Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Supreme Court of Nevada
221 P.3d 1276 (2009)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A pharmacy owes no duty of care to unidentifiable third parties injured by a customer's use of lawfully prescribed and dispensed medication, and state pharmacy regulations are intended to protect the customer, not the general public, thus precluding a negligence per se claim by such third parties.

Facts:

From May 2002 to May 2003, Patricia Copening obtained approximately 4,500 hydrocodone pills from 13 different pharmacies.
In June 2003, a Prescription Controlled Substance Abuse Prevention Task Force sent a letter to the pharmacies that had dispensed prescriptions to Copening, informing them of her extensive prescription-filling activities.
After receiving the Task Force letter, the respondent pharmacies continued to fill prescriptions for controlled substances for Copening.
On June 4, 2004, while under the influence of controlled substances, Copening drove her vehicle and struck Gregory Sanchez, Jr., and Robert Martinez, who were on the side of a highway.
As a result of the collision, Sanchez died and Martinez sustained serious injuries.

Procedural Posture:

The families of Sanchez and Martinez (Appellants) filed a wrongful death and personal injury complaint in district court against Patricia Copening and others.
After discovery, Appellants were granted leave to file a second amended complaint, adding several pharmacies (Respondents) as defendants.
The pharmacies filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5), arguing they owed no duty of care to the Appellants.
The district court granted the pharmacies' motion to dismiss.
The district court certified its order as a final judgment under NRCP 54(b), allowing an immediate appeal.
The Appellants appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Nevada.

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Issue:

Does a pharmacy owe a duty of care to unidentified third parties who are injured by a customer driving under the influence of controlled substances that the pharmacy dispensed, particularly after the pharmacy was notified of the customer's potential drug abuse?

Opinions:

Majority - Hardesty, C.J.

No. A pharmacy does not owe a duty of care to unidentified third parties. The court reasoned that no special relationship exists between a pharmacy and an unidentified member of the general public. Citing persuasive authority from Florida, the court held that the appellants were anonymous members of the driving public, and imposing a duty would create an undefined 'zone of risk.' The court also rejected the negligence per se claim, concluding that Nevada's pharmacy statutes and regulations are intended to protect the pharmacy's customer, not the general public, from the type of harm sustained. Therefore, the appellants were not within the class of persons the statutes were designed to protect.

Dissenting - Cherry, J.

Yes. The pharmacies did owe a duty of care to the appellants. The dissent argued that the relationship between a pharmacist and a customer is a 'special relationship.' This relationship, combined with the actual notice provided by the Task Force letter about Copening's potential drug abuse, created a duty for the pharmacies to act. The dissent contended that it was foreseeable that dispensing such a large quantity of narcotics to a potential abuser could result in harm to others, such as through impaired driving. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the pharmacy statutes were intended to protect the public from the effects of prescription drug abuse, making the appellants part of the protected class and thus allowing a negligence per se claim.

Analysis:

This decision significantly limits the scope of a pharmacy's liability by refusing to extend its duty of care to the general public for harms caused by a customer's misuse of prescription drugs. It establishes that, in Nevada, the legal responsibility for such third-party harm rests with the driver and prescribing physician, not the dispensing pharmacist, even when the pharmacy has notice of potential abuse. This precedent insulates pharmacies from common-law negligence and negligence per se claims brought by non-customers, reinforcing the principle that a professional's duty is generally confined to their direct client or patient unless a more specific, identifiable victim is foreseeable.

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