Ryan v. Towar
55 L.R.A. 310, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner owes no duty of care to a trespassing child to keep the premises safe from dangerous conditions, and is liable only for injuries that are intentionally or wantonly inflicted. The doctrine of attractive nuisance, which would create a special duty for conditions that might attract children, is not recognized.
Facts:
- The Bice Manufacturing Company owned a defunct manufacturing plant which included a small pump-house on railroad property.
- The pump-house contained a small overshot water-wheel.
- A hole in the stone wall of the pump-house, apparently created by children, allowed access to the wheel inside.
- Children, including the plaintiff, a girl aged 12-13, habitually crossed the company's property as a shortcut.
- On the day of the incident, the plaintiff's brothers entered the pump-house and began playing on the water-wheel.
- The plaintiff's younger sister, aged 8, followed and became caught between the wheel and the wheel-pit.
- Upon hearing her sister's screams, the plaintiff entered the pump-house to rescue her and was herself injured in the process.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the Bice Manufacturing Company and two of its directors in a trial court for negligence.
- At trial, the judge directed a verdict in favor of the two directors, finding them not liable as a matter of law.
- The jury proceeded to find the Bice Manufacturing Company liable and rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the directors (appellees) to the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a landowner owe a duty of care to trespassing children to keep the premises safe from a dangerous condition, such as an unsecured water-wheel, that might attract them onto the property?
Opinions:
Majority - Hooker, J.
No, a landowner does not owe a duty of care to trespassing children to protect them from dangerous conditions on the property. The general common law rule, which limits a landowner's liability to trespassers to only wanton or intentional injuries, applies equally to children and adults. The court explicitly rejects the 'Turntable Cases' and the attractive nuisance doctrine, arguing that mere tolerance of trespassing does not constitute an invitation or license. To impose a duty of care towards child trespassers would unreasonably burden property owners and shift the fundamental duty of child supervision from parents to the public at large. The court concludes that the creation of such an exception to a long-standing property rights rule is a matter for the legislature, not the courts. As the company owed no duty to the plaintiff's sister (the original trespasser), it also owed no duty to the plaintiff as a rescuer.
Dissenting - Montgomery, C. J.
Yes, a landowner owes a duty of care in this situation. A property owner's rights are limited by the principle that one must not use their property in a way that is likely to injure another, which includes children acting on 'childish instincts.' Leaving a dangerous and tempting machine exposed where children are likely to encounter it is equivalent to an implied invitation. This position, often called the 'attractive nuisance' or 'turntable' doctrine, is a humane rule supported by the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States, including the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Railroad Co. v. Stout. The majority's holding ignores this precedent and adheres to a harsh, outdated rule that fails to protect vulnerable children from foreseeable harm.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant rejection of the then-emerging 'attractive nuisance' doctrine, placing Michigan in a minority of jurisdictions that adhered strictly to the traditional common law rule regarding trespassers. By refusing to create an exception for children, the court established a strong precedent prioritizing landowners' property rights over the special protection of children from foreseeable dangers. This bright-line rule simplifies liability analysis for property owners but offers less protection to child trespassers than the more widely adopted attractive nuisance framework, which considers foreseeability and the nature of the hazard. The case starkly illustrates the judicial tension between established property law and evolving tort principles aimed at protecting vulnerable populations.
