Rosenberg v. Fleuti
374 U.S. 449 (1963)
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Rule of Law:
A lawful permanent resident's return to the United States following an innocent, casual, and brief excursion abroad is not an "entry" within the meaning of § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as such a trip is not a departure intended to be meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence.
Facts:
- Fleuti, a Swiss national, was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in October 1952.
- He resided continuously in the U.S. for nearly four years after his admission.
- In August 1956, Fleuti made a visit of "about a couple hours" duration to Ensenada, Mexico.
- Upon his return, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sought to deport him.
- The basis for deportation was that Fleuti was a homosexual, a condition the INS alleged made him excludable as an alien "afflicted with psychopathic personality" at the time of his 1956 return.
- Fleuti was not excludable on this basis at the time of his original, lawful admission in 1952.
Procedural Posture:
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Fleuti to be deported.
- Fleuti's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed.
- Fleuti filed an action for declaratory judgment and review in a federal trial court.
- The trial court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, upholding the deportation.
- Fleuti, as appellant, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals, with Rosenberg (the government) as appellee, set aside the deportation order, holding the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
- Rosenberg, on behalf of the government, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a lawful permanent resident's brief, casual, and innocent trip of a few hours to a foreign country constitute an "entry" upon their return, subjecting them to the grounds for exclusion under the Immigration and Nationality Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Goldberg
No. A lawful permanent resident's return from an innocent, casual, and brief excursion abroad is not an "entry" that triggers the grounds of excludability. The Court, exercising judicial restraint to avoid a constitutional question, focused on the statutory interpretation of "entry" under § 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The legislative history indicates Congress intended to ameliorate the harshness of the prior "re-entry doctrine," which treated every physical crossing as a new entry. The statutory exception for a departure that was "not intended" should be interpreted not merely as an involuntary or accidental departure, but as one that was not intended to be meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. To subject a resident alien to the momentous consequence of deportation based on a brief, insignificant trip would be to subject them to "meaningless and irrational hazards," contrary to the ameliorative purpose of the statute as recognized in cases like Di Pasquale v. Karnuth and Delgadillo v. Carmichael.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Clark
Yes. A lawful permanent resident's return from a voluntary and intentional trip abroad, however brief, constitutes an "entry" under the plain language of the statute. The majority is not construing the statute but is constructing a new one. The Act defines "entry" as "any coming" of an alien into the U.S., with narrow exceptions for departures that were unintentional or involuntary. Fleuti's trip to Mexico was plainly intentional and voluntary. The legislative history shows that Congress considered and rejected broader exceptions for temporary absences, choosing instead to codify only the narrow judicial exceptions found in cases like Delgadillo. The Court should have deferred to the clear legislative text and proceeded to decide the constitutional question presented, rather than rewriting the law.
Analysis:
This decision established the landmark "Fleuti doctrine," which significantly liberalized the definition of "entry" for lawful permanent residents (LPRs). It created a flexible, intent-based standard that protected LPRs from facing exclusion for conditions developed after their initial admission if they took a brief, casual trip abroad. The doctrine shifted the focus from the mere physical act of crossing a border to the nature and purpose of the alien's departure. This judicial protection was a cornerstone of immigration law for over three decades until it was legislatively abrogated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which replaced the concept of "entry" with a much stricter definition of "admission."
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