Sanders v. State
2013 WL 5394312, 2013 Ala. LEXIS 137, 145 So. 3d 92 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
When interpreting a criminal statute, courts must adhere to the plain meaning of the statutory language, and official commentary does not override the clear text of the statute, especially regarding what constitutes a "building" for burglary purposes based on its potential, rather than actual or intended, use.
Facts:
- On April 1, 2010, law-enforcement officers found Curtis Maurice Sanders taking items from a house located at 8413 5th Avenue North in Birmingham.
- The Birmingham Airport Authority (Authority) had acquired the house as a part of a federally funded noise-abatement program.
- Under the terms of that program, the Authority was given federal funds to purchase the house, demolish it, and then redevelop the land.
- Once acquired by the Authority for demolition, the house could no longer be used for "any ... normal purposes, like a residence."
- On the date of the offense, the structure was set for demolition by Britt Demolition, a contractor.
- Once a contractor was cleared to demolish a structure, the contractor or his employees could take scrap materials from the structure because it was "essentially ... theirs at that point."
- Lowrenzo Taylor, an Authority employee, testified that he did not know whether anyone, including the demolition company, had stored any property of value inside the structure.
Procedural Posture:
- Curtis Maurice Sanders was indicted for third-degree burglary under § 13A-7-7(a), Ala.Code 1975.
- Sanders filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment in the trial court, arguing that the structure he had entered was not a "building" as defined in § 13A-7-1(2).
- The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and subsequently denied Sanders's motion to dismiss the indictment.
- Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, Sanders entered a plea of guilty to third-degree burglary, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.
- The trial court sentenced Sanders, as a habitual offender, to two years in prison, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation.
- Sanders appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the house, which was scheduled for demolition, was not a "building" as defined by statute.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Sanders, reasoning that the structure could not have been legally utilized for the statutory purposes, reversed the trial court's judgment, and rendered a judgment in favor of Sanders as to the conviction for third-degree burglary.
- The State of Alabama petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision.
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Issue:
Does an unoccupied house scheduled for demolition, which an owner cannot legally use for certain purposes, still constitute a "building" under Alabama Code § 13A-7-1(2) for purposes of third-degree burglary, where the statute defines a building as any structure that may be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging, or the storage of goods?
Opinions:
Majority - Wise, Justice
Yes, an unoccupied house scheduled for demolition, even if the owner cannot legally use it for specific purposes, still constitutes a "building" under Alabama Code § 13A-7-1(2) for third-degree burglary purposes. Justice Wise, writing for the majority, emphasized the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, stating that the Court must look to the "natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning" of the words. Section 13A-7-1(2) defines a "building" as "[a]ny structure which may be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging or the storage of goods." The Court found that a house, by its inherent nature, is a structure that may be used for these purposes. The statute's use of "may be" focuses on the potential for use, not the actual or intended use by the owner, nor any legal restrictions placed upon the owner. The Court rejected the Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on the Commentary to § 13A-7-1, which stated that the definition does not include "an abandoned building awaiting demolition," citing Hiler v. State, 44 So.3d 543 (Ala.2009). Following Hiler, the Court reiterated that commentary does not override the plain language of an unambiguous statute. Since the statute itself does not include an exception for abandoned buildings awaiting demolition, the Court would not read such an exception into the law. The majority reasoned that the house, even if awaiting demolition, could still be used by the demolition company for business purposes or storage of goods, thus falling within the statutory definition.
Dissenting - Moore, C.J.
Moore, C.J., dissented from the majority opinion. No reasoning for the dissent was provided in the text of the case.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of strict statutory construction in Alabama, particularly that judicial reliance on official commentary to alter the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute is impermissible. It clarifies that the definition of a "building" for burglary focuses on the structure's inherent potential for specified uses ("may be utilized") rather than its current occupancy, the owner's specific intent, or any contractual restrictions. This ruling broadens the scope of structures covered by burglary statutes, potentially affecting cases involving derelict properties, unoccupied commercial spaces, or structures undergoing renovation, by emphasizing structural capacity over present functional status.
