Santos v. State
380 So. 2d 1284 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
The single-subject requirement of the Florida Constitution (Article III, section 6) applies to legislative acts at the time of their enactment, not to the subsequent codification of those acts into the Florida Statutes. A single statutory section may therefore contain provisions originating from multiple, distinct legislative acts without being unconstitutional, so long as each original act satisfied the single-subject rule when passed.
Facts:
- Raul Lopez Santos was charged with driving while intoxicated under section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1977).
- Santos was simultaneously charged with driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level under section 316.193(3) of the same statute.
- The offense of driving while intoxicated, proscribed in subsection (1), was originally established by a 1971 legislative act known as the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law.
- The offense of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level, proscribed in subsection (3), was created by a different legislative act passed in 1974.
- These two distinct offenses, originating from separate legislative acts, were later codified and placed together within section 316.193 of the Florida Statutes.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida charged Raul Lopez Santos in the County Court of Orange County with driving while intoxicated and driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level.
- Santos filed a motion to dismiss the information, arguing that section 316.193 was unconstitutional for violating the single-subject rule.
- The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, upholding the statute's constitutionality.
- The trial court subsequently dismissed the driving while intoxicated charge on separate grounds.
- Santos entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level, specifically reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the statute's constitutionality.
- The trial court adjudicated Santos guilty and imposed a sentence.
- Santos, as appellant, appealed the judgment directly to the Supreme Court of Florida, with the State of Florida as appellee.
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Issue:
Does section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1977), violate the single-subject rule of Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution by creating two separate criminal offenses within the same statutory section?
Opinions:
Majority - Boyd, J.
No, section 316.193 does not violate the single-subject rule of the Florida Constitution. The court reasoned that the single-subject requirement in Article III, section 6 applies to "laws" in the sense of legislative acts as they are enacted, not to the sections of the codified Florida Statutes. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent legislative practices like logrolling and surprise during the lawmaking process. Once laws are validly passed, the legislature is free to organize and codify them as it sees fit. The court traced the two subsections at issue to their original, separate legislative acts (Chapter 71-135 and Chapter 74-384) and determined that each of those acts properly embraced a single subject. Therefore, their subsequent compilation into a single statutory section does not create a constitutional violation.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the Florida Constitution's single-subject rule, establishing a crucial distinction between legislative 'acts' and codified 'statutes.' It affirms that the constitutional test for the single-subject rule applies at the moment of enactment, focusing on the original legislative bill, not on the final organization of the statutory code. This precedent grants the legislature significant flexibility in how it arranges and publishes the laws after they are passed, thereby preventing constitutional challenges based merely on the structure or organization of the Florida Statutes.
