Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran
2018 U.S. LEXIS 1376, 138 S. Ct. 816, 583 U.S. 202 (2018)
Rule of Law:
Section 1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not provide a freestanding basis for judgment holders to attach and execute against a foreign state's property; rather, it identifies property available for attachment only when its immunity has been rescinded under a separate, explicit provision within §1610.
Facts:
- On September 4, 1997, Hamas carried out three suicide bombings in Jerusalem, resulting in the deaths of 5 people and injuring nearly 200 others.
- Petitioners are United States citizens who were either wounded in the attack or are close relatives of those injured.
- Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and was found responsible for the bombing because it provided material support and training to Hamas.
- A collection of approximately 30,000 ancient clay tablets and fragments, known as the Persepolis Collection, belonging to Iran, is in the possession of the University of Chicago at its Oriental Institute.
- University archeologists recovered the Persepolis Collection artifacts during an excavation of the old city of Persepolis in the 1930s.
- In 1937, Iran loaned the Persepolis Collection to the Oriental Institute for research, translation, and cataloging.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners sued Iran in the District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging Iran was responsible for the bombing.
- The District Court for the District of Columbia entered a default judgment in favor of petitioners for $71.5 million against Iran, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7).
- After Congress replaced §1605(a)(7) with §1605A, petitioners moved for and were granted an order converting their judgment to one under the new §1605A.
- When Iran did not pay the judgment, petitioners brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to attach and execute against the Persepolis Collection.
- The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that §1610(g) does not deprive the Persepolis Collection of immunity.
- The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that §1610(g) does not create a freestanding exception to immunity.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals regarding the effect of §1610(g).
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Issue:
Does §1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provide a freestanding exception to foreign sovereign property immunity, allowing parties holding a judgment under §1605A to attach and execute against a foreign state's property, or does it only identify property subject to attachment if its immunity is rescinded by another provision of §1610?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Sotomayor
No, §1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not provide a freestanding exception to foreign sovereign property immunity; rather, it serves to identify property available for attachment and execution only when its immunity has been rescinded under a separate provision within §1610. The Court found that the most natural reading of §1610(g)(1)'s phrase “as provided in this section” refers to §1610 as a whole, meaning a judgment holder must identify an independent basis for immunity abrogation elsewhere in §1610. The Court emphasized that other provisions unambiguously revoking immunity use phrases such as “shall not be immune” or “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” which are conspicuously absent from §1610(g). This interpretation ensures that all provisions of §1610 retain meaning and are not rendered superfluous, consistent with interpretive canons like Corley v. United States. It also aligns with the historical practice of rescinding attachment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign state’s commercial acts, as discussed in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria. While §1610(g) does abrogate the Bancec factors (from First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba) regarding the liability of agencies and instrumentalities for a foreign state's judgments, this abrogation does not create an independent basis for attachment. The Court rejected petitioners' arguments that “this section” was a drafting error or referred to specific procedures in §1610(f), stating that Congress knows how to clearly express an intent to divest immunity. The Court concluded that it would not read a blanket abrogation of immunity into the statute without a clearer indication of congressional intent.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), establishing that §1610(g) is not a broad exception to foreign sovereign property immunity. By requiring plaintiffs to identify a separate, explicit basis for immunity abrogation, the ruling limits the types of assets available for execution against state sponsors of terrorism, particularly non-commercial property like the Persepolis Collection. This narrow interpretation reinforces the principle that exceptions to sovereign immunity must be clearly expressed by Congress, maintaining the delicate balance between respecting foreign sovereignty and providing recourse for victims of terrorism, which could influence future legislative efforts or litigation strategies regarding asset recovery.
