San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon
3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 (as a protected concerted activity) or § 8 (as an unfair labor practice) of the National Labor Relations Act, states and federal courts must defer to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, and state jurisdiction is preempted.
Facts:
- In March 1953, the San Diego Building Trades Council (the unions) sought an agreement from Garmon, a lumber dealer, to hire only union members or those who applied for membership within thirty days.
- Garmon refused the agreement, claiming none of his employees wished to join a union and no union had been designated as a collective bargaining agent.
- In response, the unions began to peacefully picket Garmon's place of business.
- The unions also exerted pressure on Garmon's customers and suppliers to persuade them to cease business with Garmon.
- The trial court found that the sole purpose of the unions' picketing and pressure was to compel Garmon to sign the proposed union shop contract.
Procedural Posture:
- Garmon initiated an action in the Superior Court of California (a state trial court) seeking an injunction and damages against the unions.
- The trial court granted the injunction and awarded Garmon $1,000 in damages.
- The unions, as appellants, appealed to the California Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- The unions petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the state could not grant an injunction but leaving the damages award open for reconsideration.
- On remand, the California Supreme Court set aside the injunction but sustained the award of damages.
- The unions again petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to decide the preemption question regarding the damages award.
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Issue:
Does the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempt a state court's jurisdiction to award damages for peaceful union conduct that is arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the Act, even when the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has declined to exercise jurisdiction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Frankfurter
Yes. The NLRA preempts a state court's jurisdiction to award damages for peaceful union conduct that is arguably subject to the Act. When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, states must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board to avoid state interference with national labor policy. Congress established a comprehensive regulatory scheme and entrusted its administration to the NLRB to ensure uniform application of its substantive rules. State jurisdiction is preempted not only when conduct is clearly protected or prohibited by the Act, but also when it is arguably so, because the initial determination must be made by the Board. This preemption applies regardless of whether the state seeks to provide a remedy through injunction or damages, as an award of damages is a potent form of regulation that can frustrate national purposes. An exception for matters 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility' exists for violent conduct, but this case involves peaceful activity and does not fall within that exception.
Concurring - Justice Harlan
Yes. The judgment should be reversed, but on narrower grounds than the majority provides. State action is precluded here only because the unions' conduct may fairly be considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act, requiring an initial determination by the NLRB. The majority's broad rule improperly departs from precedents like Laburnum and Russell, which allowed states to award damages for federally prohibited, non-protected conduct. Those cases were not limited to situations involving violence, but rather distinguished between state injunctions (preempted) and state damage awards for past tortious conduct (not preempted, as they don't conflict with the NLRB's primarily preventive powers). The majority's new rule will deeply curtail the ability of states to provide remedies for nonviolent tortious conduct and may leave injured parties with no forum for redress, especially when the Board declines jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the landmark 'Garmon preemption' doctrine, which significantly expanded the scope of federal preemption in labor law. By holding that states are divested of jurisdiction over conduct that is even 'arguably' protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the Court created a broad presumption in favor of the NLRB's exclusive primary jurisdiction. This rule centralizes power in the federal agency and aims to create a uniform national labor policy, but it also creates a potential 'no-man's land' where parties may be left without a remedy if the NLRB declines to assert jurisdiction over a dispute that state courts are now forbidden from hearing. The decision shifted the initial jurisdictional question away from the courts and firmly to the NLRB.
