Rush v. Ray
362 N.W.2d 479, 1985 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 949 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A provision in an appropriation bill that restricts the use of funds to only the specified purpose and prohibits their transfer is a non-severable qualification or limitation, not a distinct "item" subject to the governor's item veto power.
Facts:
- The Iowa General Assembly enacted five appropriation bills for specific purposes.
- Each bill contained a provision stating that the funds appropriated by the act could not be transferred or expended for any purpose other than what was specified.
- This provision explicitly stated it applied "notwithstanding section eight point thirty-nine (8.39) of the Code," a general law that otherwise allowed the governor, through the state comptroller, to transfer funds between departments.
- Governor Robert D. Ray exercised his constitutional item veto power to strike only these restrictive provisions from each of the five bills.
- The legislature did not override the Governor's vetoes.
Procedural Posture:
- State Senator Robert Rush filed an action in Iowa district court (trial court) against Governor Ray, challenging the legality of the vetoes.
- The district court initially dismissed the case as moot.
- On a prior appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, finding the issue was of public importance and remanded the case.
- On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted the Governor’s motion for summary judgment, upholding the vetoes.
- Rush, as appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Iowa Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the governor's item veto power, under the Iowa Constitution, permit the governor to strike a provision in an appropriation bill that prohibits the transfer of the appropriated funds to other departments or for other purposes?
Opinions:
Majority - Schultz, J.
No. The governor's item veto power does not permit striking a provision in an appropriation bill that prohibits the transfer of funds. The vetoed language constituted a non-severable qualification or limitation on the appropriation, not a distinct 'item.' The governor's veto power is a negative power to destroy, not a creative power to alter legislative intent. By striking the restriction, the governor affirmatively altered the legislation, making funds available for purposes not authorized by the legislature. This distortion of legislative intent is an unconstitutional use of the item veto because the restriction cannot be severed from the appropriation without affecting the substance of the remaining legislation. A governor who disapproves of a qualification on an appropriation must veto the appropriation itself.
Dissenting - Harris, J.
Yes. The governor's item veto power permits the governor to strike such a provision. The vetoed language was not a true qualification on spending, but rather a separate piece of legislation designed to repeal or suspend an existing statute (Iowa Code § 8.39) that was appended to a must-pass appropriation bill. The 'scar tissue test' from prior case law is meant to allow a governor to excise such tacked-on legislation that is not germane to the appropriation itself. The vetoes did not alter the legislative plan for how the appropriated funds could be used for their specified purpose; they only affected the disposition of potentially unused funds. By prohibiting this veto, the majority allows the legislature to rob the governor of his constitutional veto power over general legislation by attaching it to an appropriation bill.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the executive item veto power in Iowa, reinforcing the separation of powers by limiting the governor's ability to legislatively reshape appropriation bills. It establishes that the item veto is a purely negative power to eliminate whole items, not a creative power to alter the purpose or effect of the remaining law by striking conditions. This precedent strengthens the legislature's 'power of the purse,' allowing it to attach specific, non-severable conditions to appropriations. Consequently, a governor faced with an appropriation containing a condition they oppose must choose between accepting the bill as written or vetoing the entire appropriation, rather than surgically removing the unwanted condition.
