Safeco Insurance Co. v. Mobile Power and Light Co.
810 So.2d 756 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
Expert testimony presenting multiple plausible but unsubstantiated causes for an injury is considered speculative and is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply where the defendant lacked exclusive control over the instrumentality due to a significant lapse of time and intervening work by a third party.
Facts:
- In 1994, a fire damaged the home of Audrey and Brenda Loyd.
- Following the 1994 fire, the Loyds hired Mobile Power and Light Company, Inc. to repair their electrical system.
- Mobile Power completed its work in December 1994, and the work passed all required inspections by the Mobile County Building Inspection Department.
- Mobile Power performed no further work on the Loyds' home after December 1994.
- In early 1996, a second fire occurred in the Loyds' electrical panel box.
- An unidentified third party, not Mobile Power, performed repairs on the electrical system after the second fire.
- On August 20, 1996, approximately two years after Mobile Power's work, a third fire destroyed the Loyds' home.
- An expert hired by Safeco Insurance Company identified three potential causes for the third fire: improper lug torque during installation, mechanical failure of a lug, or thermal shrinkage of a conductor.
Procedural Posture:
- Safeco Insurance Company, as subrogee for the Loyds, sued Mobile Power and Light Company, Inc. in an Alabama trial court for negligence.
- Mobile Power moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mobile Power.
- Safeco, as the appellant, appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment.
- Mobile Power, as petitioner, was granted certiorari review by the Supreme Court of Alabama.
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Issue:
Does an expert's testimony presenting three possible causes for a fire, only one of which is attributable to the defendant's alleged negligence, create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment when no evidence indicates that the defendant's conduct was the more probable cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Moore
No. Expert testimony that is merely speculative about the cause of an injury is not substantial evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Safeco's expert, Casellas, offered three possible causes for the fire but presented no evidence to show that the one potentially attributable to Mobile Power (improper lug torque) was any more probable than the other two causes (mechanical failure or thermal shrinkage), for which Mobile Power was not responsible. Such testimony amounts to mere conjecture. Furthermore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable because Mobile Power did not have the required exclusive management and control of the instrumentality; nearly two years had passed since its work, and, critically, an unidentified third party had performed intervening repairs on the electrical panel box after a second fire.
Concurring - Justice Lyons
No. The only potential basis for holding Mobile Power liable would be the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, Safeco cannot prove the essential element of 'full management and control' of the instrumentality that caused the damage. The subsequent events, specifically the intervening repairs performed by another party after the second fire, prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur, making summary judgment for Mobile Power appropriate.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high bar for plaintiffs in negligence cases to survive summary judgment based on circumstantial evidence. It clarifies that expert testimony on causation must be more than speculative; it must provide a logical basis for a fact-finder to conclude that the defendant's negligence was the probable, not just possible, cause. The case also strictly construes the 'exclusive control' element of res ipsa loquitur, demonstrating that a significant time lapse and intervening work by a third party will defeat the application of the doctrine.
