No, it's not fair. Using a 'just over 50%' standard is unconstitutional for something so serious. The court said that a parent's right to raise their child is one of the most important rights we have. The risk of making a mistake and wrongly taking a child away forever is too high with such a low standard of proof. The government has all the advantages in these cases, so to make it fair, the judge needs to be much more sure—at least 'clear and convincing'—before making such a final, life-changing decision.

Yes, it is fair. The 'just over 50%' standard is okay when you look at everything New York does to protect parents. The state provides lawyers, holds multiple hearings, and really tries to help families get back together first. The court shouldn't just focus on this one rule. We also have to remember the child's interest in having a safe and stable home. The state's process balances the parent's rights and the child's needs, and the federal government shouldn't be telling states how to handle these sensitive family matters.

Yes, the Constitution requires a higher standard of proof. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Using a 'more likely than not' standard creates too high of a risk of erroneously terminating parental rights. The state's interest in using a lower standard isn't that strong. So due process requires at least a 'clear and convincing evidence' standard. I stress that a parent's right to raise their children is way more important than property rights. When the state tries to break apart a family, it has to use very fair procedures. In these cases, the state is directly adverse to the parents. Until the state proves the parents are unfit, the child and parents have a shared interest in preventing a wrong decision. Only when it's really clear that the parents can't provide a good home does the state's interest in finding the child a new permanent home come into play.

I disagree. The Court is wrong to say New York's standard of proof for ending parental rights is unconstitutional. The decision ignores New York's serious efforts to help parents regain custody and all the procedural protections for parents' rights. The Court finds a constitutional violation only by narrowly focusing on due process and ignoring how fair New York's process is overall. The New York legislature made a reasonable decision in balancing the interests of parents, children, and the state. The majority is wrong to say the state only cares about the child's well-being after the parents are found unfit. The bad result of wrongly finding a parent unfit - breaking up a family - is about equal to the bad result of wrongly finding them fit - risking permanent harm to the child by returning them to an abusive home or keeping them from a permanent home. This is the kind of decision state legislatures should make.

Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.

The United States Supreme Court has held that a parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence

A parent's rights to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of his or her children are constitutional interests "far more precious than any property right."

—holding that the minimum standard of proof in termination of parental rights cases is clear and convincing evidence

—respondent ['s]... claim that a parental rights termination proceeding does not interfere with a fundamental liberty interest.[Citations.] The fact that important liberty interests of the child and its foster parents may also be affected by a permanent neglect proceeding does not justify denying the natural parents constitutionally adequate procedures. Nor can the State refuse to …

Considering the fundamental nature of a parent's rights and the serious consequences that stem from termination of those rights, a higher standard of proof is required in determining termination cases.

"When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."

"When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it."

Yes, New York's use of a 'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard in parental rights termination proceedings violates the Due Process Clause. This standard is insufficient to protect the fundamental liberty interest of parents in their relationship with their children, which is a commanding private interest. The Court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge. First, the private interest of the parents is immense, as termination is a severe and irreversible action. Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this right is substantial under the preponderance standard, given the state's significant resource advantage and the subjective nature of 'neglect' determinations; a higher standard would reduce this risk. Third, the government's interest in the child's welfare and in administrative efficiency does not justify a lower standard, as the state shares the parents' interest in an accurate decision, and a higher standard imposes minimal fiscal or administrative burdens. Therefore, a standard of at least 'clear and convincing evidence' is required to ensure fundamental fairness.

No, New York's statutory scheme, when viewed as a whole, is fundamentally fair and does not violate the Due Process Clause. The majority's narrow focus on the standard of proof ignores the extensive procedural protections New York provides to parents, such as the right to counsel, multiple hearings, and the requirement that the state make diligent efforts to reunite the family before seeking termination. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the child's welfare, which is often pitted against the parents' interests. A preponderance standard appropriately balances the parents' rights with the child's critical need for a stable, nurturing home and the state's interest as parens patriae. By imposing a federal standard of proof, the Court improperly intrudes into the area of domestic relations, which has traditionally been left to the states to regulate and experiment with.

Yes. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than a 'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard in parental rights termination proceedings because the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial, and the governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure is comparatively slight. Therefore, due process requires at least a 'clear and convincing evidence' standard. I emphasize that the rights to the companionship, care, custody, and management of one's children are constitutional interests far more precious than any property right, and when the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. The factfinding stage of a New York permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the State and the child's natural parents. At this stage, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries. Until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship. The State's interest in finding the child an alternative permanent home arises only when it is clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child.

I dissent. The Court today errs in concluding that the New York standard of proof in parental-rights termination proceedings violates due process of law. The decision disregards New York's earnest efforts to aid parents in regaining the custody of their children and a host of procedural protections placed around parental rights and interests. The Court finds a constitutional violation only by a tunnel-vision application of due process principles that altogether loses sight of the unmistakable fairness of the New York procedure. The New York Legislature has made a reasonable effort to balance the interests of parents against the legitimate interests of the child and the State. The majority's conclusion that a state interest in the child's well-being arises only after a determination of parental unfitness suffers from the same error as its assertion that the child has no interest, separate from that of its parents, in the accuracy of the factfinding hearing. The undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of parental unfitness - the unwarranted termination of the family relationship - is roughly equal to the undesirable consequence of an erroneous finding of parental fitness - the risk of permanent injury to the child either by return of the child to an abusive home or by the child's continued lack of a permanent home. Such a conclusion is well within the province of state legislatures.

Santosky v. Kramer

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