Russell v. United States
369 U.S. 749 (1962)
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Rule of Law:
An indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 for contempt of Congress is constitutionally insufficient if it fails to state the specific subject under congressional committee inquiry at the time the defendant refused to answer questions.
Facts:
- Several individuals, including Norton Anthony Russell and M. S. Price (the petitioners), were summoned to testify before subcommittees of either the House Committee on Un-American Activities or the Senate Judiciary Committee.
- During their respective hearings, the petitioners were asked a series of questions.
- The petitioners refused to answer the questions posed to them by the subcommittees.
- In at least one case (Price), the subcommittee members made meandering and contradictory statements about the subject of the inquiry, leaving the topic undefined at the time of questioning.
- The subject under inquiry was not clearly identified to the petitioners at the time they were compelled to testify.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners were indicted by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192.
- The petitioners filed motions to quash the indictments on the grounds that they failed to state the subject under congressional inquiry.
- The trial court denied the motions to quash.
- Following trials, each petitioner was convicted.
- The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where the petitioners were the appellants and the United States was the appellee.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed all the convictions.
- The petitioners filed petitions for writs of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which were granted.
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Issue:
Does a grand jury indictment for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which does not specify the subject matter of the congressional inquiry, fail to provide the accused with sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. An indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192 must identify the subject under congressional committee inquiry because this information is central to the crime and essential for apprising the defendant of the accusation against them. The core of criminality under the statute is the 'pertinency' of the question to the subject under inquiry. Without knowing the subject, a defendant cannot prepare a defense, and the court cannot determine if the facts alleged are legally sufficient to support a conviction. Simply repeating the generic language of the statute is insufficient. Furthermore, allowing a prosecutor to later define the subject via a bill of particulars would usurp the grand jury's essential function of finding all the facts necessary for the charge.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Douglas
Yes. While agreeing with the Court's reasoning on the indictment's insufficiency, the convictions should be reversed on the more fundamental ground that the underlying congressional investigations into the press were unconstitutional. The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of the press. Since a congressional investigation is an adjunct to the legislative process, Congress cannot investigate in an area where it cannot legislate. Therefore, any inquiry into the beliefs or associations of newspaper employees is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Clark
No. The Court has concocted a new and novel doctrine that abruptly breaks with over a century of established practice where indictments have consistently used the statutory language. A defendant who needs to know the subject of the inquiry can either demand clarification from the committee at the time of the hearing or request a bill of particulars from the prosecutor. This ruling will only create additional hazards for the successful prosecution of congressional contempt cases and encourage contumacy before its committees.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
No. The indictments are sufficient under the two-fold test for indictments: apprising the defendant of the charge and protecting against double jeopardy. The indictments identified the committee, the date of the hearing, and the precise questions refused, which is more than enough information for the defendant to prepare a defense. The Court's holding throws criminal pleading back to a formalistic era that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to eliminate. A defendant can use a bill of particulars to get more detail, and the majority's concern that the grand jury's role is usurped is unfounded.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the procedural protections for defendants in congressional contempt cases by heightening the pleading standard for indictments. It firmly establishes that the specific subject of a congressional inquiry is an essential element of the offense that must be found by the grand jury and stated in the indictment. The ruling curtails the ability of the prosecution to shift its theory of 'pertinency' between trial and appeal, thereby ensuring that a defendant is tried only on the precise charge found by the grand jury. This creates a clear requirement for congressional committees to define their scope of inquiry unambiguously if they wish for contempt citations to be successfully prosecuted.
