San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee
483 U.S. 522 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
Congress may grant a private entity exclusive use of a word beyond traditional trademark protections without violating the First Amendment. A federally chartered private corporation is not a state actor subject to constitutional constraints unless it performs a function that is a traditional and exclusive government prerogative or the government exercises coercive power or significant encouragement over its actions.
Facts:
- San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), a non-profit corporation, was formed to organize a worldwide athletic competition called the 'Gay Olympic Games'.
- The planned event was modeled on the traditional Olympic Games, set to include a torch relay, opening ceremonies, and the awarding of gold, silver, and bronze medals.
- To fund the event, SFAA sold T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the title 'Gay Olympic Games'.
- The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 grants the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) the exclusive right to use the word 'Olympic' for certain commercial and promotional purposes.
- In late 1981, the USOC informed SFAA of the Act and requested that it cease using the word 'Olympic'.
- SFAA initially agreed to use 'Athletic' instead of 'Olympic' but resumed using the original term a month later.
Procedural Posture:
- The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) sued San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to enjoin SFAA's use of the word 'Olympic'.
- The District Court granted the USOC a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and ultimately, summary judgment and a permanent injunction.
- SFAA, as the appellant, appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with the USOC as the appellee.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the USOC.
- The SFAA's petition for rehearing en banc was denied by the Ninth Circuit.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted SFAA's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Amateur Sports Act's provision granting the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) exclusive use of the word 'Olympic' violate the First Amendment, and is the USOC a governmental actor subject to the Fifth Amendment's equal protection requirements when enforcing this right?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No, the provision does not violate the First Amendment, and no, the USOC is not a governmental actor. The Amateur Sports Act grants the USOC exclusive use of the word 'Olympic' without requiring proof of confusion, and this special protection is constitutionally permissible. Congress reasonably concluded that the word 'Olympic' acquired a secondary meaning through the USOC's efforts and that granting a limited property right in the word was necessary to protect the USOC's investment and promote amateur athletics. The statute's restrictions on commercial speech are valid, and any incidental burden on expressive speech is justified by the substantial governmental interest and is not broader than necessary. Furthermore, the USOC is not a governmental actor subject to the Fifth Amendment because coordinating amateur sports is not a traditional, exclusive government function, and there is no evidence that the government coerces or significantly encourages the USOC's enforcement decisions.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes, the Act's provision violates the First Amendment, and yes, the USOC is a governmental actor. The USOC performs a governmental function by representing the United States in the international community and exercises government-delegated power to coordinate national amateur sports. A 'symbiotic relationship' exists between the USOC and the federal government, making its actions governmental action subject to the Constitution. The Act's grant of power over the word 'Olympic' is unconstitutionally overbroad, as it restricts a substantial amount of noncommercial and political speech without the safeguards of traditional trademark law. By giving the USOC unfettered discretion to censor the use of a historically significant word, the Act violates the principles of free expression and is not content-neutral.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice O'Connor
No, the statute does not violate the First Amendment, but yes, the USOC's enforcement of its rights constitutes governmental action. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Act's grant of exclusive use of the word 'Olympic' is constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment. However, I agree with the dissent that the USOC and the United States are 'joint participants' in the challenged activity due to their symbiotic relationship. This joint participation makes the USOC subject to the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment, so the case should be remanded to evaluate the claim of discriminatory enforcement.
Analysis:
This decision significantly bolsters Congress's authority to grant rights in words that exceed traditional trademark protections, creating a form of 'super-trademark' for entities serving a public purpose. It also reinforces a narrow interpretation of the 'state action' doctrine, making it difficult to hold federally chartered private organizations accountable under the Constitution, even when they perform public-facing roles and receive governmental benefits. The ruling affirms that even expressive uses of a protected term can be restricted if they are part of a commercial or promotional endeavor that Congress has chosen to regulate to achieve a substantial governmental interest. This has implications for how other congressionally chartered organizations' intellectual property rights are balanced against First Amendment claims.
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