Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. Citrus County
2008 WL 4681167, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 16449, 2 So. 3d 329 (2008)
Rule of Law:
Under Florida Statute § 163.3215, a party has standing to challenge a local government's development order as inconsistent with a comprehensive plan if they allege an interest protected by the plan that exceeds in degree the general community interest, and that this interest will be adversely affected by the challenged decision, without necessarily requiring a unique harm different in kind from the general population.
Facts:
- Homosassa River Resort, LLC (Resort) owns property adjacent to the Homosassa River, an Outstanding Florida Waterway and essential manatee habitat.
- The Resort's property, designated for low intensity coastal lakes, contained 15 residential condominium units.
- Resort applied to Citrus County for an amendment to the land development code atlas to allow development and redevelopment of 87 condominium units, retail space, amenities, and parking, involving the construction of four four-story residential structures.
- On July 11, 2006, the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners enacted Ordinance No. 2006-A13, approving Resort’s application and amending the County’s land development code.
- Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. (Alliance) is a not-for-profit corporation committed to the preservation and conservation of environmentally sensitive lands and wildlife in and around the Homosassa River and Old Homosassa, Florida.
- James Bitter owns property approximately three miles from Resort’s site, fishes and boats in the River, and actively participates in public conversations regarding area development.
- Rosemary Rendueles owns canal-front real property less than a mile from Resort’s site, uses the River for recreation, and participated in public hearings on Resort’s application.
- Priscilla Watkins owns property within Homosassa, Florida, frequently kayaks on the River, bicycles on local roads, and actively participated in public hearings on Resort’s application.
- Plaintiffs allege that the County’s approval of the development order is inconsistent with the County’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (Ordinance No. 89-04), specifically regarding density, height, character, and commercial uses within various zones, including the coastal high hazard area.
- Plaintiffs assert that the development will increase demands on public services, evacuation routes, traffic, and infrastructure, adversely affecting their property interests, the quality of the Homosassa River, endangered manatees, and health and safety.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs (Save the Homosassa River Alliance, James Bitter, Rosemary Rendueles, and Priscilla Watkins) filed suit against Citrus County, Florida, pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging the County’s approval of Homosassa River Resort, LLC’s (Resort) application on the ground that it was inconsistent with the County’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
- Before the initial complaint was served, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint.
- Resort was allowed to intervene in the dispute.
- The County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish standing.
- The trial court agreed with the County and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint, granting them twenty days to amend.
- Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint against both the County and Resort.
- The County and Resort responded by filing a joint motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to establish standing by not sufficiently alleging an interest exceeding that of the general community, harm above that of neighbors, or a nexus between alleged plan violations and their interests.
- The trial court heard arguments on the joint motion.
- The trial court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that their interests were adversely affected by the project in a way not experienced by the general population and due to insufficient 'nexus' allegations.
- Plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the trial court’s analysis was not within the statute and that dismissal with prejudice was premature.
- The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing.
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Issue:
Does a party have standing under Florida Statute § 163.3215 to challenge a development order for inconsistency with a comprehensive plan by alleging interests that exceed in degree the general community good and will be adversely affected, even if the harm is not unique to them relative to the general population?
Opinions:
Majority - Griffin, J.
Yes, a party has standing under Florida Statute § 163.3215 if they allege an interest protected by the local government comprehensive plan that exceeds in degree the general community good and will be adversely affected, even without showing a unique harm. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleged standing. The court reasoned that section 163.3215 was enacted to liberalize standing for citizens challenging development orders inconsistent with comprehensive plans, making it a remedial statute that should be liberally construed. The statutory requirement that an interest 'exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons' means the party must have something more than a 'general interest in community well-being,' not that they must suffer a 'unique harm' different in kind from the general population. The court cited Putnam County Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs to illustrate that specific injuries and an organization's primary purpose related to the affected interest are sufficient. The majority rejected the argument that a 'unique harm' is required, stating that such an interpretation would 'eviscerate the statute and ignore its remedial purpose' by dragging it back to the common law test. It emphasized that the statute aims to remedy a governmental entity's failure to comply with its plan by enabling a category of persons with particularized interests to prosecute the claim, rather than redressing damage to particular plaintiffs. The allegations that the individual plaintiffs use the same water system, roadway system, waterway system, and, in Watkins's case, sewer system, and would experience increased demands related to public services, evacuation, traffic, and infrastructure due to the proposed development, coupled with the Alliance's specific preservation mission and investment of resources, demonstrate a direct and demonstrated concern for protected interests that would be adversely affected beyond a mere general interest.
Dissenting - Pleus, J.
No, a party does not have standing under Florida Statute § 163.3215 unless they allege specific adverse effects or harm that is unique to them and greater in degree than that suffered by the general community. Justice Pleus dissented, arguing that the trial court correctly dismissed the case because the plaintiffs repeatedly failed to allege any adverse effects, impact, or harm that was unique to them. The dissent contended that the majority's opinion 'eviscerates' the 'adverse effect' element of the standing requirement and conflicts with established case law. Citing cases like Dunlap v. Orange County, Stranahan House, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, and Florida Rock Properties v. Keyser, the dissent asserted that prior rulings consistently required factual allegations of specific, concrete injuries or impacts that are distinct from the community at large, such as blocked ocean views, reduced property values, or specific business impediments. The dissent argued that merely alleging that development will increase demands on resources (water, sewer, traffic) is insufficient; plaintiffs must allege 'ultimate facts showing how or why increased demands will result in adverse impacts' to them personally, and that these impacts are greater than the community's general experience. The dissent also rejected the idea that an organization's 'investment of resources and volunteer activities' alone confers standing, citing Sierra Club v. Morton for the principle that a mere 'interest in a problem' is not enough. The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs' 'bare-bones allegations' of increased density affecting river use were 'pure speculation and fantasy' and did not meet the constitutional requirement for a 'concrete and particularized' injury, justifying the trial court's dismissal with prejudice.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standing requirements for citizens challenging land use decisions under Florida Statute § 163.3215. By rejecting the need for 'unique harm,' the majority opinion broadens access to the courts for individuals and organizations seeking to enforce comprehensive plans, reducing the hurdle that previously required a highly individualized injury. This interpretation empowers environmental groups and concerned citizens to hold local governments accountable for adhering to their own development plans, potentially leading to more consistent and environmentally conscious land use. However, it also raises concerns, as articulated by the dissent, about potentially opening the 'floodgates' to litigation by parties with less direct or concrete injuries, potentially hindering development and burdening local governments and developers with protracted legal challenges based on more generalized concerns.
