S.B. v. A.C.C.
28 N.Y.3d 1, 61 N.E.3d 488 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing to seek custody or visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70 (a) if they prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the child together. Alternatively, a biological parent may be judicially estopped from denying a partner’s parental standing if they previously asserted that partner’s parentage to secure a favorable judgment in a support proceeding.
Facts:
- In 2006, Petitioner Brooke S.B. and Respondent Elizabeth A.C.C. began a relationship and became engaged in 2007, though same-sex marriage was not yet legal in New York.
- The couple jointly decided to have a child, agreeing that Elizabeth would carry the child, and in 2008, Elizabeth became pregnant through artificial insemination.
- During Elizabeth's pregnancy and after the child's birth in June 2009, Brooke was actively involved in care, cut the umbilical cord, and the child was given Brooke's last name.
- Brooke and Elizabeth lived together with the child, jointly raising him and sharing parental responsibilities, with Brooke staying home for a year and the child referring to Brooke as "Mama B."
- Brooke and Elizabeth ended their relationship in 2010, after which Elizabeth initially permitted Brooke regular visits with the child, but in late 2012, their relationship deteriorated.
- Around July 2013, Elizabeth effectively terminated Brooke's contact with the child.
- In 2003, Petitioner Estrellita A. and Respondent Jennifer L.D. began a relationship and moved in together, later registering as domestic partners in 2007.
- The couple agreed to have a child, with Jennifer bearing the child and choosing a donor who shared Estrellita's ethnicity, leading to Jennifer becoming pregnant through artificial insemination in February 2008.
- During Jennifer's pregnancy, Estrellita attended medical appointments, cut the umbilical cord at the child's birth in November 2008, and the couple agreed the child would call Jennifer "Mommy" and Estrellita "Mama."
- The child resided with Estrellita and Jennifer for three years, during which they shared a complete range of parental responsibilities.
- In May 2012, Estrellita and Jennifer ended their relationship, with Estrellita moving out in September 2012, but Estrellita continued to have contact with the child.
Procedural Posture:
- In the Brooke S.B. case, Brooke S.B. commenced a proceeding in Family Court seeking joint custody of the child and regular visitation.
- Elizabeth A.C.C. moved to dismiss Brooke S.B.'s petition, asserting she lacked standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70 as interpreted by Alison D.
- Family Court dismissed the petition, noting it was constrained by Alison D.
- The attorney for the child appealed the Family Court's decision to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Family Court's dismissal.
- The attorney for the child was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
- In the Estrellita A. case, Jennifer L.D. commenced a proceeding in Family Court seeking child support from Estrellita A.
- Estrellita A. denied liability for child support.
- Family Court granted Jennifer L.D.'s child support petition, finding Estrellita A. to be a "parent" and remanding the matter to a support magistrate to determine the support obligation.
- Estrellita A. then filed, and later amended, a petition in Family Court seeking visitation, asserting she had been adjudicated a parent.
- Jennifer L.D. moved to dismiss Estrellita A.'s visitation petition, arguing Estrellita A. lacked standing under Alison D.
- Family Court denied Jennifer L.D.'s motion to dismiss the visitation petition, applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
- Jennifer L.D. filed an interlocutory appeal, which was dismissed by the Appellate Division.
- Family Court held a hearing on the visitation petition and found that regular visitation and consultation with Estrellita A. would serve the child’s best interests, granting visitation.
- Jennifer L.D. appealed this order to the Appellate Division, Second Department.
- The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Family Court's order, concluding that Jennifer L.D. was judicially estopped from denying Estrellita A.'s standing as a "parent."
- Jennifer L.D. was granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a non-biological, non-adoptive partner have standing as a "parent" under Domestic Relations Law § 70 to seek custody or visitation of a child conceived with the biological parent, when they agreed to conceive and raise the child together, or when the biological parent previously asserted their partner's parentage in a support proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Abdus-Salaam, J.
Yes, a non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing as a "parent" under Domestic Relations Law § 70 to seek custody or visitation if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive and raise the child together, or if the biological parent is judicially estopped from denying their parentage. The Court overrules Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. (1991), finding its restrictive definition of "parent" unworkable and inconsistent with contemporary familial relationships and more recently delineated legal principles, particularly the legalization of same-sex marriage through the Marriage Equality Act and Obergefell v Hodges. The Court notes that Alison D. created disparities between child support and custody contexts (e.g., Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D.) and caused disproportionate hardship for children in non-traditional families by severing strongly formed bonds. While affirming the fundamental rights of biological and adoptive parents, the Court clarifies that this case concerns who qualifies as a coequal parent, not an infringement by a third party. Therefore, the Court establishes a narrow test: standing is granted where a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that they and the biological parent agreed to conceive and raise the child as co-parents. This decision addresses only standing, with the ultimate custody/visitation determination resting on the child’s best interests. For Brooke S.B., the case is remitted to Family Court to apply this new test. For Estrellita A., the Court affirms the lower courts' recognition of standing based on judicial estoppel, as Jennifer L.D. had successfully argued Estrellita A. was a parent in a prior child support proceeding, precluding her from taking an inconsistent position.
Concurring - Pigott, J.
Justice Pigott concurs with the outcomes for both cases but disagrees with the majority's decision to overrule Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M. He argues that the definition of "parent" in Alison D. was consistent with legislative history and common law, and the legislature, despite multiple opportunities, has not amended Domestic Relations Law § 70 to expand this definition. He believes that such a significant change should come from legislative enactment rather than judicial reinterpretation. Justice Pigott acknowledges that the Marriage Equality Act and the Court's ruling in Matter of Jacob (allowing second-parent adoptions) have since removed the inequalities that previously barred same-sex couples from establishing legal parent-child relationships through marriage or adoption. Consequently, for children conceived after 2011, an unmarried individual lacking biological or adoptive ties should not have standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70. However, for cases like Brooke S.B., where the couples entered relationships and conceived children before same-sex marriage was legal in New York, he would grant standing based on "extraordinary circumstances," recognizing the historical inequality and the couples' mutual intent to raise the children, rather than crafting a new judicial definition of "parent." He agrees with the application of judicial estoppel for Estrellita A..
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally redefines parental standing in New York, moving beyond a rigid biological or adoptive definition towards a more equitable, intent-based standard. By overruling Alison D., the Court prioritizes established emotional bonds and agreed-upon parental roles, especially where conception was jointly planned, over strict biological ties. This ruling acknowledges the realities of modern family structures, ensuring that children raised by two committed parents, regardless of marital status or biological connection, have the opportunity for continued relationship with both, if deemed in their best interest. It also reinforces the principle of judicial estoppel, preventing parties from taking inconsistent legal positions to their advantage and promoting fairness in legal proceedings.
