Rudes v. Gottschalk
2 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 315, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
When a minor's conduct is alleged to constitute negligence per se due to a statutory violation, the minor's standard of care (considering age, intelligence, experience, and capacity) must be applied, and the foreseeability element of proximate cause for the minor's alleged contributory negligence must also reflect this child's standard, not an adult's.
Facts:
- William Charles Gottschalk, an eight-year-old boy, attempted to push his bicycle across a controlled access expressway in San Antonio, Texas.
- Gerald W. Rudes was driving an automobile on the expressway.
- William Charles Gottschalk was struck by Rudes's automobile.
- William Charles Gottschalk attempted to cross the expressway at a point other than within a marked or unmarked crosswalk at an intersection.
- A legislative regulation (Article 6701-d, Sec. 78(a), Vernon’s Ann. Texas Stats.) provided that pedestrians crossing a roadway at points other than within crosswalks must yield the right-of-way to vehicles.
- The City of San Antonio also had an ordinance prohibiting such crossing, which was pleaded by the defendant.
Procedural Posture:
- William Charles Gottschalk (minor plaintiff) and his parents (plaintiffs) brought an action against Gerald W. Rudes (defendant) in the trial court.
- The trial court, upon jury findings, denied a recovery to the plaintiffs, concluding that William Charles Gottschalk was guilty of negligence per se and held him to an adult standard of care.
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for another trial.
- Upon rehearing, a difference of opinion developed among the justices of the Court of Civil Appeals concerning the proper method of submitting the proximate cause issue (315 S.W.2d 361).
- The Supreme Court of Texas granted a writ of error upon Rudes’ contention that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed on the theory of negligence per se, and upon the Gottschalks’ contention that the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals erred in its instructions relating to the proximate cause issue.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of negligence per se apply to minors using an adult standard of care, and how should foreseeability be submitted in a proximate cause issue when a minor is alleged to be contributorily negligent?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Norvell
No, a child's conduct is not to be judged by an adult standard of care simply because statutory negligence (negligence per se) is involved; instead, the child's standard of care should apply, and the foreseeability element of proximate cause for a child's alleged contributory negligence should also reflect the child's capacity. The court affirmed that the common law rule, which judges a minor by the standard of a child and not an adult, also applies to cases of negligence per se. Civil courts retain the power to adopt or reject standards from criminal statutes for tort liability and are not bound to apply them rigidly to children. The overwhelming weight of authority in the United States supports applying a child's standard of care even when a statutory violation is at issue. While the statutory standard is not nullified, the jury must determine if the child's violation evidenced less care than an ordinarily prudent child of the same age, intelligence, knowledge, and experience would have exercised. Furthermore, the court acknowledged that a child’s powers to anticipate danger and harmful consequences for foreseeability, a component of proximate cause, are not the same as an adult’s. Therefore, when submitting issues to a jury in cases involving a child's contributory negligence, 'ordinary care' should be defined separately for the adult (as a person of ordinary prudence) and for the minor (as an ordinarily prudent child of the minor’s age, intelligence, experience, and capacity) and then incorporated into the proximate cause definition. The eight-year-old in this case falls within the age bracket where contributory negligence is a jury question, not a matter of law.
Analysis:
This case fundamentally reshapes the application of negligence per se to minors in Texas, preventing automatic adult liability for statutory violations. It solidifies the 'child's standard of care' across all negligence determinations, including contributory negligence and the foreseeability aspect of proximate cause. By requiring juries to assess a minor's actions based on their actual developmental capacity, the ruling promotes a more equitable and realistic framework for assigning fault. This decision will significantly impact future cases involving child plaintiffs or defendants, ensuring that their actions are judged within the context of their age and maturity, and provides clear guidance for trial courts on crafting appropriate jury instructions.
