Rushink v. Gerstheimer
440 N.Y.S.2d 738, 82 A.D.2d 944, 1981 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14675 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210(a), which prohibits leaving keys in an unattended vehicle, was not enacted to protect an unauthorized user of the vehicle from the consequences of their own actions.
Facts:
- Mary Jane Gerstheimer, an employee of a developmental center, drove her husband's car to a pharmacy located on the grounds of the Middletown Psychiatric Center.
- On August 9, 1978, she parked the automobile in front of the pharmacy.
- Gerstheimer left the vehicle unattended with the keys in the ignition.
- Stephen E. Rushink, a resident patient at the psychiatric facility, entered the unattended vehicle and drove away.
- Shortly thereafter, Rushink was killed when the vehicle he was driving left the road and struck a tree.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, representing the estate of Stephen E. Rushink, sued defendants Mary Jane Gerstheimer and George F. Gerstheimer in the Supreme Court, Sullivan County, which is a trial-level court in New York.
- Following the initial pleadings, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
- The defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint.
- The Supreme Court at Special Term denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.
- Both the plaintiff and the defendants filed cross-appeals from that order to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (an intermediate appellate court).
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Issue:
Does New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210(a), which prohibits leaving keys in an unattended vehicle, create a protected class that includes the unauthorized user of the vehicle, allowing their estate to sue for injuries resulting from the user's own actions?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam (Sweeney, Kane, Casey, JJ.)
No. The provisions of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1210(a) were plainly not designed to protect unauthorized users from the consequences of their own actions. The court reasoned that the statute was enacted to deter theft and prevent injury to the public and property from the operation of stolen vehicles. The unauthorized user, even one who may lack the mental capacity to form larcenous intent like the plaintiff's decedent, is not within the class of persons the legislature intended to protect. While a statutory claim fails, the court noted that the plaintiff could still pursue a common-law negligence action, for which there are triable issues of fact, making summary judgment for either party inappropriate.
Concurring - Mahoney, P.J. (Weiss, J. concurring)
No. While concurring in the result to deny summary judgment, the concurrence disagrees with the majority's reasoning regarding the statute's scope. This opinion argues that the statute was designed to protect the public generally from all foreseeable consequences of an unauthorized use, and that the plaintiff's decedent should be considered a member of this protected class. The statute changed the common law by establishing that the intervention of an unauthorized user no longer breaks the chain of causation from the owner's negligence. Therefore, it is unfair to deny the plaintiff the evidentiary weight of the statutory violation and force them to the higher burden of proving common-law negligence.
Analysis:
This decision narrowly interprets the protective scope of New York's 'key-in-ignition' statute, establishing that the unauthorized user of a vehicle cannot sue the owner under a theory of negligence per se based on a violation of the statute. It distinguishes between the general public, whom the statute protects, and the unauthorized user, who is excluded from that protection. The case solidifies the principle that while a statutory claim is barred for the 'thief', the door remains open for a common-law negligence claim, particularly where foreseeable risk is heightened, such as leaving a car accessible on the grounds of a psychiatric facility. The concurrence signals an ongoing judicial debate about whether such statutes should be interpreted more broadly to include any person foreseeably harmed.
