Scales v. United States
367 U.S. 203 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
The membership clause of the Smith Act is constitutional when interpreted to prohibit only active membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force, requiring proof that the member knows of the organization's illegal purpose and has a specific intent to accomplish that purpose.
Facts:
- Junius Scales served as the Chairman of the Carolina District of the Communist Party of the United States.
- Scales actively recruited new members into the Party, including an undercover FBI informant named Ralph Clontz.
- Scales informed Clontz that a forceful revolution was necessary for the Communist Party to gain power in the United States and that the Soviet Union would provide aid once the revolution began.
- Scales was a director of a secret Communist Party school where students were taught the Party's revolutionary doctrines.
- The instruction at Party schools, including the one Scales directed, included the necessity of smashing the existing state apparatus (army, police) by force and using techniques like jujitsu and killing a person with a pencil.
- Scales and other high-ranking Party officials directed members to infiltrate key industries, unions, and civil defense organizations to better position the Party to lead a future revolution.
- Scales distributed Party literature, including a pamphlet describing alleged American atrocities in Korea, intended to undermine the government in the eyes of the people as a preparatory measure for revolution.
Procedural Posture:
- Junius Scales was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act.
- A jury convicted Scales in 1955.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial based on its intervening decision in Jencks v. United States.
- Scales was retried in the district court, and a jury convicted him for a second time in 1958.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit again affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the membership clause of the Smith Act, which makes it a felony to be a knowing member of an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, violate the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and association and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Harlan
No, the membership clause of the Smith Act does not violate the First or Fifth Amendments when properly construed. To sustain a conviction, the government must prove not merely nominal membership, but active membership and the defendant's specific intent to bring about the violent overthrow of the government as soon as circumstances permit. The Fifth Amendment's requirement of personal guilt is satisfied because the statute punishes a defendant's own culpable choice to actively participate in and further the organization's illegal aims, not mere association. The First Amendment is not violated because, as established in Dennis v. United States, advocacy of violent overthrow is not protected speech, and the statute is narrowly tailored to reach only those who purposefully join a group to advance its illegal objectives, distinguishing them from members who may join for legitimate reasons.
Dissenting - Justice Black
Yes, the statute as applied is unconstitutional. The Court has effectively rewritten the membership clause by implying the requirements of 'activity' and 'specific intent,' which are not present in the statute's text. This makes the law unconstitutionally vague and constitutes an ex post facto application, as Scales was convicted under a judicial construction that did not exist at the time of his actions. Furthermore, this case demonstrates the danger of the Court's 'balancing test,' as it is used here to justify a direct abridgment of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association by weighing them against governmental interests.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes, the conviction and the statute are unconstitutional. This decision legalizes guilt by association, punishing Scales for his beliefs and memberships rather than for any overt criminal act. No illegal act is charged; the crime is essentially a crime of belief in Communist doctrine. This is a departure from the American tradition that rejects punishing thoughts and ideas, a principle rooted in the First Amendment and the historical understanding of the Treason Clause. Punishing belief is characteristic of totalitarian regimes and is abhorrent to a free society.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
The constitutional question should not be reached because this prosecution is barred by statute. Section 4(f) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 granted immunity from prosecution under the Smith Act's membership clause. Congress included this immunity to overcome the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which would otherwise have allowed Communists to refuse to comply with the Act's registration requirements. The statutory language that membership shall not 'constitute per se a violation' was intended to immunize all forms of membership, including active membership, thereby requiring dismissal of this indictment on statutory grounds.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the constitutionality of punishing 'knowing, active membership' in subversive organizations, attempting to strike a balance between national security and First Amendment rights. By reading the requirements of 'active membership' and 'specific intent' into the Smith Act, the Court avoided striking down the statute while narrowing its application to prevent punishment for mere association or belief. This case, along with Yates v. United States, established a high evidentiary bar for Smith Act prosecutions, requiring proof of advocacy of concrete action, not just abstract doctrine, and a defendant's personal, culpable involvement in those illegal aims.
