No. The tribe cannot be sued in federal court over this rule. Native American tribes are treated like their own separate governments with the power to run their own affairs (this is called 'sovereignty'). You can't sue a sovereign government in court unless it clearly agrees to be sued. Congress did not make it clear that tribes agreed to be sued in federal court for these kinds of civil rights issues. While Congress wanted to protect individual rights, it also wanted to protect the tribes' independence and right to handle their own problems. The only exception Congress clearly made was to allow federal lawsuits if a person is being held in jail by the tribe illegally.

Yes. They should be able to sue. This decision makes the Indian Civil Rights Act seem weak and pointless. What's the use of having guaranteed rights if you can't go to court to defend them? The dissenting judge believed that when the government grants people rights, it's assumed it also gives them a way to enforce those rights in court. Letting the tribe that made the unfair rule be the only one to judge it doesn't really protect the individual like the law was supposed to.

No, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not allow people to sue a tribe or its officials in federal court because the Act does not clearly say the tribe can be sued. Indian tribes usually cannot be sued unless Congress clearly allows it. Letting the case go forward in federal court could also undermine the tribe's authority to handle disputes on its own. The Court must respect tribal sovereignty and Congress' power over Indian affairs, so it cannot assume the Act allows these suits without a clear sign Congress intended that.

The Indian Civil Rights Act does allow a person to sue a tribe and its officials because the reason Congress passed the Act was to protect individual Indians' rights against unfair tribal actions. When federally protected rights are violated, federal courts should provide a way to fix the problem. The Act was meant to benefit people like Julia and Audrey Martinez, so a right to sue is consistent with the Act's purpose. Congress' concerns about tribal sovereignty do not rule out a right to sue because the Act's interference with tribal self-government to protect rights assumes some way to enforce those rights.

"Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers."

It is true that Congress, in adopting the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), 25 USC §§ 1301 et seq., used its plenary authority to "impos [e] certain restrictions upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment."

—however, the Court held that sovereign immunity protected a tribe from suit under the Act, that the Act did not create a private cause of action cognizable in federal court, and that a tribal court was the appropriate forum for vindication of rights created by the Act.

A "tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community

It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.

"[H] owever, Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess."

—and thus "a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent."

"As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority."

Congress thus struck in ICRA a careful balance between "strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe" and "promot [ing] the well-established federal `policy of furthering Indian self-government.'"

The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the only remedy Congress intended to redress violations of ICRA is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

No. The Indian Civil Rights Act does not impliedly authorize civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal court against a tribe or its officers; the only federal remedy expressly created by the Act is the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that Indian tribes possess common-law sovereign immunity from suit, which can only be waived by an unequivocal and express act of Congress. Title I of the ICRA contains no such express waiver. Furthermore, while tribal officers are not protected by sovereign immunity, implying a cause of action against them would constitute a significant interference with tribal self-government. Congress, in passing the ICRA, sought to balance two competing goals: protecting individual rights and promoting tribal autonomy. The legislative history, including the rejection of proposals for broader federal judicial review of civil matters, demonstrates a deliberate choice by Congress to limit federal court intrusion into tribal affairs to the single remedy of habeas corpus for unlawful detention.

Yes. A private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief should be implied from Title I of the ICRA to make its protections meaningful. The dissent argued that without a federal forum for enforcement, the rights guaranteed by the Act become mere unenforceable declarations of principle. Many of the rights enumerated in the ICRA, such as freedom of speech and religion, are not susceptible to redress through habeas corpus, which implies that Congress must have contemplated other remedies. Leaving the enforcement of these rights to the very tribal governments accused of violating them frustrates the Act's primary purpose, which is to protect individual Indians from arbitrary tribal actions. The history of federal courts fashioning remedies for the violation of federally protected rights supports implying a cause of action here.

No, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against a tribe or its officers in federal court because the Act does not expressly waive the tribe's sovereign immunity from suit. Indian tribes possess common-law immunity from suit, and without congressional authorization, they are exempt from suit. Congress' provision for habeas corpus relief does not waive sovereign immunity for other types of actions. The Court must tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent, as tribal sovereignty and Congress' plenary authority over Indian affairs cautions that a waiver of immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. The ICRA's legislative history also indicates Congress' intent to create only a limited mechanism for federal court review through habeas corpus. Subjecting a dispute to a forum other than the one Indians have established for themselves may undermine tribal authority. A proper respect for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area demands that the Court not lightly imply a cause of action in this context.

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 does implicitly authorize a private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribe and its officials because the Act's legislative history and fundamental purpose of protecting individual Indians' rights against tribal abuses support this inference. Where federally protected rights have been invaded, federal courts should be alert to adjust their remedies to grant necessary relief. The factors outlined in Cort v. Ash for implying a private cause of action are satisfied here. Respondents are among the class for whose benefit the ICRA was enacted, a private cause of action is consistent with the Act's purpose, and the rights protected are of a type traditionally enforced by federal courts. Congress' rejection of certain proposals for federal review does not indicate opposition to a federal cause of action. Concern for tribal sovereignty does not preclude a federal cause of action because the ICRA's intrusion on tribal self-government to protect individual rights necessarily contemplates some mechanism to enforce those rights.

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

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