Scadron v. City of Des Plaines
180 Ill. Dec. 77, 606 N.E.2d 1154, 153 Ill. 2d 164 (1992)
Rule of Law:
The Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 does not preempt the authority of 'home rule' municipalities to regulate outdoor advertising signs, including imposing more restrictive regulations or outright bans, because the Act does not contain an express statement specifically limiting or exclusively reserving this power to the State, as required by the Illinois Constitution for preemption of home rule authority.
Facts:
- Robert Scadron, Jeffrey Scadron, and Barry Scadron, doing business as Scadron Enterprises, operate a business that leases real property to erect advertising sign structures, which are then leased or donated to advertisers.
- Scadron entered into a lease agreement for property at 2410 Des Plaines Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois, which is zoned for business and commercial uses and abuts an entrance ramp to I-294 (Tri-State Tollway).
- Scadron sought to erect a dual-face billboard, with each face measuring 20 by 60 feet (1,200 sq ft), within 660 feet of the tollway for off-premise commercial and noncommercial advertising.
- The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), the state agency charged with enforcing the Act, issued a permit to Scadron for the construction of the sign.
- The City of Des Plaines (the City) denied Scadron a building permit, citing its sign regulations which prohibited sign structures designed to be viewed from a limited access highway and imposed size limitations significantly smaller than Scadron's proposed sign.
Procedural Posture:
- Scadron filed a three-count complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging in Count III that the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act preempted the City's sign ordinance.
- The City filed a motion to dismiss Count III, which the district court granted, concluding that the City's ordinance was not preempted by the Act.
- Scadron appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where Scadron was the appellant and the City of Des Plaines was the appellee.
- The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions of State law to the Illinois Supreme Court, requesting answers that could be dispositive of the cause.
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Issue:
1. Does the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 (the Act) preempt the authority of home rule municipalities to regulate outdoor advertising signs in areas subject to the Act? 2. If the Act does preempt home rule autonomy, does section 7 of the Act authorize home rule units to regulate outdoor advertising within 660 feet of federally-funded highways more restrictively than the criteria set forth in section 6? 3. If home rule units may regulate such outdoor advertising, does section 7 of the Act authorize such local municipalities to totally exclude outdoor advertising signs in areas subject to the Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Moran
No, the Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 does not preempt the authority of home rule municipalities to regulate outdoor advertising signs in areas subject to the Act. The Illinois Constitution of 1970, Article VII, Section 6(i), dictates that home rule units may exercise powers concurrently with the State unless the General Assembly “specifically limit[s] the concurrent exercise or specifically declare[s] the State's exercise to be exclusive.” This constitutional mandate aims to minimize judicial preemption based on unexpressed legislative intent, requiring an express statement to limit home rule powers, as established in precedents like Rozner v. Korshak and Stryker v. Village of Oak Park. After a comprehensive review of the Act, the court found no explicit statement limiting home rule municipalities' power to enact more restrictive regulations or declaring state authority exclusive. While Section 7 of the Act refers to municipal zoning authorities, it does not specifically mention home rule municipalities, which is crucial for a specific limitation. The Act's conflicting provisions, such as Section 1's declaration that “more severe restrictions [than those in section 6 are] inconsistent with customary use” and Section 7's allowance for municipal regulations “consistent with the intent of this Act and with customary use,” indicate legislative ambiguity rather than a clear preemption. Historically, municipalities have played a significant role in regulating outdoor advertising, and such regulation clearly pertains to their “government and affairs,” a concept broadly interpreted to empower home rule units in addressing local concerns like traffic safety and aesthetics. Regarding the second certified question, it cannot be answered because it is expressly conditioned on the Act preempting home rule autonomy, which the court has determined it does not. Yes, Section 7 of the Act does authorize local municipalities to totally exclude outdoor advertising signs in areas subject to the Act. Given that the legislature has not specifically limited the City's home rule power, the court would only intervene to curtail local power in the “clearest cases of oppression, injustice, or interference by local ordinances with vital state policies.” Scadron argued that allowing a local sign ban would thwart Illinois's vital policy of “effectively controlling” outdoor advertising signs, potentially leading to a 10% reduction in federal highway funds under the federal Highway Beautification Act (23 U.S.C. §131(b)). However, the court found that a total ban by a home rule municipality would not clearly result in the U.S. Department of Transportation determining that Illinois is not effectively controlling signs. The federal Beautification Act, particularly Section 131(d), uses permissive language regarding the erection of signs (“may be erected”) and Section 131(k) explicitly recognizes the right of state and local zoning authorities “to establish ‘standards imposing stricter limitations.’” This federal provision indicates that stricter local regulations, including bans, are permissible and do not contradict the federal act's purpose. Therefore, a local ban is not clearly at odds with the state's policy to comply with federal regulations, and a loss of federal highway funds is not a clear consequence.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad scope of home rule powers in Illinois, establishing a high bar for state legislative preemption by requiring an 'express statement' specifically limiting or exclusively reserving a power. The ruling allows home rule units to enact ordinances that are more restrictive than state statutes, even in areas of shared concern, thereby promoting diverse local approaches to issues like land use and advertising. Furthermore, the decision clarifies that local bans on certain types of advertising signs are permissible under the home rule framework and do not automatically undermine state compliance with federal regulations or cause the loss of federal funds, provided there is no explicit federal prohibition or clear interference with a vital state policy.
