Sands v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance
789 So. 2d 745, 2000 La.App. 4 Cir. 1274, 2001 La. App. LEXIS 1732 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
The determination of whether a witness is 'independent and disinterested' for purposes of Louisiana's uninsured motorist statute, La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(f), requires a concrete, case-by-case evaluation of their actual interest or potential gain from the litigation, and mere status as a named defendant or former employee is insufficient, as a matter of law, to automatically disqualify them.
Facts:
- Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company was the liability and uninsured motorist (UM) insurer of a World War II-era jeep purchased by John Kushner to donate to the D-Day museum.
- On the early morning of November 3, 1996, Wali Armstead drove the jeep with passengers Jack Sands and Randolph Harrill to a public relations event at an air show in Belle Chase, Louisiana.
- At the intersection of General de Gaulle Drive and Garden Oaks Drive in New Orleans, Armstead allegedly swerved to avoid hitting a champagne-colored Honda vehicle that ran a red light.
- As Armstead attempted to stop, the jeep's brakes allegedly failed, causing the jeep to overturn.
- Jack Sands sustained injuries in the accident, including a broken shoulder and a ruptured spleen.
- The phantom vehicle that allegedly ran the red light made no physical contact with the jeep or its occupants.
Procedural Posture:
- Jack Sands and his wife, Martha Sands, sued Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, as the liability and UM insurer of the jeep, and Wali Armstead, claiming he contributed to their damages; Armstead was not served in this specific lawsuit.
- Randolph Harrill, the other passenger in the jeep, filed a separate lawsuit against Prudential and named Armstead as a defendant, and Armstead was served with that lawsuit.
- Prudential filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. and Mrs. Sands failed to provide an independent and disinterested witness as required by statute for their phantom vehicle UM claim.
- The trial judge granted Prudential’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. and Mrs. Sands’ UM claim.
- Mr. and Mrs. Sands appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a vehicle's driver, who is a named defendant in the lawsuit and a former employee of the injured party, automatically fail to qualify as an 'independent and disinterested witness' under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(f) to corroborate a phantom vehicle accident for uninsured motorist coverage?
Opinions:
Majority - Murray, Judge
No, a vehicle's driver, even if a named defendant in the lawsuit and a former employee of the injured party, does not automatically fail to qualify as an 'independent and disinterested' witness under La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(f). The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo and determined that Prudential's assertions that Armstead was not disinterested, had a motive to shift blame, and was biased were merely conclusory statements, lacking a sufficient factual basis. La.R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(f) requires an 'independent and disinterested witness' for phantom vehicle claims where no physical contact occurred. The court adopted ordinary dictionary definitions for 'independent' (not influenced or controlled by others) and 'disinterested' (unbiased by personal interest or advantage). While Armstead was named as a defendant in the Sands' lawsuit (though unserved) and was served in a separate lawsuit filed by the other passenger, Harrill, and had formerly worked for Sands, Prudential failed to provide concrete evidence that Armstead had an actual interest or stake in the specific outcome of this litigation or stood to gain from the existence of a phantom vehicle. The court distinguished previous cases based on the specifics of witness interest (e.g., a child with a direct financial claim in Stracener) and clarified when a witness's interest is assessed (e.g., at the time of deposition as in Cox versus trial testimony as in O'Boyle). Concluding that Armstead appeared disinterested because Prudential did not demonstrate an actual stake, and independent because he was unrelated by blood or affinity and his former employment was deemed insignificant, the court found that Armstead was not precluded, as a matter of law, from being an 'independent and disinterested' witness. The determination of his credibility was reserved for the trier of fact. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Analysis:
This case underscores the Louisiana legislature's intent to liberally construe uninsured motorist statutes to promote full recovery for innocent accident victims. It establishes a heightened standard for granting summary judgment in phantom vehicle UM claims, requiring insurers to present concrete, factual evidence of a witness's actual interest or bias rather than relying on mere assumptions or tangential connections like being a named defendant or former employee. The ruling emphasizes a nuanced, case-by-case analysis of witness independence and disinterest, thereby protecting plaintiffs from premature dismissal of legitimate claims and ensuring that the determination of witness credibility, a factual issue, remains within the purview of the trier of fact unless compelling evidence dictates otherwise. This approach limits insurers' ability to avoid liability based on speculative claims of witness bias.
