Runyon v. McCrary

Supreme Court of United States
427 U.S. 160 (1976)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

42 U.S.C. § 1981, which guarantees all persons the same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens, prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from refusing to contract with and admit qualified children solely on the basis of race.

Facts:

Russell and Katheryne Runyon operated Bobbe’s School, and Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc. operated a separate school; both were private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools in Virginia.
Both schools solicited students from the general public, using mass mailings addressed to 'resident' and advertisements in the 'Yellow Pages' of the telephone directory.
In May 1969, after seeing an advertisement, the parents of Colin Gonzales, a Black child, applied for his admission to Fairfax-Brewster School's summer day camp.
Fairfax-Brewster School rejected Colin's application; the school's Chairman of the Board later explained to Mr. Gonzales that the rejection was because the school was not integrated.
Following this rejection, Mr. Gonzales called Bobbe's School and was told that it only accepted members of the Caucasian race.
In August 1972, the mother of Michael McCrary, another Black child, called Bobbe's School in response to a telephone book ad and was told that the school was not integrated.
Neither school had ever accepted a Black child for any of its programs.

Procedural Posture:

The parents of Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales filed suit against the proprietors of Bobbe's School and Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The Southern Independent School Association was granted permission to intervene as a defendant.
The District Court found that the schools' racially discriminatory admissions policies violated § 1981.
The District Court issued an injunction against the schools, awarded compensatory damages to the families, and awarded attorneys' fees.
The schools appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's findings on the § 1981 violation and the award of damages, but it reversed the award of attorneys' fees.
The schools and the school association (petitioners) and the families (cross-petitioners) sought and were granted writs of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.

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Issue:

Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibit private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to qualified prospective students solely because they are Black?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stewart

Yes. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated schools from engaging in racial discrimination in their admissions policies. The Court reasoned that § 1981, originating from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, reaches purely private acts of racial discrimination in the making of contracts. Based on precedents like Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., which interpreted the related statute § 1982 to bar private discrimination in property transactions, the Court held that a school's offer of educational services to the public is an offer to enter into a contract. Denying this opportunity to a prospective student solely on the basis of race constitutes a classic violation of § 1981. The Court further held that this application of § 1981 does not violate any constitutional rights of free association, privacy, or parental control, as these rights do not provide affirmative protection for invidious racial discrimination in a commercial context.

Concurring - Justice Powell

Yes. While acknowledging the persuasive historical arguments in the dissent, Justice Powell concurred based on the principle of stare decisis, citing the Court's recent and mature consideration of the issue in cases like Jones and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. He wrote separately to caution against an overly broad interpretation of the holding, distinguishing between the public, commercial contracts at issue here and highly personal contractual relationships (e.g., hiring a babysitter or tutor) which reflect a 'purpose of exclusiveness' other than race and would likely not be covered by § 1981. Because the schools made a general public offering on a commercial basis, their conduct falls within the statute's reach.

Concurring - Justice Stevens

Yes. Justice Stevens stated his firm belief that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. was wrongly decided and that the 1866 Congress did not intend to prohibit private discrimination. However, he concluded that Jones is now an important and settled part of the law. He argued that overruling it would be a 'significant step backwards' and contrary to the 'prevailing sense of justice today.' Given the interconnected history of § 1981 and § 1982, he found it necessary to either apply the rationale of Jones to this case or overrule it, and chose to adhere to precedent for reasons of legal stability and modern social policy.

Dissenting - Justice White

No. The statute does not prohibit private racial discrimination in contracting. Justice White argued that the plain language of § 1981 grants all persons the 'same right' to contract as white citizens; since white citizens never had a right to compel an unwilling private party to enter a contract, the statute does not create such a right for anyone else. He contended that § 1981's legislative history shows it derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1870, a Fourteenth Amendment statute aimed at correcting discriminatory state laws, not private conduct. The dissent argued that the majority improperly conflated § 1981 with § 1982 (at issue in Jones), which stemmed from the Thirteenth Amendment and was specifically intended to eradicate the 'badges and incidents of slavery'.

Analysis:

This landmark decision firmly extended the prohibition against racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to the sphere of private contracts, building upon the precedent of Jones v. Mayer. By applying the statute to private educational institutions, the Court created a powerful legal tool for challenging discrimination in private commercial settings, separate from the framework of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ruling affirmed a broad congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate private conduct seen as a 'badge or incident' of slavery. Justice Powell's concurrence, however, introduced a crucial limiting principle, suggesting that the statute's reach may not extend to highly personal or intimate contracts, thereby creating a distinction between public commercial relationships and private associational choices that would be explored in future cases.

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