Sanders v. Frank
2015 Ohio 3644 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Ohio's comparative fault statute, a plaintiff's implied assumption of a known risk is a form of 'contributory fault' that, if found to be greater than the defendant's negligence, will completely bar the plaintiff's recovery. The 'rescue doctrine' does not preclude this analysis unless the plaintiff is responding to an imminent peril, not merely a potential one.
Facts:
- Joseph D. Frank owned three horses which he kept in a fenced enclosure.
- On July 22, 2011, the three horses escaped from the enclosure and were running at large.
- The horses were seen crossing a public road and onto the property of a third party.
- Heather Sanders, who was experienced with horses and had previously helped corral Frank's horses, observed the situation and saw police officers on the scene.
- Sanders retrieved lead ropes and voluntarily went to assist the officers, who were unable to restrain the animals.
- While attempting to secure one of the horses, named 'Kush', Sanders sustained personal injuries.
- At the specific time of the injury, the horse was in a field next to the road, not on the roadway itself.
Procedural Posture:
- Heather Sanders and Shawn Sanders filed a Complaint against Joseph Frank in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, a trial court of first instance.
- The case, on the issue of liability only, was tried before a magistrate.
- The magistrate issued a decision finding Frank negligent but concluding that Sanders' recovery was barred because her contributory fault (implied assumption of the risk) was greater than 50%.
- Sanders filed Objections to the Magistrate's Decision.
- The Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas overruled the objections and adopted the magistrate's decision, entering judgment for Frank.
- Sanders, as Plaintiff-Appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Appellate District, with Frank as Defendant-Appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a plaintiff's implied assumption of the risk, when deemed to constitute more than fifty percent of the total fault, bar her recovery from a defendant who negligently violated a statutory duty to prevent his horses from running at large?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Diane V. Grendell
Yes, a plaintiff's implied assumption of the risk, when deemed greater than 50% of the fault, bars recovery. The statute prohibiting animals from running at large (R.C. Chapter 951) does not impose strict liability, meaning traditional negligence defenses like comparative fault are available. The court found that the 'rescue doctrine,' which can excuse a plaintiff's contributory fault, did not apply because there was no 'impending or imminent danger to human life.' The horse was in a field, not the roadway, at the time of injury, and the presence of officers mitigated the risk, making the danger potential rather than imminent. Therefore, Sanders voluntarily assumed a known risk, and the trial court's finding that her contributory fault was greater than Frank's negligence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, thus barring her recovery under Ohio's comparative fault statute.
Concurring - Judge Timothy P. Cannon
Yes, the judgment barring recovery is correct, but for partially different reasons. The majority's analysis of assumption of risk relies on case law predating statutory amendments that merged implied and even express assumption of risk into the definition of 'contributory fault.' The core of the analysis should focus on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct. In this case, the magistrate correctly determined that Sanders' assumption of a known risk was unreasonable under the circumstances and contributed more than 50% to her injuries. There was competent, credible evidence to support this factual determination, so the decision to bar her recovery should be affirmed.
Dissenting - Judge Colleen Mary O'Toole
No, the plaintiff's recovery should not be barred because the rescue doctrine applies. The majority's distinction between a horse in a field versus on a roadway is an arbitrary line that 'does not comport with reason,' as loose horses near a road present an inherent and imminent danger. The situation was an ongoing emergency, especially since the police officers on scene testified they were incapable of handling it without Sanders' specialized help. The correct legal standard is the rescuer's reasonable belief of continued peril, not the actual peril at the precise moment of injury. Public policy supports applying the rescue doctrine to encourage Good Samaritans; this decision will have a chilling effect and increase public risk in the future.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the intersection of Ohio's animal control statute, the rescue doctrine, and the state's comparative fault framework. It confirms that the 'running at large' statute is not one of strict liability, allowing defendants to raise affirmative defenses like assumption of risk. The court adopts a narrow interpretation of the 'imminent peril' requirement for the rescue doctrine, suggesting that a potential but not currently realized danger is insufficient to invoke its protection. This ruling may have a chilling effect on bystander intervention, as individuals who voluntarily assume risks to mitigate a hazard created by another's negligence may be found to bear the majority of legal fault for their own injuries.
