Schaffer v. State
1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 168, 1989 WL 107539, 777 S.W.2d 111 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A party may not circumvent the hearsay rule by using artful questioning to indirectly introduce the substance of an out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Such testimony, often called 'backdoor hearsay,' is inadmissible.
Facts:
- Michael Lee Schaffer claimed he had worked as a police informant for an Abilene police officer named Jimmy Seals for two years.
- Schaffer testified that during this time, he had provided authorities with information leading to the arrests and convictions of several drug dealers.
- A McAllen police officer arrested Schaffer in a stolen van.
- Inside the van, police found approximately 1,700 grams of peyote buttons.
- At trial, Schaffer admitted to being in the van and knowing it contained the peyote, but claimed he was acting as an informant in this instance.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Lee Schaffer was prosecuted by the State in a Texas trial court for possession of a controlled substance.
- A jury found Schaffer guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years' confinement.
- Schaffer, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence.
- The State, as petitioner, then petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a prosecutor's question that elicits a witness's conclusion based on an out-of-court conversation, without repeating the conversation itself, constitute inadmissible hearsay when the question is designed to indirectly prove the substance of that out-of-court statement?
Opinions:
Majority - McCormick, J.
Yes, this form of questioning constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Where there is an inescapable conclusion that testimony is being offered to prove the substance of statements made outside the courtroom, a party cannot obviate the hearsay prohibition through indirect or artful questioning. The prosecutor’s question to Officer Segovia ('Without telling us what he told you... would you... ask the State to drop charges?') was designed for the sole purpose of conveying to the jury that Officer Seals had told Segovia that Schaffer was not an informant. This 'backdoor hearsay' is inadmissible because it introduces an unsworn, out-of-court statement for its truth, depriving the defendant of the right to cross-examine the declarant (Officer Seals). The court distinguished this from permissible testimony where an officer explains their presence by stating they acted on 'information received,' because here the testimony went to the core substantive issue of the defense, not merely to explain the officer's conduct.
Dissenting - Campbell, J.
No, the testimony was not hearsay under the rules of evidence. Officer Segovia's answer, 'No, sir,' was his own in-court statement, not an out-of-court statement by another declarant. Furthermore, even if it implied an out-of-court statement, it was introduced as the basis for Segovia's opinion, not for the truth of the matter asserted by Officer Seals. The proper objection should have been based on relevance, as Officer Segovia's opinion on whether to drop charges was completely irrelevant, and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. Because the defendant failed to make a relevance objection at trial, the issue was not preserved for appeal, and the majority incorrectly creates a new 'backdoor hearsay' theory to remedy this procedural failure.
Analysis:
This case establishes the doctrine of 'backdoor hearsay' in Texas, clarifying that the prohibition against hearsay extends beyond the literal repetition of out-of-court statements. The court's ruling requires trial judges to look past the form of questioning to its substantive purpose and effect. This decision prevents prosecutors and other litigants from using clever trial tactics to introduce inadmissible evidence and protects a defendant's confrontation rights by ensuring that the substance of an accusation comes from a witness who can be cross-examined. It creates a precedent for excluding testimony that, while not explicitly repeating an out-of-court statement, is clearly intended to communicate its substance to the jury for the truth of the matter.
