Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.
266 S.W.3d 347 (2008)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An employer owes a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to individuals who have regular, extended, and close contact with an employee's asbestos-contaminated work clothes. This duty arises from the employer's affirmative act of creating an unreasonable risk of harm (misfeasance), and therefore does not require a special relationship between the employer and the injured third party.
Facts:
- Since the 1930s, Alcoa, Inc. used materials containing asbestos in its manufacturing operations and was aware that asbestos was a highly dangerous substance.
- By the 1960s, Alcoa learned that family members of its employees were experiencing higher disease rates due to regular exposure to asbestos fibers on the employees' work clothes.
- In 1972, OSHA promulgated regulations prohibiting employees exposed to asbestos from taking their work clothes home to be laundered.
- From 1973 to 1984 (with a break for military service), Doug Satterfield worked at Alcoa's Tennessee facility, where he was exposed to high levels of asbestos dust daily.
- Alcoa failed to warn Mr. Satterfield of the risks, did not provide protective clothing, discouraged the use of on-site bathhouse facilities, and did not offer to launder his work clothes.
- As a result, Mr. Satterfield wore his asbestos-contaminated work clothes home each day.
- Amanda Satterfield was born in 1979, and for the first three months of her life, her father visited her daily in the hospital immediately after work while wearing his contaminated clothes.
- Amanda Satterfield was later diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer almost exclusively caused by asbestos exposure, and died at age 25.
Procedural Posture:
- Amanda Satterfield filed a negligence lawsuit against Alcoa, Inc. in the Circuit Court for Knox County, a trial court.
- The case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Blount County.
- Following Amanda Satterfield's death, her father, Doug Satterfield, was substituted as plaintiff for her estate.
- Alcoa filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting it owed no legal duty to Amanda Satterfield.
- The trial court granted Alcoa's motion and dismissed the complaint.
- Doug Satterfield, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, concluding that Alcoa did owe a duty to Ms. Satterfield.
- Alcoa, as appellant, was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the state's highest court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an employer owe a duty of reasonable care to its employee's child who contracted mesothelioma allegedly as a result of regular and extended exposure to asbestos fibers from the employee's work clothes brought home from the employer's facility?
Opinions:
Majority - Koch, Jr., J.
Yes. An employer owes a duty of reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to those who regularly come into close contact with its employees' asbestos-contaminated work clothes. The court reasoned that Alcoa's conduct constituted misfeasance—an affirmative act creating a risk—rather than nonfeasance, which is a mere failure to act. Because Alcoa created the unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm by operating its plant in an unsafe manner and allowing employees to leave with contaminated clothing, a duty of reasonable care arose. The court rejected the argument that a special relationship was required, as that standard applies to nonfeasance cases. Applying a balancing test, the court found that the foreseeability and grave magnitude of the harm (fatal cancer) far outweighed the burden on Alcoa to implement safer practices, such as providing warnings, clean coveralls, or laundry services. Public policy considerations, such as the asbestos litigation crisis, do not justify precluding claims from severely ill victims like Ms. Satterfield.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Holder, J.
Yes. Although agreeing that Alcoa owed a duty of care to Ms. Satterfield, this opinion dissents from the majority's analytical framework. The dissent argues that foreseeability should not be a component of the duty analysis, which is a question of law for the court. Instead, foreseeability is a fact-based inquiry that belongs to the jury's determination of breach and proximate cause. By incorporating foreseeability into the duty analysis, the majority improperly expands the role of judges at the expense of juries. The better approach, per the Restatement (Third) of Torts, is to presume a duty exists whenever an actor's conduct creates a risk of harm, with courts finding 'no duty' only in exceptional cases based on clearly articulated countervailing public policy principles.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands tort liability in Tennessee for 'take-home' or 'transmission' exposure to toxic substances. By classifying the employer's failure to provide a safe workplace as misfeasance (creating a risk) rather than nonfeasance (failing to protect), the court eliminated the need for a plaintiff to prove a special relationship with the defendant. This broadens the scope of duty beyond the physical premises of a business to foreseeable third parties, such as employees' family members. The ruling establishes a precedent that a company's duty of care can follow the hazardous materials it allows to leave its property, impacting how future toxic tort cases involving indirect exposure are litigated.
Unlock the full brief for Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.