Roy v. United States
652 A.2d 1098 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
An accomplice who aids and abets an intended crime is not criminally liable for a separate offense committed by the principal if that offense is not a natural and probable consequence of the originally intended crime and is qualitatively different in nature from the initial criminal plan.
Facts:
- Peppi Miller, working as an informant for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), arranged to purchase a handgun from Nakia A. (Tony) Roy for $400.
- Roy told Miller to return later with the money, at which point Roy would have the weapon.
- When Miller returned, Roy informed him that he had to wait for Steve B. Ross, who was bringing the handgun.
- After Ross arrived, Roy directed Miller to go with Ross into a nearby schoolyard to complete the transaction, while Roy remained near the entrance.
- In the schoolyard, Ross handed the gun to Miller and then immediately asked for it back.
- Ross then loaded the gun, pointed it at Miller's face, accused Miller of robbing his 'peoples,' and demanded the $400.
- Ross forced Miller to drop the money on the ground and then ordered him to jump over a fence and run away.
Procedural Posture:
- Nakia Roy and Steve Ross were convicted in a joint jury trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (the trial court).
- The jury found Roy guilty of armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV), and carrying a pistol without a license (CPWOL).
- Roy's attorney made a motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) at the conclusion of the prosecution's case and renewed it at the conclusion of all evidence, arguing insufficient evidence.
- The trial judge denied Roy's motions.
- Roy appealed the denial of his MJOA to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, where he was the appellant.
- Ross also appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to sever offenses.
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Issue:
Is an armed robbery the natural and probable consequence of a planned illegal handgun sale, such that an individual who aided and abetted only the sale can be held criminally liable for the armed robbery committed by the principal?
Opinions:
Majority - Schwelb, J.
No. An armed robbery is not the natural and probable consequence of a planned illegal handgun sale under these circumstances. To be liable as an aider and abettor for a crime committed by a principal that was not part of the original plan, the secondary crime must be a 'natural and probable' consequence in the 'ordinary course of things.' This requires the outcome to be within a reasonably predictable range, not merely a conceivable possibility. The court found no evidence that Roy planned or intentionally participated in the robbery; Ross's act of first handing the gun to Miller suggests the robbery was an impromptu decision, not a pre-planned event. An armed robbery is qualitatively different from a gun sale; they do not share a common purpose. Holding that a robbery is a natural and probable consequence of any illegal sale would create a limitless rule, as a person involved in any illicit transaction might be a target. The evidence was insufficient to show the robbery was anything more than a speculative possibility, and therefore Roy's convictions for armed robbery and PFCV could not be sustained on this theory.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the 'natural and probable consequences' doctrine of accomplice liability in the District of Columbia. By emphasizing that the secondary crime must be within a 'reasonably predictable range' and not 'qualitatively different' from the intended crime, the court raises the evidentiary bar for prosecutors. This precedent protects defendants who participate in lesser crimes from being held liable for more serious, spontaneous offenses committed by their confederates. The ruling requires a more direct and foreseeable link between the planned crime and the ultimate offense, preventing liability based on mere speculation about what could conceivably happen during an illegal transaction.
