Scarborough v. United States
1977 U.S. LEXIS 2230, 431 U.S. 563, 52 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
To satisfy the federal jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1), which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm 'in commerce or affecting commerce,' the government need only prove that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce at some point prior to the felon's possession.
Facts:
- In 1972, petitioner Scarborough pleaded guilty to the felony of possession of narcotics with intent to distribute in a Virginia state court.
- Prior to his 1972 felony conviction, Scarborough had acquired four different firearms.
- Evidence established that all four firearms had been manufactured outside of Virginia and had traveled in interstate commerce at various times before Scarborough became a convicted felon.
- In August 1973, approximately one year after his felony conviction, law enforcement officials executed a search warrant at Scarborough's home.
- During the search, officers seized the four firearms from Scarborough's bedroom.
- Scarborough contended that, to avoid violating the statute, he had transferred ownership of the firearms to his wife before his felony conviction.
- The government did not attempt to prove that Scarborough acquired the weapons after he became a convicted felon.
Procedural Posture:
- Scarborough was charged in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia with receipt and possession of firearms as a convicted felon.
- At the close of the government's case, the trial judge granted Scarborough's motion for acquittal on the 'receipt' portion of the indictment.
- A jury found Scarborough guilty of the 'possession' charge.
- Scarborough, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of a firearm's prior travel in interstate commerce satisfied the statutory requirement.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Scarborough's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts on the issue.
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Issue:
Does proof that a firearm has, at any time, traveled in interstate commerce satisfy the 'in commerce or affecting commerce' nexus requirement for a conviction of a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1)?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes. Proof that a firearm possessed by a convicted felon previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession and commerce. The legislative history of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, though brief, clearly indicates Congress's broad intent to keep firearms away from those it deemed untrustworthy, such as convicted felons. While the Court's prior decision in United States v. Bass required a nexus to commerce for possession offenses, it did not define the scope of that nexus. Here, the court finds that Congress intended to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause, and the phrase 'affecting commerce' shows an intent to require only a minimal jurisdictional nexus. A requirement of a more contemporaneous connection to commerce, or that the firearm be acquired after the conviction, would create significant enforcement loopholes contrary to Congress's clear purpose. Unlike the ambiguous statute in Bass, the legislative history here is unambiguous in its goal to broadly prohibit possession, making the rule of lenity inapplicable.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. The statute should be construed to prohibit a convicted felon from coming into possession of a firearm only after the conviction. The majority's interpretation means that a person in lawful possession of a firearm automatically becomes guilty of a serious federal crime at the moment of their conviction for a separate felony, a harsh result not clearly mandated by the statutory text. The statute's language is ambiguous, and the legislative history contains statements supporting both interpretations. Given this ambiguity, the time-honored rule of lenity should apply, requiring the court to choose the less harsh construction. The statute does not clearly and definitely outlaw a possession that was legal when it began, and the Court should not infer such a criminal prohibition from ambiguous language.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadened the reach of federal felon-in-possession statutes by establishing a minimal standard for the required 'interstate commerce nexus.' By focusing on congressional intent to solve a social problem rather than on textual ambiguity, the Court made it substantially easier for federal prosecutors to secure convictions. The ruling effectively federalized a crime traditionally handled by states, as nearly every firearm has moved in interstate commerce at some point. This broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the context of gun control contrasts with later decisions like United States v. Lopez, which placed more significant limits on federal power in this area, but Scarborough remains a key precedent for this specific statute.
