Salazar v. Buono
176 L. Ed. 2d 634, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3674, 559 U.S. 700 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A court must consider changed circumstances, such as a congressional land-transfer statute, before enjoining government action intended to remedy a prior Establishment Clause violation. A court errs by enjoining such a transfer based on the government's perceived evasive motive without first analyzing whether the transfer itself cures the original constitutional harm of perceived government endorsement.
Facts:
- In 1934, members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) placed a Latin cross on Sunrise Rock in the Mojave Desert to honor soldiers who died in World War I.
- Sunrise Rock is located on federal land, which later became part of the Mojave National Preserve administered by the National Park Service.
- Over the decades, the cross was replaced and repaired by private citizens, most recently in 1998 by Henry Sandoz.
- The site has been used as a gathering place for Easter services since it was first established.
- Frank Buono, a retired Park Service employee who regularly visits the Preserve, was offended by the presence of a religious symbol on federal land.
- After a court found the cross's presence on federal land unconstitutional, Congress enacted a statute directing the Secretary of the Interior to transfer the one-acre parcel of land containing the cross to the VFW.
- The land transfer was to be in exchange for a five-acre parcel owned by Henry Sandoz, located elsewhere in the Preserve.
- The statute included a provision that the land would revert to the government if it was not maintained as a memorial to World War I veterans.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Buono sued the government in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging an Establishment Clause violation.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Buono, finding the cross constituted impermissible government endorsement of religion and permanently enjoined the government from permitting its display (Buono I).
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision (Buono II).
- The government did not seek review from the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final.
- Buono returned to the District Court to challenge a new land-transfer statute, arguing it was an attempt to evade the injunction.
- The District Court agreed and issued a new injunction, permanently barring the government from implementing the land-transfer statute (Buono III).
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again affirmed the District Court.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment upholding the injunction against the land transfer.
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Issue:
Does a court-ordered injunction, which prohibits the government from permitting the display of a religious symbol on public land, justify enjoining a subsequent congressional act that transfers the land to a private party to preserve the symbol?
Opinions:
Plurality - Justice Kennedy
No. An injunction prohibiting the display of a religious symbol on public land does not automatically justify enjoining a subsequent congressional act to transfer that land to a private party. The District Court erred by failing to conduct the proper equitable analysis required for injunctive relief. Instead of considering the changed circumstances brought about by the land-transfer statute, the court focused improperly on Congress’s perceived motive to evade the prior injunction. The original constitutional harm was the perception of government endorsement due to the cross's presence on public land; the transfer to a private entity is a legislative judgment designed to remedy that specific harm. The court should have recognized Congress’s prerogative to resolve the dispute through a policy of accommodation for a symbol with complex historical and commemorative meaning, rather than dismissing the statute as an illicit evasion. The case is remanded for the District Court to conduct a proper, fact-sensitive inquiry and consider whether, in light of the transfer, prospective relief is still appropriate, and if so, whether less drastic remedies exist than invalidating the entire statute.
Concurring - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The District Court's injunction against the land transfer elevates form over substance. If the government could comply with the injunction by tearing down the cross, selling the land, and then allowing the private owner to immediately re-erect the cross, it is an 'empty ritual' to prohibit the government from simply selling the land with the cross on it. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows, and enjoining the more direct and practical solution is illogical.
Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment - Justice Alito
No. The land transfer is a constitutionally permissible solution, and the case should be resolved without a remand. Congress faced a delicate problem and devised a practical accommodation that respects both the monument's historical significance and Establishment Clause concerns. A 'reasonable observer,' aware of the full history and the fact that the land would become private, would not perceive government endorsement of religion. Instead, they would understand the transfer as an effort to preserve a historic war memorial while eliminating government ownership, which was the basis of the original constitutional challenge.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Scalia
No. The court should not have reached the merits because the respondent, Frank Buono, lacks Article III standing to challenge the land transfer. Buono's original injury was the presence of a cross on public land, and he explicitly stated he had no objection to religious symbols on private property. Because the land transfer would remedy his only alleged injury, he cannot demonstrate any new, concrete harm that would give him standing to seek an expanded injunction against the transfer.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The District Court correctly enjoined the land transfer because it was an attempt to perpetuate an established Establishment Clause violation. The transfer would not cure the government's endorsement of religion, as a reasonable observer would see it as a sham engineered to keep the cross in place. The government's actions—designating the cross a national memorial, fighting its removal, and transferring the land specifically to preserve it while retaining a reversionary interest—solidify the perception of endorsement. A Latin cross is an inherently sectarian symbol, and making it a war memorial does not render it secular; it renders the war memorial sectarian.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. The case should be decided on the narrow grounds of the law of injunctions, not the Establishment Clause. A district court has considerable discretion to interpret and enforce its own orders. The District Court's finding that the land transfer, which was intended to ensure the cross's continued display, fell within the scope of its injunction against 'permitting the display' of the cross was a reasonable exercise of its discretion. The judgment should be affirmed on that basis alone.
Analysis:
This fractured decision highlights the Court's ongoing difficulty in applying Establishment Clause doctrine to historical religious displays. The plurality's approach favors accommodation and pragmatism, signaling deference to legislative solutions that attempt to resolve conflicts over such symbols. By focusing on the procedural posture and the remedial scope of the injunction, the Court avoided a direct ruling on the constitutionality of the land transfer itself. This leaves the 'endorsement test' intact but suggests that lower courts must apply it with more sensitivity to historical context and the complex, non-religious meanings a symbol may acquire over time, potentially making it harder to remove long-standing public religious displays.
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