No, the life sentence is not cruel and unusual. The punishment isn't just for the last small crime; it's for being a repeat offender who has shown he won't follow the law. It's the job of lawmakers, not judges, to decide how long prison sentences should be. The rule against 'cruel and unusual' punishment is stricter for the death penalty, but for prison time, states have a lot of freedom to be tough on crime. Plus, he might get out on parole someday, so it's not a hopeless situation.

I don't personally like Texas's law and think other states have better ones. But my job is to decide if the law is unconstitutional, not if it's a good idea. This law, while harsh, doesn't violate the Constitution, so I have to agree with the majority.

Yes, this is cruel and unusual. The punishment is completely out of proportion to the crimes. Giving someone a life sentence for stealing a total of about $230 is ridiculous. If you look at what other states do, or even how Texas punishes more violent criminals, this sentence is way too harsh. The punishment should fit the crime, and this one clearly doesn't.

No, giving Rummel a mandatory life sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment. The Court agrees that the Constitution prohibits sentences that are way out of proportion to the crime. But challenges to sentences for being out of proportion almost never win, unless it's a death penalty case. Rummel's case is not one of those super rare cases. Texas gets to decide where to draw the line between felony theft and petty theft. Given Rummel's record, Texas didn't have to treat him the same as a first-time offender. Since Texas already put Rummel in prison twice for felonies, it could decide he's just not able to follow the law and should be separated from society. The point of a repeat offender law is to discourage repeat offenders and keep them away from society for a long time. States get to decide how many crimes make someone a repeat offender and how long to put them away for.

I agree with the judgment. If the Constitution let me tell Texas courts how to handle these cases based on my own views, I wouldn't agree with the Court. Many other states have way better repeat offender procedures than Texas. But the question isn't if we like Texas' procedures. The question is if those procedures are so bad that the Constitution won't allow them. And on that question, I have to agree with the Court's opinion and judgment.

I disagree because I believe (1) a punishment for a noncapital crime can be so out of proportion that it's unconstitutional, (2) the chance of parole shouldn't matter when deciding if a punishment is cruel and unusual, (3) a mandatory life sentence is way too harsh for what Rummel did, and (4) saying Rummel's Eighth Amendment rights were violated fits with being proper and respectful of states' rights. Each of Rummel's crimes involved lying to get small amounts of money. None involved hurting anyone, threatening to hurt anyone, violence, or using a weapon. It's hard to imagine felonies that are less dangerous to a peaceful society than Rummel's three crimes. Looking at the factors the Court normally uses to decide if a sentence is too harsh, it's clear Rummel is getting cruel and unusual punishment. He basically got the second worst punishment possible because he committed three crimes that cheated people out of about $230 total. The nature of his crimes doesn't suggest he ever threatened anyone or put society in danger. Hardly any other states would allow a punishment as harsh as what Rummel got. And compared to other criminals punished in Texas, Rummel got a harsher sentence for three property crimes than many first-time or second-time offenders get for way more serious crimes.

Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare

—noting that the Court has "upheld a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a defendant's third nonviolent felony, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses

The Eighth Amendment "prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime."

—the Supreme Court upheld a sentence under a Texas recidivist statute of life with the possibility of parole for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.

We said that "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."

—the Supreme Court upheld a recidivist sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the crime of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, following prior convictions for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services and passing a forged check for $28.36.

The point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction

Comparing his crime to overtime parking, which could not constitutionally be punishable by life imprisonment

Proportionality review under those evolving standards should be informed by “ 'objective factors to the maximum possible extent

The Graham holding rested on those characteristics—not, as the majority would have it, on "the differences between children and adults," majority at 896—and on prior Eighth Amendment cases in which "the severity of sentences that deny convicts the possibility of parole" played an integral part in the Court's decision.

No, the mandatory life sentence imposed upon Rummel does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A state is entitled to deal more harshly with repeat offenders, and for crimes classifiable as felonies, the length of the sentence imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. The Court's proportionality analysis is far narrower for terms of imprisonment than for capital punishment, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability. The purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders and segregate from society those who have demonstrated an inability to conform to social norms. While Texas may be harsher than other states, federalism allows for such variation, and the possibility of parole, though not a right, distinguishes this sentence from one of true life imprisonment without any hope of release.

While he personally finds other states' recidivist procedures superior to those used by Texas, the question is not one of personal policy preference but of constitutional minimums. The procedures used in this case do not fall below the level tolerated by the Constitution, and therefore he is constrained to join the Court's opinion and judgment.

Yes, the mandatory life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. The principle of proportionality, which forbids punishments grossly disproportionate to the crime, applies to non-capital sentences. The possibility of parole is speculative and should not be considered in the constitutional analysis. Applying objective criteria reveals the sentence's disproportionality: (1) the nature of the offenses was trivial, non-violent, and involved less than $230; (2) sentences in other jurisdictions are far more lenient, with only two other states authorizing such a penalty for similar crimes; and (3) the sentence is harsher than what Texas imposes for far more serious, violent crimes committed by first- or second-time offenders. The sentence is grossly unjust and crosses the line into cruel and unusual punishment.

No, the mandatory life sentence imposed upon Rummel does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. However, outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are exceedingly rare. The Court has never found a sentence for a term of years to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment. Rummel's sentence is not one of those rare cases where the proportionality principle would come into play. Texas is entitled to make its own judgment as to where to draw the line between felony theft and petty larceny, subject only to those strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by objective factors. Given Rummel's record, Texas was not required to treat him in the same manner as it might treat a first offender. Having twice imprisoned him for felonies, Texas was entitled to place upon Rummel the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State. The purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders and to segregate them from the rest of society for an extended period of time. The point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.

I concur in the judgment. If the Constitution gave me a roving commission to impose upon the criminal courts of Texas my own notions of enlightened policy, I would not join the Court's opinion. The recidivist procedures adopted by many other States are far superior to those utilized here. But the question is not whether we applaud or even personally approve the procedures followed in this case. The question is whether those procedures fall below the minimum level the Constitution will tolerate. Upon that question, I am constrained to join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

I dissent because I believe that (i) the penalty for a noncapital offense may be unconstitutionally disproportionate, (ii) the possibility of parole should not be considered in assessing the nature of the punishment, (iii) a mandatory life sentence is grossly disproportionate as applied to Rummel, and (iv) the conclusion that Rummel has suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles of judicial restraint and federalism. Each of Rummel's crimes involved the use of fraud to obtain small sums of money. None of the crimes involved injury to one's person, threat of injury to one's person, violence, the threat of violence, or the use of a weapon. It is difficult to imagine felonies that pose less danger to the peace and good order of a civilized society than the three crimes committed by Rummel. Examination of the objective factors traditionally employed by the Court to assess the proportionality of a sentence demonstrates that Rummel suffers a cruel and unusual punishment. He has been sentenced to the penultimate criminal penalty because he committed three offenses defrauding others of about $230. The nature of the crimes does not suggest that Rummel ever engaged in conduct that threatened another's person or endangered the peace of society. A comparison of the sentence Rummel received with the sentences provided by habitual offender statutes of other American jurisdictions demonstrates that only two other States authorize the same punishment. A comparison of Rummel to other criminals sentenced in Texas shows that he has been punished for three property-related offenses with a harsher sentence than that given first-time offenders or two-time offenders convicted of far more serious offenses.

Rummel v. Estelle

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Issue:

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