Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc.
699 S.W.2d 423, 1985 Mo. LEXIS 282, 54 U.S.L.W. 2236 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
In civil cases, a party may impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent statements, and such statements are admissible not only to impeach credibility but also as substantive evidence, provided the declarant is available for cross-examination at trial.
Facts:
- On August 13, 1982, Richard Rowe's 1981 Ford LTD was found burning in a rural field about seven miles from his home.
- Rowe filed an insurance claim with Farmers Insurance Company, his automobile insurance provider, for the burned car.
- Farmers Insurance Company disallowed Rowe's claim, contending that Rowe either had his car torched to collect insurance proceeds or knew who did and failed to report the information.
- Farmers Insurance Company called Chester Carroll, Rowe’s first cousin, as a witness, who had allegedly told Officer Overbey on November 22, 1982, that he overheard Rowe say he intended to burn his Ford LTD for insurance money to buy a four-wheel-drive truck.
- Carroll, after meeting with Rowe about a week before his deposition, denied in his deposition and at trial ever overhearing any such conversation.
- Farmers Insurance Company also sought to introduce deposition testimony of Peggy Slavings, who was living with Rowe when his car was burned but could not be subpoenaed for trial.
- Slavings had given a signed statement to Officer Overbey on September 19, 1982, indicating she saw Rowe give his car to three people the night it was burned and that Rowe's son later told Rowe someone saw him deliver the car to Clyde and Lloyd Brown.
- In her deposition, Slavings denied making the assertions contained in her signed statement to Officer Overbey.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard Rowe brought an action against Farmers Insurance Company after his automobile insurance claim was disallowed.
- The trial court did not allow Farmers Insurance Company to introduce evidence of Chester Carroll's prior inconsistent statement to Officer Overbey or Peggy Slavings' prior inconsistent statement to Officer Overbey or her deposition denial, relying on the traditional rule that a party may not impeach his own witness.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Richard Rowe.
- Farmers Insurance Company (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals, Southern District.
- The Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the judgment.
- The Supreme Court of Missouri (this Court) ordered transfer to consider whether a party could impeach his own witness.
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Issue:
Does a party have the right to impeach its own witness with prior inconsistent statements, and can those prior inconsistent statements be used as substantive evidence in civil trials when the declarant is available for cross-examination?
Opinions:
Majority - Welliver, Judge
Yes, a party may introduce prior inconsistent statements to impeach its own witness, and such statements can be considered as substantive evidence in civil trials when the declarant is available for cross-examination. The traditional rule prohibiting a party from impeaching its own witness is an anachronistic holdover from primitive English practice where 'oath helpers' were partisans, a rationale no longer applicable as parties today are forced to take witnesses as they find them. Abolishing this rule aligns Missouri with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, including federal courts, and promotes truth-finding by allowing juries to consider all information relevant to a witness's credibility. Furthermore, prior inconsistent statements are often made closer to the event, when memory is fresher, and before motives for perjury or selective forgetting may arise, potentially making them more reliable than later trial testimony. The instruction to juries to disregard such statements for truth is often confusing and unrealistic. When a witness is available for cross-examination, the core dangers of hearsay are largely absent, satisfying the purpose of the hearsay rule.
Dissenting - Billings, Judge
No, the majority opinion engages in judicial legislation by adopting new rules of evidence that should properly be established by the state legislature, and the traditional Missouri common law rule regarding impeachment of one's own witness operates fairly and effectively. The common law rule, as applied in Missouri, already permits impeachment in cases of surprise, entrapment, or hostility, and for refreshing memory, without allowing a party to introduce unreliable hearsay. Prior inconsistent statements carry substantial dangers, including inaccurate repetition, incompleteness, and potential for coercion, making them unreliable as substantive evidence. Postponed cross-examination cannot substitute for immediate cross-examination, as its effectiveness is diminished. Furthermore, the Missouri Constitution (Article V, Section 5) prohibits the Supreme Court from promulgating rules of evidence, making the majority's action an inappropriate usurpation of legislative authority, especially given the legislature's recent action in modifying evidence law for criminal cases.
Concurring - Blackmar, Judge
Yes, the disadvantages of the orthodox rule against impeaching one's own witness and restricting prior inconsistent statements to credibility far outweigh its advantages, and the Court has a duty to develop the common law of evidence. The rigid application of the orthodox rule can prevent relevant and potentially truthful initial statements from reaching the trier of fact, even when disclaimers occur prior to trial. Juries are capable of discerning sound evidence from infirm, and providing them with full information promotes better decision-making. Meaningful cross-examination can still occur even if a witness disavows a prior statement, allowing exploration of the circumstances surrounding both the statement and the disavowal. Missouri's 'substantial evidence' rule prevents wholly unsubstantial cases from resting solely on a repudiated prior statement, mitigating a concern raised by opponents of the rule change. The legislature’s action in criminal statutes does not imply a policy against judicial development in civil matters.
Concurring - Donnelly, Judge
Yes, in civil cases, the admission of prior inconsistent statements as both impeachment and substantive evidence, when the witness is available for cross-examination, is a logical and necessary next step from prior Missouri precedent, but this rule should not apply to criminal cases due to distinct state constitutional confrontation rights. Previous decisions in Pulitzer v. Chapman and State v. Granberry have already recognized the substantive admissibility of sworn deposition testimony, paving the way for extending this to other extrajudicial statements in civil cases. This is a policy choice that recognizes the diminished dangers of hearsay when the declarant is available for cross-examination. However, applying this rule in criminal cases would violate Article I, Section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees an accused the right 'to meet the witnesses against him face to face.' This provision, unlike its federal counterpart, was intended to constitutionalize existing common law proscriptions against hearsay in criminal proceedings, as evidenced by its historical interpretation and the carefully limited exception for depositions in felony cases (Article I, Section 18(b)).
Analysis:
This landmark decision represents a significant modernization of Missouri evidence law, aligning it with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the majority of other jurisdictions. By abandoning the restrictive 'voucher' rule and allowing prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence in civil cases, the Court aims to enhance the truth-seeking function of trials, providing juries with more complete information. However, the dissenting and concurring opinions highlight a persistent tension between judicial development of common law and legislative prerogative in shaping evidentiary rules, especially regarding the reliability of unsworn out-of-court statements and the unique constitutional considerations for criminal defendants in Missouri.
