Yes, the special free speech rules apply to important government employees, not just elected ones. First, you can't sue for libel just because an article criticizes the government agency you worked for, even if you were one of the few people in charge. That would be like suing on behalf of the government itself, which isn't allowed. Second, the label 'public official' includes anyone whose government job is important enough that the public has a good reason to care about how they do it. Because Baer was 'the man in charge' of a public place, he probably counts as a public official and has to meet the higher standard to win his case.

Yes, but the court's idea of a 'public official' is confusing. Who decides if a janitor with access to secrets is more 'public' than a high-level clerk? We should just focus on whether the topic is a 'public issue.' If it is, speech about it should be protected, no matter who is involved.

Yes, I agree, but we should be careful. The special rule is meant to stop people from being punished for criticizing the government. It's not meant to give people a free pass to spread lies that destroy a person's reputation, which is a very important right we all have.

Yes, the writer should win, but the case should be over for good, with no new trial. The Constitution gives an absolute right to criticize public officials, period. The 'proving they knew it was a lie' test isn't enough to protect free speech. Also, a jury, not a judge, should get to decide if someone is a 'public official'.

Yes, I agree on the 'public official' rule, but the court is wrong about the group criticism part. There's a big difference between a vague comment about 'the police' and a comment that points a finger at a small, specific group of managers. It's perfectly normal in law for any member of a small, targeted group to be able to sue.

We shouldn't have even taken this case. The whole thing happened before the Supreme Court made its big free speech ruling in the New York Times case. So, the original trial didn't collect the right kind of evidence for us to be making these huge decisions now. We're guessing about the facts.

Yes, the rule does apply. If someone has an important government job that makes people pay attention to them, newspapers can print criticism of how they did their job. They can't be successfully sued for this unless they knew it was false or didn't care. This is important to let people openly discuss the government. It's the judge's job to decide if Mr. Baer's resort job was this type of important public position.

The Court shouldn't have taken this case because the trial happened before the rule protecting criticism of public officials was announced. The facts weren't looked at with that rule in mind. The Court needs to be careful about making states follow new rules without considering all the facts.

The big question is how much the Constitution has changed state laws about lying. If free speech is the most important thing, maybe states aren't allowed to punish any lies about the government or public issues. When someone has a government job that people would naturally discuss and criticize, newspapers should be free to criticize them without worrying about being sued.

The Constitution doesn't allow suing the government for damages over lies. But it also doesn't take away all rights of private citizens to sue each other for lies. Suing over lies is sometimes the only way to fix a ruined reputation. The special protections for criticizing public officials should only apply when state law isn't giving enough protection to free speech.

The Court should say Mr. Rosenblatt wins, period. The First Amendment completely forbids these kinds of lawsuits over criticism of public employees. It shouldn't matter what their exact title is. The only way to truly protect freedom of speech and the press is to say states simply can't allow libel lawsuits when public issues are being discussed.

The Court is wrong to say the jury was allowed to find Mr. Rosenblatt guilty of libel just because his article seemed to be about the government in general. The jury was told that if they thought the article was accusing a small, specific group of people including Mr. Baer, then Mr. Baer could sue. That's just normal law, not the special protection for general discussions of government that the Court talked about in another case.

The "public official" "designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs

"The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt, reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being, `a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'"

Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees,... the New York Times malice standards apply.

The reason defamation is proscribable is "society ['s] pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation."

Furthermore, "[t] he employee's position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."

—the Supreme Court said that it is for the trial judge "in the first instance" to determine whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure

—noting that "[t] he legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.*** `The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments

—quoting Justice Stewart, the individual's right to protection of his own good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and …

The Rosenblatt decision, in holding that a former supervisor of a county recreation area fell within the public official class, suggested that the determination was to be made by reference to two considerations: "***[F] irst,[the] strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second,[the] strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to …

Yes, the First Amendment's "actual malice" standard applies to non-elected government employees whose positions are of such importance that the public has an independent interest in their performance. First, a charge of libel cannot be based on a theory that an impersonal criticism of a government operation casts suspicion on a small group of people in charge; this is tantamount to an action for libel on government, which the Constitution forbids. The plaintiff must show the statement was specifically 'of and concerning' them. Second, the 'public official' designation is not determined by state law but by a federal constitutional standard. It applies to those in the government hierarchy who have, or appear to have, substantial responsibility for or control over governmental affairs, as criticism of their conduct is essential to public debate about government performance. Because Baer's role as Supervisor may have been prominent enough to qualify him as a public official, the case is remanded for a new trial under the correct constitutional standards.

Yes, but the Court's 'public official' test is an unworkable standard. The focus of First Amendment protection should not be on the status of the person discussed but on whether the speech pertains to a 'public issue.' Drawing lines between different levels of government employees is arbitrary; free discussion must embrace all matters of public concern. The First Amendment should be interpreted to bar Congress and the states from enacting any libel laws related to public issues.

Yes, the Court's decision is consistent with the principle that the Constitution does not tolerate actions for libel on government. However, the New York Times rule should be applied cautiously, as it protects defamatory falsehood. The right to protect one's reputation is a fundamental concept of human dignity, and the First Amendment has not stripped private citizens of all means of redress for injuries caused by careless liars. The rule's purpose is to prevent state defamation law from being unconstitutionally converted into a law of seditious libel.

Yes, the judgment against Rosenblatt must be reversed, but a new trial should not be permitted. The First Amendment provides an absolute, unconditional right to criticize the government and its agents. The 'actual malice' standard is an inadequate protection for the press against crippling libel judgments. Furthermore, the question of whether someone is a 'public official' is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury, not a judge, to protect the historical role of the jury in libel cases as a safeguard for freedom of speech.

Yes, the Court correctly defines the 'public official' standard, but it incorrectly rejects the trial court's jury instruction regarding group libel. The instruction was not about an 'impersonal' attack on government like in New York Times. It reflected the conventional tort doctrine that if a defamatory statement is directed at a small, identifiable group, any member of that group may have a cause of action. Criticizing Baer and the three commissioners as a small management group is legally different from a general criticism of 'the police'.

The writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted. The case was tried before New York Times v. Sullivan was decided, meaning the factual record was not developed with the 'public official' or 'actual malice' standards in mind. The Court is therefore applying new, complex constitutional principles to an inadequate record, deciding important issues in a factual vacuum.

Yes. The 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. This designation is necessary to ensure uninhibited debate on public issues, as required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The position must invite public scrutiny, apart from the particular charges at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment because it allowed recovery without proof of actual malice - that the falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. It is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a 'public official.'

The writ should be vacated as improvidently granted because the factual record was not developed in light of the principles in New York Times v. Sullivan, which was decided after the trial. A new trial may help respondent, but it will be too late to assist the Court. Especially where the decision furnishes a Procrustean bed for state law, the Court should insist upon a relevant factual record.

The key question is the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment has displaced state libel laws when it comes to public issues. If freedom of speech is the guide, state libel laws may have no place when public issues are involved. The First Amendment likely bars Congress from passing any libel law. While there is a strong interest in preventing attacks on reputation, when interests in public discussion are strong, the Constitution limits the protections of defamation law. Where a government position is one that invites public scrutiny and discussion, the New York Times malice standards should apply.

The Constitution does not tolerate actions for libel on government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private citizens of all means of redress for defamation. An action for damages is the only hope for vindication the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishonored. The New York Times rule should only be applied where a State's defamation law has been unconstitutionally converted into seditious libel.

The judgment should be reversed, but no new trial should be allowed, as a libel judgment against Rosenblatt is forbidden by the First Amendment. Discussion of how a public agent does his job is exactly what the First Amendment protects. Unconditional freedom to criticize public functions is necessarily included in the First Amendment. The right to criticize a public agent engaged in public activities should not depend on whether he is labeled a 'public official.' Only by recognizing that libel laws are barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments can speech and press be protected against the threats posed by libel actions.

The Court incorrectly characterizes part of the trial court's charge as depending on an impermissible theory of 'impersonal' libel. The charge merely reflected the conventional tort law principle that if a defamatory statement is directed at a small enough group, any member of that group can recover. This is different from New York Times v. Sullivan, where criticism of 'the police' generally was at issue. There is no reason why a statement read as accusing A, B, C, and D of being thieves should be absolutely privileged, while a statement accusing only A would not be. The trial judge was simply referring to the traditional doctrine that more than one person can be libeled by the same statement.

Rosenblatt v. Baer

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