Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp.
214 Cal. Rptr. 393, 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
For a bystander to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the shock must result from the direct, sensory, and contemporaneous observance of the infliction of injury upon a closely related person, not merely from perceiving the event or the danger via mediated broadcast.
Facts:
- On February 10, 1981, Karen Scherr was watching television in Los Angeles.
- She saw live news coverage of a fire at the Las Vegas Hilton Hotel.
- Her husband, Victor Scherr, was a guest at the hotel at the time and suffered physical injuries in the fire.
- The television broadcast that Karen Scherr watched did not show Victor Scherr's injuries as they were being inflicted.
Procedural Posture:
- Karen Scherr and Victor Scherr filed a lawsuit against Las Vegas Hilton in a trial court.
- Karen Scherr's complaint included a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Las Vegas Hilton filed a demurrer challenging the legal sufficiency of Karen Scherr's emotional distress claim.
- The trial court sustained Las Vegas Hilton's demurrer without leave for Karen Scherr to amend her complaint.
- The trial court subsequently dismissed Karen Scherr's cause of action.
- Karen Scherr appealed the dismissal of her cause of action to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (Karen Scherr as appellant, Las Vegas Hilton as appellee).
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when observing a live television news broadcast of an accident involving a closely related person, but without contemporaneously witnessing the actual infliction of injuries upon that person?
Opinions:
Majority - Compton, J.
No, a plaintiff does not state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under these circumstances because she did not contemporaneously witness the actual infliction of injuries upon her husband. The court affirmed the guidelines set forth in Dillon v. Legg, which require that the bystander's shock result from a "direct emotional impact... from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident." While Karen Scherr's perception of the fire via a live broadcast was sensory and contemporaneous, the broadcast did not depict her husband's specific injuries as they occurred. The court clarified that perceiving mere "endangerment" or the "high probability" of injury is insufficient to cause the legally cognizable "disabling shock" required for recovery. Distinguishing Krouse v. Graham, where the bystander perceived the "certainty of injurious impact," the court held that the critical element for bystander emotional distress is the contemporaneous perception of the infliction of injury, a factor absent here. The court emphasized that allowing recovery based solely on knowledge of a loved one's presence in a dangerous situation, without witnessing the actual injury, would extend liability beyond reasonable limits and defy common sense.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the application of the Dillon v. Legg bystander emotional distress test, particularly the "sensory and contemporaneous observance" prong. It clarifies that merely observing a dangerous event (like a fire) where a loved one is present, even live via media, is insufficient; the plaintiff must observe the actual infliction of injury. This ruling imposes a high bar for remote or mediated observations, limiting the foreseeability of such plaintiffs and preventing an "infinite liability" for defendants. It underscores the judiciary's concern with limiting the scope of emotional distress claims to situations involving direct and immediate trauma, emphasizing the necessity of witnessing the traumatic impact itself.
