Sammons v. Doctors for Emergency Services, P.A.
913 A.2d 519, 2006 WL 3513947 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it precludes an expert from testifying on a subject that was not disclosed in pretrial discovery responses in accordance with the court's scheduling order. Disclosing a new opinion for the first time during a deposition after the expert disclosure deadline does not cure the failure to properly supplement discovery.
Facts:
- Gail Sammons, a 41-year-old who suffered from sickle cell disease, went to the St. Francis emergency room on January 3, 2002, complaining of pain.
- In the early morning of January 4, 2002, hospital staff treated Gail with pain medication and IV fluids, then released her with instructions to follow up with her doctor.
- Later that day, an ambulance took Gail to Wilmington Hospital, where Dr. Rosenbaum of Doctors for Emergency Services (DFES) examined her and diagnosed a sickle cell crisis.
- Residents from Family Practice Associates, Gail's primary care physicians, were contacted to admit her to the hospital.
- A Family Practice physician approved her admittance, and a resident signed the admitting order at approximately 6:30 p.m. with a diagnosis of painful sickle cell crisis.
- Gail was transferred from the emergency department to a hospital floor at approximately 10:45 p.m.
- Shortly after, her condition deteriorated, and she was found unresponsive around 12:00 a.m. on January 5, 2002.
- Gail Sammons was pronounced dead at 1:25 a.m.
Procedural Posture:
- Elizabeth Sammons, as administratrix of Gail Sammons's estate, filed a medical malpractice action in Superior Court against various physicians and their employers, including Doctors for Emergency Services (DFES), Dr. Sobel, and Family Practice Associates.
- Before trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine to preclude Sammons's expert, Dr. Bridges, from testifying about causation and sepsis, as these opinions were not in his initial disclosure.
- Sammons filed a motion in limine to prevent DFES from calling Dr. Zenilman, an expert originally designated by a co-defendant who had been dismissed from the case.
- The trial judge granted the motion to limit Dr. Bridges's testimony but denied the motion to exclude Dr. Zenilman.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants.
- After the verdict, the trial judge, on her own initiative (sua sponte), found Sammons's initial affidavit of merit to be deficient and entered an order dismissing the claim against DFES.
- Sammons appealed the various pretrial and trial evidentiary rulings, as well as the post-verdict dismissal, to the Delaware Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a trial judge abuse their discretion by precluding a plaintiff's expert from testifying on causation and failure to diagnose sepsis due to untimely disclosure, while permitting a defendant to adopt an expert originally designated by a co-defendant who was later dismissed?
Opinions:
Majority - Steele, Chief Justice
No, a trial judge does not abuse their discretion under these circumstances. The trial court acted within its discretion by precluding the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Bridges, from testifying about causation and sepsis because the plaintiff failed to disclose this opinion by the deadline in the court's scheduling order. Revealing this new opinion for the first time during a deposition after the deadline was an improper attempt to circumvent discovery rules, which would 'wreak havoc on the orderly development of expert's opinions.' The defendants were entitled to rely on the plaintiff's formal discovery responses and were prejudiced by the lack of notice. Conversely, allowing the defendant's expert, Dr. Zenilman, to testify was not an abuse of discretion because his opinions had been timely disclosed by a co-defendant, the plaintiff had ample notice of his testimony, and the adopting defendant had reserved the right to use other parties' experts. The plaintiff was not unfairly prejudiced, as she had the opportunity to depose the expert but chose to cancel the deposition.
Analysis:
This decision strongly affirms the authority of trial courts to enforce pretrial scheduling orders and discovery rules to ensure fairness and prevent 'trial by ambush.' It clarifies that a party cannot cure a failure to properly disclose the substance of an expert's opinion by simply revealing it for the first time in a deposition after the court-ordered deadline. The case serves as a critical procedural lesson for litigators on the importance of timely and thorough expert disclosures. The ruling also provides practical guidance on the permissibility of 'adopting' experts from other parties in multi-defendant litigation, conditioning it on adequate notice and the absence of unfair prejudice.
