Ruotolo v. Tietjen

Connecticut Appellate Court
890 A.2d 166 (2006)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under Connecticut's antilapse statute, mere words of survivorship, such as 'if he survives me,' are insufficient on their own to constitute a 'provision ... for such contingency' that would prevent the statute from applying. To override the statute, a will must unequivocally express an intent to disinherit the beneficiary's issue or provide for an alternative bequest.

Facts:

On March 1, 1990, John N. Swanson executed a will.
The will's residuary clause bequeathed one-half of the residue to his stepdaughter, Hazel Brennan, with the specific condition, 'if she survives me'.
Hazel Brennan was a stepchild of Swanson, a relationship covered by the state's antilapse statute.
Hazel Brennan died on January 2, 2001.
John N. Swanson, the testator, died seventeen days after Brennan.
Kathleen Smaldone is the child (issue) of the deceased beneficiary, Hazel Brennan.

Procedural Posture:

John N. Swanson's will was admitted to the Probate Court.
The Probate Court ruled that the bequest to Hazel Brennan had lapsed and the antilapse statute did not apply, causing the share to pass into the intestate estate.
Beneficiaries Fred and Charlene Ruotolo appealed the Probate Court's decision to the Superior Court.
Kathleen Smaldone, the appellant, filed a cross appeal in the Superior Court.
The Superior Court conducted a de novo hearing and affirmed the judgment of the Probate Court.
Kathleen Smaldone (appellant) appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.

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Issue:

Does the inclusion of words of survivorship, such as 'if she survives me,' in a will constitute a 'provision ... for such contingency' under Connecticut’s antilapse statute, § 45a-441, thereby preventing the statute's application?

Opinions:

Majority - Lavery, C. J.

No. The inclusion of words of survivorship alone does not constitute a provision for the contingency of a beneficiary's death sufficient to negate the application of the antilapse statute. The court reasoned that the antilapse statute is a remedial law designed to prevent the harsh common-law rule of lapse and should be construed liberally, with any doubts resolved in favor of its operation. The phrase 'if she survives me' is often boilerplate language and does not, by itself, provide clear evidence that the testator considered and intended to disinherit the beneficiary's descendants. Allowing such common phrasing to defeat the statute would contradict the legal presumption that testators intend to dispose of their entire estate and avoid intestacy. To effectively prevent the statute's application, a testator must either unequivocally express an intent to disinherit the beneficiary's line of descent or provide for an alternative disposition of the property.

Analysis:

This case of first impression establishes a significant precedent in Connecticut probate law by setting a high bar for overriding the antilapse statute. The decision aligns Connecticut with the modern trend, the Uniform Probate Code, and the Restatement (Third) of Property, which favor protecting a beneficiary's descendants from unintentional disinheritance. It provides clear guidance to estate planning attorneys that boilerplate survival language is insufficient to defeat the statute; a more explicit statement of contrary intent or an alternative gift is now required. This ruling strengthens the remedial purpose of the antilapse statute and reduces litigation over testator intent based on ambiguous, standard-form language.

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