Yes. The truck owner is responsible. The law requiring people to lock their cars isn't just about stopping theft; it's a safety rule to protect people from what happens when unauthorized people, like thieves or kids, drive them. Because the driver broke this safety rule, he created the exact danger the law was meant to prevent. The fact that a thief was the one driving doesn't get the owner off the hook, because preventing that exact situation is the whole reason the law exists.

Yes, if a truck owner leaves the keys in the ignition, breaking a city rule, and a thief steals the truck and then carelessly hits a pedestrian, the truck owner is responsible for the pedestrian's injury, even though the thief caused the direct harm.

The court changed an old rule from 1916 that would have let the truck owner off the hook. They explained that everyone now knows that leaving cars unlocked is risky because kids or thieves often mess with them and cause accidents. The court said that when someone breaks a safety rule, like the one about locking your car, it automatically counts as being careless (this is called 'negligence').

The most important reason for the rule about locking cars isn't just to stop theft for the car owner, but to keep people on the streets safe from injuries caused by stolen or misused vehicles. So, because the worker broke this safety rule, he created the exact danger the rule was trying to stop, and that danger directly led to the accident. Therefore, the owner is responsible for the harm.

The court also said that just because a thief did something wrong in between doesn't mean the truck owner is no longer responsible. The owner's carelessness (not locking the car) created the very risk that a thief would do something bad. It's only fair to make those who create a danger responsible for the harm that comes from it, and this rule also helps make our streets safer.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b78-27">
  EDGERTON, Associate Justice.
 </author>
<p id="b78-28">
  This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment for the defendant in a personal injury action.
 </p>
<p id="b78-29">
  The facts were stipulated. Appellee’s agent violated a traffic ordinance of the District of Columbia
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn1" id="fn1_ref">
   1
  </a>
  by leaving appellee’s truck unattended in a public alley, with the ignition unlocked and the key in the switch. He left the truck outside a garage “so that it might be taken inside the garage by the garage attendant for night storage,” but he does not appear to have notified anyone that he had left it. Within two hours an unknown person drove the truck away and negligently ran over the appellant.
 </p>
<p id="b78-30">
  The trial court duly directed a verdict for the appellee on the authority of Squires v. Brooks.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn2" id="fn2_ref">
   2
  </a>
  That case was decided in 1916. On facts essentially similar to these, and despite the presence of a similar ordinance, this court held that the defendant’s act in leaving the car unlocked was not a “proximate” or legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury because the wrongful act of a third person intervened.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn3" id="fn3_ref">
   3
  </a>
  We cannot reconcile that decision with facts which have become clearer and principles which have become better established than they were in 1916, and we think it should be overruled.
 </p>
<p id="b79-4">
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="15"> 
   *15
   </span>
  Everyone knows now that children and thieves frequently cause harm by tampering with unlocked cars. The danger that they will do so on a particular occasion may be slight or great. In the absence of an ordinance, therefore, leaving a car unlocked might not be negligent in some circumstances, although in other circumstances it might be both negligent and a legal or “proximate” cause of a resulting accident.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn4" id="fn4_ref">
   4
  </a>
</p>
<p id="b79-5">
  But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn5" id="fn5_ref">
   5
  </a>
  which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn6" id="fn6_ref">
   6
  </a>
  This comes only to saying that in such circumstances the law has no reason to ignore and does not ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of driving.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn7" id="fn7_ref">
   7
  </a>
</p>
<p id="b79-8">
  The same principles govern this case. The particular ordinance involved here is one of a series which require, among other things, that motor vehicles be equipped with horns and lamps. Ordinary bicycles are required to have bells and lamps,
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn8" id="fn8_ref">
   8
  </a>
  but they are not required to be locked. The evident purpose of requiring motor vehicles to be locked is not to prevent theft for the sake of owners or the police, but to promote the safety of the public in the streets. An unlocked motor vehicle creates little more risk of theft than an unlocked bicycle, or for that matter an unlocked house, but it creates much more risk that meddling by children, thieves, or others will result in injuries to the public. The ordinance is intended to prevent such consequences. Since it is a safety measure, its violation was negligence.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn9" id="fn9_ref">
   9
  </a>
  This negligence created the hazard and thereby brought about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent. It was therefore a legal or “proximate” cause of the harm.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn10" id="fn10_ref">
   10
  </a>
  Both negligence and causation
  <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="16"> 
   *16
   </span>
  are too clear in this case, we think, for submission to a jury.
 </p>
<p id="b80-4">
  The fact that the intermeddler’s conduct was itself a proximate cause of the harm, and was probably criminal, is immaterial. Janof v. Newsom
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn11" id="fn11_ref">
   11
  </a>
  involved a statute which forbade employment agencies to recommend servants without investigating their references. An agency recommended a servant to the plaintiff without investigation, the plaintiff employed the servant, and the servant robbed the plaintiff. This court held the agency responsible for the plaintiff’s loss. In that case as in this, the conduct of the defendant or his agent was negligent precisely because it created a risk that a third person would act improperly. In such circumstances the fact that a third person does act improperly is not an intelligible reason for excusing the defendant.
  <a class="footnote" href="#fn12" id="fn12_ref">
   12
  </a>
</p>
<p id="b80-7">
  There are practical as well as theoretical reasons for not excusing him. The rule we are adopting tends to make the streets safer by discouraging the hazardous conduct which the ordinance forbids. It puts the burden of the risk, as far as may be, upon those who create it. Appellee’s agent created a risk which was both obvious and prohibited. Since appellee was responsible for the risk, it is fairer to hold him responsible for the harm than to deny a remedy to the innocent victim.
 </p>
<p id="b80-8">
  Reversed.
 </p>












<div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn1" label="1">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn1_ref">
   1
  </a>
<p id="b78-19">
   “Locks on Motor Vehicles. Every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a lock suitable to lock the starting lever, throttle, or switch, or gear-shift lever, by which the vehicle is set in motion, and no person shaE allow any motor vehicle operated by him to stand or remain unattended on any street or in any public place without first having locked the lever, throttle', or switch by which said motor vehicle may be set in motion.” Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations for the District of Columbia, Section 58.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn2" label="2">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn2_ref">
   2
  </a>
<p id="b78-32">
   44 App.D.C. 320.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn3" label="3">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn3_ref">
   3
  </a>
<p id="b78-33">
   Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 1927, 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778, and Castay v. Katz &amp; Besthoff, Ltd., La.App.1933, 148 So. 76, are to similar effect; but cf. Malloy v. Newman, 1941, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E. 2d 1001.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn4" label="4">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn4_ref">
   4
  </a>
<p id="b79-9">
   Lee v. Van Beuren &amp; New York Bill Posting Co., 190 App.Div. 742, 180 N.Y.S. 295; Gumbrell v. Clausen-Flanagan Brewery, 199 App.Div. 778, 192 N.Y.S. 451; Connell v. Borland, 223 App.Div. 234, 228 N.Y.S. 20.
  </p>
<p id="b79-10">
   Contra, Rhad v. Duquesne Light Co., 255 Pa. 409, 100 A. 262, L.R.A.1917D, 864.
  </p>
<p id="b79-11">
   The New York Court of Appeals has said broadly that “If one is negligent in leaving a motor vehicle improperly secured, if as a result thereof and in immediate sequence therewith some other event occurs, which would not have occurred exeept for such negligence, and if injury follows, such a one is responsible, even though the negligent act comes first in order of time.” Maloney v. Kaplan, 233 N. Y. 426, 135 N.E. 838, 839, 26 A.L.R. 909.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn5" label="5">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn5_ref">
   5
  </a>
<p id="b79-12">
   Cf. Boronkay v. Robinson &amp; Carpenter, 247 N.Y. 365, 160 N.E. 400.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn6" label="6">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn6_ref">
   6
  </a>
<p id="b79-13">
   Clements v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 26 App.D.C. 482; Janof v. Newsom, 60 App.D.C. 291, 53 F.2d 149; Martin v. Herzog. 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814; DeHaen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N. Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764; Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543, 12 Am. St.Rep. 698; Restatement, Torts, §§ 286, 449.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn7" label="7">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn7_ref">
   7
  </a>
<p id="b79-14">
   Capital Traction Co. v. Apple, 34 App. D.C. 559; Danzansky v. Zimbolist, 70 App.D.C. 234, 105 F.2d 457.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn8" label="8">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn8_ref">
   8
  </a>
<p id="b79-17">
   §§ 53(c), 47(e).
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn9" label="9">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn9_ref">
   9
  </a>
<p id="b79-18">
   In Rosenberg v. Murray, 73 App.D.C. 67, 116 F.2d 552, on which appellee relies, it did not appear that either the owner of the car or any agent whom he had employed to drive it had acted negligently.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn10" label="10">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn10_ref">
   10
  </a>
<p id="b79-19">
   This does not mean that one who violates a safety ordinance is responsible for all harm that accompanies or follows his negligence. He is responsible for the consequences of his negligence but not for coincidences. If in the present case, for example, the intermeddler had simply released the brake of appellee’s truck, without making use of the ignition key or the unlocked switch, and the truck had thereupon rolled downhill and injured appellant, appellee would not have been responsible for the injuries because of the negligence of his agent in leaving the switch unlocked, since it would have had no part in causing them. In other words the fact that the ignition was unlocked, which alone gave the agent’s conduct its negligent character, would have had nothing to do with bringing about the harm.
  </p>
<p id="b79-20">
   Neither do we suggest that the ordinance should be interpreted as intended to apply in all possible circumstances. In some emergencies, no doubt, the act of leaving a car unlocked and unattended in a public
   <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="16"> 
    *16
    </span>
   place would not be a violation of the ordinance, fairly interpreted, and would therefore entail no responsibility for consequences. A classic illustration of the same general principle is the Bologna ordinance against blood-letting in the streets, which did not make criminals of surgeons.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn11" label="11">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn11_ref">
   11
  </a>
<p id="b80-10">
   60 App.D.C. 291, 53 F.2d 149.
  </p>
</div><div class="footnote" id="fn12" label="12">
<a class="footnote" href="#fn12_ref">
   12
  </a>
<p id="b80-11">
   Restatement, Torts, § 449. Cf. Butts v. Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6, 116 A.L.R. 1441.
  </p>
</div></div></opinion>

Yes. The defendant's violation of the motor vehicle ordinance constitutes the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The ordinance requiring motor vehicles to be locked is a public safety measure intended to prevent harm from unauthorized use. The violation of such a safety ordinance is negligence. When this negligence leads to the specific hazard the ordinance was designed to prevent—a thief driving the vehicle and causing injury—it is the legal cause of that injury. The intervening criminal act of the thief does not break the chain of causation, because the risk of such an act is precisely what makes the defendant's conduct negligent and what the ordinance was intended to address.

Yes, a car owner's violation of a traffic ordinance requiring vehicles to be locked, which leads to a third party stealing and negligently driving the car, does constitute the legal (proximate) cause of an injury to a pedestrian, despite the intervening criminal act.

The court overrules *Squires v. Brooks*, finding that the prior decision from 1916 cannot be reconciled with clearer facts and better-established legal principles. It notes that the widespread knowledge that children and thieves frequently cause harm by tampering with unlocked cars is now undeniable. The court holds that violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety constitutes negligence per se. If this negligent conduct creates the hazard the ordinance was designed to prevent and results in the harm the ordinance sought to avoid, it is a legal cause of that harm.

The specific ordinance requiring motor vehicles to be locked is identified as a safety measure intended to promote public safety in the streets, not merely to prevent theft for vehicle owners. An unlocked vehicle presents a significant risk of meddling by others, leading to public injuries. Consequently, the violation of this safety ordinance was negligence and directly created the hazard and brought about the harm the ordinance intended to prevent, making it a legal or 'proximate' cause of the injury.

The court further clarifies that the intervening criminal conduct of the third party does not break the chain of causation. Citing *Janof v. Newsom*, the court reasons that when a defendant's negligence is precisely defined by the risk that a third person will act improperly, the actual occurrence of such improper action is not a valid reason to excuse the defendant from liability. Placing the burden of the risk on those who create it serves both practical and theoretical purposes, making streets safer and ensuring fairness to innocent victims.

Ross v. Hartman

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