the total bail for both charges at $750.
- Under an Illinois statute, Schilb secured his pretrial release by depositing $75 with the court clerk, which was 10% of the total bail amount.
- Schilb was later acquitted of the charge of leaving the scene of an accident but was convicted of obstructing traffic.
- Upon the conclusion of his case, the court clerk returned Schilb's $75 deposit but, pursuant to the statute, retained $7.50 as 'bail bond costs,' which represented 1% of the total bail set.
Procedural Posture:
- John Schilb filed a state class action lawsuit against the St. Clair County court clerk, the county, and the county treasurer in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois (a trial court).
- The Circuit Court upheld the challenged bail statute and dismissed Schilb's complaint.
- Schilb, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
- The Supreme Court of Illinois, the state's highest court, affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, with two justices dissenting.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Schilb's request to hear the case by noting probable jurisdiction.
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Issue:
Does an Illinois bail statute that imposes a 1% administrative fee only on defendants who gain pretrial release by depositing 10% of their bail amount, while not charging a fee to those released on personal recognizance or those who deposit the full bail amount, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun
No, the Illinois bail statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The statutory classification is not based on a suspect criterion and does not affect a fundamental right, so it is subject to the rational basis test, which it satisfies. The state has a rational basis for distinguishing between the different classes of defendants. Not charging those released on personal recognizance is rational because the state holds nothing for safekeeping. The distinction between those who post 10% and those who post 100% is also rational because the latter group is dispossessed of a larger productive asset and provides the state with greater protection against the costs of a defendant jumping bail. The 1% charge is a permissible administrative fee, not an unconstitutional imposition of prosecution costs on the innocent.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Marshall
No, the statute is constitutional. The new system was designed to reform the abusive professional bondsman system and primarily affects the class of defendants who previously would have used bondsmen. This class now pays a 1% fee instead of an irretrievable 10% fee. In the context of the evolving struggle for meaningful bail reform, this legislative step is a constitutional improvement and not an invidious discrimination.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas does not answer the Equal Protection question directly, resting his dissent on other grounds. He argues that the statute violates the Due Process Clause by imposing costs upon an acquitted defendant. In his view, imposing any costs, even administrative ones, on a defendant who is ultimately found not guilty of a charge is fundamentally unfair and violates the 'most rudimentary concept of due process of law.' Since Schilb was acquitted of one charge, the imposition of a cost related to that bail was unconstitutional.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, the Illinois bail statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. The law arbitrarily discriminates by imposing administrative costs on only one class of defendants—those who deposit 10% of their bail. The stated purpose of the fee is to cover administrative costs, but the state has acknowledged that the costs are the same or even greater for the other classes of released defendants (personal recognizance, full deposit) who pay no fee. There is no rational relationship between the classification and the purpose of defraying administrative costs, making the distinction invidious.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of rational basis review to legislative classifications in the context of criminal procedure and court administration, so long as they do not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights. It signals that courts will give significant deference to state legislatures attempting to reform complex systems like bail, even if the reforms are imperfect or create new, minor inequalities. The case distinguishes between the imposition of administrative fees, which can be permissible even for acquitted defendants, and the imposition of prosecution costs, which is constitutionally suspect, thereby creating a key distinction for future due process challenges.
