Salomon Ledezma-Cosino v. Jefferson Sessions
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9361, 2017 WL 2324717, 857 F.3d 1042 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
The provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that statutorily bars "habitual drunkards" from establishing good moral character, and thus makes them ineligible for cancellation of removal, is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Facts:
- Salomon Ledezma-Cosino, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without authorization in 1987.
- On May 7, 2008, police in Carlsbad, California, arrested Ledezma-Cosino for driving under the influence of intoxicants and driving with a suspended license, which led to a conviction.
- During medical treatment in 2010, doctors recorded that Ledezma-Cosino had a 'more than ten year history of heavy alcohol abuse.'
- Medical records indicated that during this period, he drank an average of one liter of tequila per day.
- During his removal proceedings, Ledezma-Cosino's daughter testified that he had 'a drinking problem' and his liver had failed because of '[t]oo much alcohol.'
Procedural Posture:
- The Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear, initiating removal proceedings against Salomon Ledezma-Cosino in an immigration court.
- Before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Ledezma-Cosino conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal.
- The IJ denied the application, finding Ledezma-Cosino was a 'habitual drunkard' and thus statutorily ineligible for relief due to a lack of good moral character.
- Ledezma-Cosino, as appellant, appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
- The BIA, as appellee, affirmed the IJ's decision on the 'habitual drunkard' ground and dismissed the appeal.
- Ledezma-Cosino, as petitioner, filed a petition for review of the BIA's final order with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the 'habitual drunkard' provision violated equal protection principles.
- The Ninth Circuit subsequently voted to rehear the case en banc, and the three-judge panel's opinion was vacated.
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Issue:
Does the Immigration and Nationality Act provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1), which defines a 'habitual drunkard' as a person lacking good moral character and thus ineligible for cancellation of removal, violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Graber, J.
No, the statutory provision does not violate equal protection principles. The law is subject to rational basis review because it does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. Congress could have rationally concluded that denying cancellation of removal to individuals who regularly drink to excess furthers the legitimate governmental interest in public safety. The constitutional inquiry focuses on the rationality of the congressional action—denying relief—not on whether the label 'good moral character' is an accurate or fair description. The court also held that the term 'habitual drunkard' is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ledezma-Cosino's conduct.
Dissenting - Thomas, C.J.
The court should not reach the constitutional questions because the case can be resolved on statutory grounds. The term 'habitual drunkard' is not synonymous with 'alcoholic.' Proper statutory construction, considering the term's context within a list of acts causing public harm, indicates it should apply only to individuals whose alcohol abuse causes harm to others or the community, not merely to someone with the medical diagnosis of alcoholism. The BIA erred by equating the two, and the case should be remanded for the agency to apply the correct legal standard, which would require a finding of public harm beyond the diagnosis itself.
Concurring - Kozinski, J.
Yes, the petition should be denied, but the majority applied the wrong, insufficiently deferential standard of review. Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress's authority over immigration is nearly absolute, and its rules for aliens are subject to a standard even more deferential than rational basis, requiring only a 'facially legitimate' reason. Courts have no business applying domestic equal protection law to political judgments made in the sphere of foreign relations and immigration. Under this highly deferential standard, the law is clearly valid.
Concurring - Watford, J.
Yes, the petition should be denied because the provision survives rational basis review. The proper inquiry is whether Congress had a rational basis for establishing a conclusive presumption that habitual drunkards lack good moral character. Congress could rationally conclude that most habitual drunkards lack good moral character, as the condition is acquired through frequent, repetitive acts of excessive drinking, which can be viewed as volitional and thus morally blameworthy. Creating a conclusive presumption is a rational means of avoiding the administrative costs of individualized determinations.
Analysis:
This en banc decision solidifies the application of a highly deferential rational basis review to immigration classifications that do not involve suspect classes. It affirms Congress's broad authority to define moral character for immigration purposes, even using archaic, morally-laden terms that may conflict with modern medical understanding of conditions like alcoholism. The decision also highlights the ongoing debate within the circuit regarding the appropriate standard of review for immigration laws, contrasting the majority's use of the standard rational basis test with the concurrences' arguments for an even more deferential 'plenary power' standard. This holding makes it significantly more difficult to challenge such statutory bars to immigration relief on equal protection grounds.
