Roth, Pamela v. King, Rufus
371 U.S. App. D.C. 254, 449 F.3d 1272, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14237 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Attorneys do not have a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving future compensated court appointments where the appointment system is discretionary and not guaranteed by statute or rule.
Facts:
- Prior to 2003, the D.C. Superior Court appointed counsel for indigent parties in Family Court from lists of volunteers maintained by the CCAN Office or the D.C. Public Defender Service (PDS).
- Any lawyer could be on the volunteer lists without an inquiry into their qualifications, but inclusion did not guarantee any appointments.
- A joint congressional committee urged the D.C. Superior Court to evaluate and improve the quality of legal services for juvenile cases.
- In response, Chief Judge Rufus G. King, III, appointed an ad hoc committee to recommend panels of qualified attorneys for Family Court appointments.
- The committee established an application process requiring attorneys to detail their experience, education, and professional background.
- From 351 applications, the committee recommended a smaller number of attorneys for inclusion on various panels (juvenile delinquency, guardian ad litem, etc.).
- Chief Judge King issued Administrative Order 03-11 ('AO 03-11'), which established the Family Court Attorney Panels based on the committee's recommendations.
- AO 03-11 mandated that, in most cases, judges must appoint attorneys from these new panel lists to represent indigent parties if the attorney is to receive compensation.
Procedural Posture:
- A class of attorneys (plaintiffs-appellees) sued judges of the D.C. Superior Court and officials of the Public Defender Service (PDS) (defendants-appellants) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The complaint sought monetary damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging the new panel system violated their Fifth Amendment rights.
- The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing they were immune from suit and that the plaintiffs failed to allege a constitutionally protected property interest.
- The District Court granted the motion to dismiss the claims for money damages, finding the defendants had judicial or legislative immunity.
- The District Court denied the motion to dismiss the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, concluding it was unclear 'whether the plaintiffs have a property interest in their specialty practice of law.'
- The defendants (Superior Court judges and PDS officials) filed an interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, challenging the denial of their motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claims and the denial of immunity for injunctive relief.
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Issue:
Does a court's administrative order, which establishes panels of qualified attorneys for compensated appointments in Family Court, violate the Fifth Amendment by depriving attorneys not selected for the panels of a protected property interest in their 'specialty practice'?
Opinions:
Majority - Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge
No, the administrative order does not violate the Fifth Amendment because attorneys do not have a constitutionally protected property interest in their 'specialty practice' based on an expectation of future compensated court appointments. To have a property interest in a government benefit, a person must have more than a unilateral expectation; they must have a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' created by an independent source like a statute or regulation. Here, no such source existed. Before AO 03-11, the appointment system was entirely discretionary, and inclusion on a volunteer list never guaranteed work. Because government officials retained discretion to grant or deny the benefit (the appointment), no protected property interest could arise. The court distinguished a prior case, Moultrie, which dealt with the potential 'taking' of an attorney's services through mandatory pro bono work, not the expectation of future paid work. As there is no property interest to be deprived of under the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause claim fails a fortiori. Additionally, the court held that the judicial officers were immune from suits for injunctive relief for acts taken in their judicial capacity.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high bar for establishing a constitutionally protected property interest under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It clarifies that a mere expectation of future government work, even if it forms the basis of a professional practice, does not create a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' when the conferral of that work is discretionary. The ruling provides government bodies, particularly courts, with significant latitude to reform and professionalize their systems for appointing contract professionals without facing takings or due process liability from those who no longer qualify. The case serves as a crucial precedent distinguishing between the unconstitutional appropriation of services (a potential 'taking') and the mere refusal to purchase future services.
