Salter v. Hamiter
887 So. 2d 230, 2004 Ala. LEXIS 31, 2004 WL 318483 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A deed is validly delivered when the grantor physically transfers the instrument to the grantee with the clear, present intent to divest themself of title. A grantor's request to delay recordation and their continued permissive use of the property does not invalidate the conveyance, and their recognition of the grantee's ownership will defeat a defense based on the rule of repose.
Facts:
- Frank T. Salter and Mary Ellen Knowles were longtime business associates and friends, starting in the early 1960s.
- In October 1966, Knowles gave Salter power of attorney over her assets, and in March 1967, she executed a will leaving her entire estate to him.
- In November 1967, Knowles executed three warranty deeds to convey approximately 1,000 acres of land in Conecuh and Covington Counties to Salter.
- Knowles consulted her attorney, stating her desire to transfer title to Salter and asking about the legal effect of not recording the deeds until after her death.
- A few months later, while in the hospital, Knowles summoned her attorney and Salter to witness her physically handing the deeds to Salter to ensure a 'good delivery.'
- At that time, Knowles requested that Salter not record the deeds until after her death.
- For the next 33 years, Salter retained exclusive possession of the deeds, managed the timber property, and held keys to the gates.
- During this period, Knowles continued to live on the property and conducted several transactions, including selling timber and leasing mineral rights, but did so with Salter's knowledge and consent, often stating she would not act without his approval.
Procedural Posture:
- The representatives of Mary Ellen Knowles's estate, Harold Hamiter and Gillis Ralls, filed an action against Frank T. Salter in a state trial court.
- The estate sought a declaratory judgment to void three warranty deeds from Knowles to Salter.
- The complaint alleged that the deeds were improperly delivered, were an invalid attempt to create a will, and were barred by the doctrines of laches and the rule of repose.
- After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment declaring all three deeds void.
- The trial court found that the deeds were intended to be the equivalent of a will and that there was no intent by Knowles to vest title in Salter at the time of the purported delivery.
- Salter, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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Issue:
Does a grantor's physical delivery of deeds to a grantee, with the expressed intent to immediately pass title, constitute a valid and irrevocable conveyance even if the grantor requests the grantee not to record the deeds until after her death and continues to exercise some control over the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Lyons, Justice
Yes. A grantor's physical delivery of deeds with the expressed intent to immediately pass title constitutes a valid conveyance. The court determined the controlling question is whether the grantor intended any estate or interest to vest before death. Here, the language of the deeds ('grant, bargain, sell, and convey') unambiguously showed a present intent to convey title, making them deeds, not a failed will. The undisputed evidence of Knowles physically handing the deeds to Salter in her attorney's presence to ensure a 'good delivery' established her intent to divest herself of title and dominion over the property. Salter's acceptance is presumed because the deeds were beneficial to him, and his delay in recording was merely honoring Knowles's request, not a condition of the conveyance, and does not invalidate the deed as between the original parties. Finally, the rule of repose was defeated because Knowles's possession was not adverse; she was effectively a tenant of the grantee, and undisputed testimony showed she consistently recognized Salter's superior title, which stays the running of the prescriptive period.
Analysis:
This case provides a crucial clarification on the legal requirements for the delivery of a deed, emphasizing that the grantor's present intent at the moment of transfer is the dispositive factor. It establishes that a request to delay recording does not create a condition precedent or render the conveyance testamentary, thereby protecting the grantee's title. Furthermore, the decision distinguishes the rule of repose from adverse possession in the context of a grantor retaining possession, holding that the grantor's subsequent recognition of the grantee's title tolls the 20-year prescriptive period. This precedent solidifies the grantee's position in situations of delayed recording and permissive use by the grantor.
