Sanders v. Gore
676 So.2d 866, 1996 WL 382263 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A promise to marry made by a person who is already married is unenforceable as it violates public policy, which seeks to protect the institution of marriage. Consequently, no cause of action for breach of such a promise will be recognized, regardless of whether the claim is styled in contract, tort, or detrimental reliance.
Facts:
- In March 1990, Brenda Sanders, who was married, hired Brent Gore, a married attorney, for a collection matter.
- The two began an adulterous affair in May 1990.
- Gore convinced Sanders he would divorce his wife and marry her, and persuaded Sanders to divorce her own husband.
- Represented by Gore, Sanders divorced her husband of twenty-one years in May 1992.
- On November 12, 1992, Gore presented Sanders with an engagement ring and formally proposed marriage, which she accepted.
- The affair continued until December 1993, when Gore informed Sanders that he was 'too weak' to leave his wife, would not marry her, and was ending their relationship.
Procedural Posture:
- Brenda Sanders filed suit against Brent Gore in a Louisiana trial court, seeking damages for breach of a promise to marry.
- Brent Gore responded by filing a peremptory exception of no cause of action, asking the court to dismiss the case.
- The trial court granted Gore's exception and dismissed Sanders' lawsuit.
- The trial court also denied Sanders' motion to amend her petition to add other claims.
- Sanders, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a person have a valid cause of action for breach of a promise to marry when the promisor was already married to another person at the time the promise was made?
Opinions:
Majority - Knoll, J.
No, a person does not have a valid cause of action for breach of promise to marry under these circumstances. A promise to marry by a person already married is unenforceable as against public policy. The contract is absolutely null because a primary cause—the dissolution of an existing marriage—is illicit and violates the public order which protects the institution of marriage and the spousal duties of fidelity and support. Because the underlying promise is void ab initio, all related claims, including fraud and detrimental reliance, must also fail as they cannot be based on an unlawful cause. The law will not provide a remedy for parties who knowingly engage in illicit conduct that defiles a marriage.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Yelverton, J.
No, the promise to marry is unenforceable against public policy. While modern law has made divorce easier and the concept of marriage's indissolubility has faded, the state's interest in protecting the institution of marriage from third-party contractual interference transcends an individual's freedom of contract. Although it is a debatable issue, public policy bars a cause of action for damages in this case. However, the dissent disagrees with sanctioning the plaintiff's attorney, arguing that filing the suit was not a sanctionable offense because it presented a res nova (new) legal question with good faith arguments on both sides.
Dissenting - Cooks, J.
Yes, a cause of action should be recognized. The majority's reliance on public policy is outdated, as the state no longer has a strong interest in forcing spouses to remain married, evidenced by the simplification of no-fault divorce laws. Permitting a married person to contract to marry another does not violate modern public policy. Furthermore, the petition stated facts sufficient to support other legally recognized claims, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend her petition to assert them.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a bright-line rule in Louisiana that contracts in derogation of marriage are void as a matter of public policy. It demonstrates that even with the advent of no-fault divorce, the judiciary will prioritize the protection of existing marital relationships over enforcing private agreements that undermine them. The ruling effectively bars recovery for any claims—whether in contract or tort—that arise from an adulterous affair predicated on a promise of future marriage. It sends a clear message that courts will not act as arbiters for promises made during illicit relationships, leaving the parties without legal recourse.
