Schafer v. Time, Inc.
142 F.3d 1361 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Under Georgia libel law, the term 'malicious' in the statutory definition of libel refers to the injurious character of the statement itself, not the defendant's subjective intent to harm the plaintiff. A jury instruction suggesting that the plaintiff must prove the defendant's statement was 'deliberately calculated to injure' is a misstatement of the law and constitutes reversible error.
Facts:
- On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, due to a suspected terrorist bomb.
- In April 1992, Time, Inc. published a cover story about the bombing, alleging that a U.S. double agent named David Lovejoy had leaked information that facilitated the attack.
- The article included a photograph with a caption identifying the man pictured as David Lovejoy.
- The man in the photograph was actually Michael Schafer, who was working in his family's janitorial business in Georgia.
- The photograph had become associated with the bombing after a lawyer, James Shaughnessy, attached it to a sworn affidavit in a separate civil case filed by the victims' families, alleging the man pictured was Lovejoy.
- After discovering his photograph in the magazine, Schafer demanded a retraction from Time.
- Time eventually published a retraction.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Schafer sued Time, Inc. for libel in U.S. District Court, based on Georgia law.
- The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Time, Inc.
- Schafer filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.
- Schafer, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a jury instruction defining 'malicious defamation' under Georgia law as a 'statement deliberately calculated to injure' improperly mislead the jury by requiring a finding of the defendant's subjective intent to harm, rather than assessing the objective character of the statement?
Opinions:
Majority - Birch, J.
Yes. A jury instruction defining 'malicious defamation' as a statement 'deliberately calculated to injure' is misleading and erroneous because it incorrectly implies that the plaintiff must prove the defendant's subjective intent to harm. Under Georgia libel law, the statutory requirement of 'malice' refers to the objective character of the statement—that is, whether it is of a type that is inherently injurious to reputation. The defendant's state of mind or personal feelings toward the plaintiff are irrelevant to this element. The court found that this phrase, taken from a prior appellate opinion without its necessary context and explanation, carries a 'powerful tendency to mislead.' This is especially true where the standard of liability for a private figure plaintiff is negligence, not intentional harm. The jury's question about the definition of malice, followed by a quick verdict for the defendant after receiving the erroneous instruction, created an 'ineradicable doubt' that the jury was improperly guided.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies a frequently confused area of defamation law, distinguishing between statutory 'common law malice' and constitutional 'actual malice.' By holding that the phrase 'deliberately calculated to injure' is misleading as a jury instruction for common law malice, the court protects private-figure plaintiffs from an improperly heightened burden of proof. The ruling serves as a caution against lifting language directly from appellate opinions for use in jury charges without considering how a lay jury might interpret it. It reinforces that for a basic libel claim by a private figure in Georgia, the focus is on the defamatory character of the statement and the defendant's negligence, not on the defendant's subjective intent to cause injury.
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