Samuel I. PRATHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
1990 WL 175026, 918 F.2d 1255 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Racially motivated discharge from employment is post-contract formation conduct that is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.
Facts:
- Samuel I. Prather was an employee of Dayton Power & Light Company for several years.
- In September 1982, Dayton Power & Light terminated Prather's employment.
- Prather alleged his discharge was motivated by his race.
- Following his termination, Prather initiated a grievance process through collective bargaining arbitration.
- Prather also filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.
- Through the state commission's proceedings, Prather was ultimately reinstated to his job and received back pay.
Procedural Posture:
- In March 1985, Samuel I. Prather filed suit against Dayton Power & Light Company in federal court, alleging discriminatory discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
- Following a prior appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on a statute of limitations issue, the case was remanded to the trial court.
- The trial court granted Prather's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
- Before the trial on damages, Dayton Power & Light moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the intervening Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.
- A magistrate judge, presiding by consent of the parties, granted Dayton's motion for summary judgment.
- The magistrate judge then denied Prather's subsequent motion to amend his complaint.
- Prather (Appellant) appealed the grant of summary judgment and the denial of his motion to amend to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, with Dayton (Appellee) defending the lower court's rulings.
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Issue:
Does a claim for racially motivated discharge fall within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects the right to 'make and enforce' contracts, following the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union?
Opinions:
Majority - Kennedy, Circuit Judge
No. A claim for racially motivated discharge does not fall within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union explicitly limited the application of § 1981 to discrimination occurring during the formation of a contract or conduct that impairs the right to enforce a contract through the legal process. A discharge from employment is post-formation conduct that involves neither of these elements. The court reasoned that allowing § 1981 to cover discharges would create unnecessary overlap with Title VII, which is specifically designed to address such claims and has its own detailed procedural and remedial framework. Excluding discharge claims from § 1981 does not leave plaintiffs without a remedy, as shown by Prather himself, who obtained reinstatement and back pay through state civil rights proceedings analogous to Title VII.
Dissenting - Boggs, Circuit Judge
Yes. A claim for racially motivated discharge should fall within the scope of § 1981. The right to be free from discrimination in 'making' a contract is rendered meaningless if an employer can fire an employee for a discriminatory reason immediately after hiring them. A discriminatory discharge is fundamentally different from on-the-job harassment because it destroys the very existence of the contract. The dissent argues that Patterson's language was ambiguous on the issue of discharge and that prior Supreme Court precedent had long permitted such claims under § 1981. Being cast into unemployment is a far more drastic 'new and distinct relation' than the failure to receive a promotion, which Patterson suggested could be actionable, making it illogical to exclude discriminatory termination from § 1981's protection.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 within the Sixth Circuit, aligning with the judicial trend following Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. By removing racially discriminatory discharge as a cause of action under § 1981, the court forced plaintiffs to rely solely on Title VII, which at the time offered more limited remedies (e.g., no punitive damages) and required exhaustion of administrative procedures. The legal landscape created by this and similar circuit court decisions was a primary motivation for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which legislatively overturned Patterson by explicitly defining the right to 'make and enforce contracts' to include the 'enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship,' including termination.
