Salmon v. Blesser
802 F.3d 249, 2015 WL 5254851 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
An order to depart a public place does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. However, when an officer uses physical force to intentionally restrain a person and control their movements to effect that departure, even briefly, a seizure has occurred which must be reasonable.
Facts:
- On September 1, 2010, Oliver Salmon accompanied his attorney to the Albany City Court to examine a court file.
- Because only lawyers were permitted in the clerk's office, Salmon waited in a public area outside the office.
- While Salmon was waiting, Police Officer Thomas Blesser approached and ordered persons in the area to leave.
- Salmon explained that he was waiting for his attorney and offered to summon his counsel to confirm this.
- Blesser allegedly became enraged, grabbed Salmon by the collar, violently twisted his arm up behind his back, and began shoving him toward the door.
- When Salmon complained that Blesser was hurting him, Blesser twisted Salmon’s arm further.
- Blesser then physically threw Salmon out the door and threatened him with arrest if he reentered the building.
- Salmon asserts that these actions caused him permanent physical injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Oliver Salmon sued Police Officer Thomas Blesser and others in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- The district court granted the motion, dismissing Salmon's complaint in its entirety.
- Specifically, the district court ruled that no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred, relying on prior case law involving a person being escorted from a courthouse.
- The district court gave Salmon 14 days to file an amended complaint, but he declined to do so.
- Salmon (appellant) then appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims against Officer Blesser (appellee) to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the use of physical force by a police officer to intentionally restrain a person and control their movements while ejecting them from a public building constitute a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Reena Raggi
Yes, the use of physical force by a police officer to intentionally restrain a person and control their movements while ejecting them from a public building constitutes a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment. The court distinguished this case from precedent like Sheppard v. Beerman, which held that merely ordering or escorting someone out of a courthouse is not a seizure because the person remains free to go elsewhere. Here, the key distinction is the method of removal. The court reasoned that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer restrains a citizen's liberty through the 'application of physical force to restrain movement,' as defined in California v. Hodari D. By allegedly grabbing Salmon by the collar, twisting his arm, and controlling his movements, Blesser transformed the encounter into a detention. This intentional restraint, however brief, qualifies as a seizure, regardless of the ultimate purpose being departure rather than arrest. While not all physical contact constitutes a seizure, sufficient force used to gain control of a person's movements does.
Analysis:
This decision refines the legal standard for what constitutes a 'seizure' in the context of 'move-on' orders. It clarifies that while a verbal order to leave a public space is not a seizure, the analysis changes when physical force is applied. The ruling establishes that the method of removal is a critical factor, creating a distinction between non-seizure actions like escorting someone and seizure-actions involving physical restraint and control. This precedent provides a clearer basis for plaintiffs to bring Fourth Amendment excessive force claims arising from ejections from public property, as it helps them satisfy the prerequisite element of a seizure.
