Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Construction, Inc.
2009 Fla. LEXIS 147, 3 So.3d 1078, 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 106 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Florida Statutes §§ 768.041(3) and 90.408 unambiguously prohibit the admission of evidence of settlement or dismissal of a defendant at trial for any purpose, including to impeach a witness's testimony, and violation of this prohibition constitutes reversible error.
Facts:
- In December 1999, Albert Saleeby was injured and rendered paraplegic when roof trusses collapsed at a construction site where he was working.
- Saleeby collected workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Labor for Hire.
- Saleeby subsequently filed a negligence action against Rocky Elson Construction Co. (Elson), the construction company that installed the trusses, and A-1 Roof Trusses Ltd. (A-1), the company that manufactured them.
- A-1's president, John Herring, was deposed regarding his review of the jobsite and his opinion on the cause of the truss collapse.
- A-1 later settled with Saleeby and was dismissed as a party defendant from the lawsuit.
- Saleeby called John Herring as a witness during the trial against Elson, and Herring testified that the truss collapse resulted from Elson's faulty installation, not a manufacturing defect.
Procedural Posture:
- Albert Saleeby filed a negligence action against Rocky Elson Construction Co. (Elson) and A-1 Roof Trusses Ltd. (A-1) in the trial court.
- A-1 settled with Saleeby and was dismissed as a defendant.
- Saleeby filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of A-1's prior status and settlement, which the trial court initially granted via an "Agreed Order."
- The trial court later granted Elson's motion, allowing impeachment of John Herring with evidence that A-1 had been a defendant and settled with Saleeby.
- A jury found Elson immune from liability under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.
- Saleeby appealed the trial court's judgment to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
- The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting the settlement evidence.
- Saleeby petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for review, alleging express and direct conflict with Ellis v. Weisbrot, a decision by the Third District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does evidence that a defendant previously settled out of a lawsuit and was dismissed from the case, or evidence of the settlement itself, remain admissible to impeach a witness's testimony, despite statutory prohibitions against disclosing such information to the jury?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
No, evidence of settlement or dismissal of a defendant is not admissible to impeach a witness's testimony because Florida statutes 768.041(3) and 90.408 contain unambiguous language prohibiting such disclosure to the jury without exception. The court emphasizes that legislative intent, as gleaned from the plain language of the statutes, is paramount. Section 768.041(3) clearly states that the fact of a release, covenant not to sue, or dismissal of a defendant "shall not be made known to the jury." Similarly, section 90.408 makes evidence of compromise offers inadmissible "to prove liability or absence of liability for the claim or its value." These statutes promote Florida's public policy favoring settlement by preventing the prejudicial effect of such evidence on a jury, as juries tend to infer liability where settlement has occurred (citing City of Coral Gables v. Jordan). The court explicitly rejects the Fourth District's and dissent's interpretation that Dosdourian v. Carsten created an exception for impeachment purposes. Dosdourian addressed "Mary Carter Agreements" where a settling defendant remained in the litigation, a situation the court subsequently prohibited prospectively due to concerns about fraud and unethical conduct. Since A-1 was dismissed and did not continue to participate as a defendant, the concerns of Dosdourian were not present, and the case falls squarely within the prohibitions of sections 768.041 and 90.408. The court also rejects the argument that Saleeby waived his objection or that an exception exists for expert witnesses, reaffirming that the statutes prohibit any disclosure of these facts to the jury.
Dissenting - CANADY, J.
Yes, evidence concerning a witness's prior status as a party defendant, though not the settlement itself, should be admissible to show bias for impeachment purposes, and any error in admitting the settlement evidence was harmless. Justice Canady argues that section 90.608(2), which expressly authorizes showing witness bias, should not be trumped by section 768.041(3). While acknowledging Dosdourian dealt with a different fact pattern, he believes it established that the exclusion rule in 768.041(3) is not absolute. He contends that Herring's prior status as president of a defendant company (A-1) that was initially sued and deposed as such was highly probative of his credibility, as his original opinion on causation would have been motivated to shift blame away from A-1. The plaintiff, by choosing Herring as an expert, created the situation where a choice between the statutes was required, and the need to expose bias should prevail. However, Canady, J. agrees with the majority that the fact of settlement itself is not relevant to bias, as an inference of bias from simply paying money to the plaintiff is irrational. He would apply a harmless error analysis to the admission of settlement evidence, citing BCK Land, Inc. v. Cook, arguing that Saleeby failed to show Elson's conduct met the "substantially certain to result in injury" standard for the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation immunity, making any error non-prejudicial.
Dissenting - POLSTON, J.
Yes, sections 90.408 and 768.041 do not prohibit the admission of evidence of settlement or dismissal of a defendant when such evidence is offered to demonstrate that a witness is biased or prejudiced. Justice Polston cites Professor Ehrhardt's Florida Evidence treatise, which asserts that settlement evidence is admissible to impeach a witness for bias or prejudice, and that Dosdourian v. Carsten implicitly overruled prior strict interpretations of 768.041(3). He emphasizes the plain language of section 90.408, which limits its prohibition to evidence offered "to prove liability or absence of liability for the claim or its value," implying admissibility for other purposes, such as bias, consistent with Florida's Evidence Code (§ 90.107) and precedent (Breedlove v. State). He reiterates that Dosdourian expressly rejected a blanket prohibition under 768.041(3) when the evidence was offered to prove bias or prejudice, even though the factual scenario involved a settling defendant remaining in the litigation.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the strict interpretation of Florida Statutes §§ 768.041(3) and 90.408, establishing a bright-line rule that evidence of settlement or dismissal of a defendant is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. The Florida Supreme Court definitively closed the door on exceptions previously argued or implied by lower courts, particularly distinguishing and limiting its prior Dosdourian decision solely to "Mary Carter" agreements involving settling defendants who remain in litigation. The ruling emphasizes the public policy of encouraging settlements by protecting parties from the prejudicial impact of such disclosures at trial, preventing juries from inferring liability from settlement.
