Satterwhite v. Commonwealth
56 Va. App. 557, 2010 Va. App. LEXIS 302, 695 S.E. 2d 555 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Dying declarations, made by a homicide victim conscious of impending death without hope of recovery, are admissible under the common law hearsay exception and are categorically outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause due to their unique historical pedigree.
Facts:
- On October 19, 2005, Tanisha Naar returned to her apartment and found her boyfriend, Dominic Joyner, lying on her bathroom floor covered in blood.
- Joyner was gasping for breath, fading in and out of consciousness, appeared limp, and told Naar he had been shot 'everywhere.'
- While Naar was on the phone with a 911 operator, she asked Joyner 'who did it?', to which Joyner loudly replied, 'Darin Satterwhite did it,' adding that Satterwhite shot him around 12:45 p.m.
- Paramedics arrived and found Joyner with three gunshot wounds to the chest and one to the head, conscious but in critical condition and with no feeling in his legs.
- Police detectives also asked Joyner what happened, and he again stated that Satterwhite had shot him.
- Joyner was rushed to the hospital for emergency surgery and, despite medical efforts, died six weeks later from complications related to his gunshot wounds.
- At trial, Satterwhite's counsel conceded Joyner had no motive to falsely identify Satterwhite, asserting instead that Joyner was simply mistaken.
- A jury found Satterwhite guilty of second-degree murder.
Procedural Posture:
- Before trial, in response to two evidentiary motions, Judge Charles D. Griffith, Jr., ruled that the victim’s statements were admissible as dying declarations.
- A jury found Darin Satterwhite guilty of second-degree murder.
- Judge Everett A. Martin, Jr., later denied Satterwhite’s motions to reconsider and set aside the verdict on the basis of the statements' admissibility.
- Darin Satterwhite (appellant) appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing the victim’s statements were inadmissible under state evidentiary and federal constitutional law.
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Issue:
Does the admission of a homicide victim's statements identifying the shooter, made while the victim was critically wounded and believed death was imminent, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses or state common law hearsay rules?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge D. Arthur Kelsey
No, the trial court did not err in admitting Joyner's statements. The Court held that Joyner’s statements constituted dying declarations admissible under the common law hearsay exception and were categorically outside the reach of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Under common law, dying declarations are admitted when the victim is conscious of impending death and has no expectation of recovery, because this state is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood. This consciousness does not need to be verbalized but can be inferred from the character and nature of the wound, the victim's appearance, and conduct. Joyner's severe injuries—three gunshots to the chest, one to the head, partial paralysis, and difficulty breathing—provided ample circumstantial evidence for the trial court to conclude he was under a sense of impending death, despite living for several more weeks. The length of time between the declaration and death is immaterial if the declarant believed death was imminent at the time of the statement. The court affords much deference to the trial court's determination on this issue, applying an abuse of discretion standard. Regarding the Confrontation Clause, the court affirmed that the dying declaration exception is a deeply rooted historical exception that predates the Bill of Rights. Citing Hill v. Commonwealth and Mattox v. United States, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington specifically acknowledged dying declarations as a sui generis historical exception that is accepted on historical grounds, and later in Giles v. California reiterated this point. Therefore, the traditional view that dying declarations are an exception to both the common law hearsay rule and the constitutional right to confront accusers remains intact.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the enduring vitality of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule and, more significantly, its categorical exemption from the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause even in the post-Crawford era. By emphasizing the historical roots and 'sui generis' nature of the exception, the court provides a clear precedent for the admissibility of such statements without requiring the declarant's availability for cross-examination. This ruling underscores the judiciary's deference to well-established common law principles, balancing a defendant's confrontation rights against the necessity of securing justice in cases where the victim cannot testify. It will guide future courts in assessing the subjective state of mind of a dying declarant based on objective circumstances.
