Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc.
132 A.L.R. 888, 284 N.Y. 335, 31 N.E. 2d 182 (1940)
Rule of Law:
In New York, a libelous publication concerning a deceased person that makes no direct reflection upon his living relatives does not give those relatives a cause of action for defamation, even if the publication names them.
Facts:
- Anna Rose was the wife of Jack Rose, and the other plaintiffs were their children.
- Jack Rose died on May 25, 1939.
- The defendant newspaper published an article of and concerning the deceased Jack Rose.
- The article erroneously identified Jack Rose with one 'Baldy Jack Rose,' described as a self-confessed murderer who had 'lived in constant fear that emissaries of the ■underworld * would catch up with him and execute gang vengeance.'
- The article named Anna Rose and the other plaintiffs as the surviving wife and children of the deceased Jack Rose.
- The article made no other direct reference to the plaintiffs.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Anna Rose and her children filed a complaint against the defendant, Daily Mirror, Inc., for libel.
- The defendant moved for judgment dismissing the complaint at Special Term (trial court).
- Special Term denied the defendant's motion.
- The Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court) reversed the order of Special Term and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.
- The plaintiffs appealed the Appellate Division's decision to the Court of Appeals of New York (highest court).
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Issue:
Does a libelous publication concerning a deceased person, which erroneously identifies him as a notorious criminal and names his surviving wife and children, provide those relatives with a cause of action for defamation when the publication makes no direct reflection upon their own reputations?
Opinions:
Majority - Loughran, J.
No, a libelous publication concerning a deceased person, even if it names his surviving relatives, does not provide those relatives with a cause of action for defamation if it makes no direct reflection upon their own reputations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the long-standing New York law that a libel or slander upon the memory of a deceased person, which does not directly reflect upon his relatives, gives them no cause of action for defamation, citing Wellman v. Sun Printing & Publishing Assn. and Sorensen v. Balaban. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that being named in the publication distinguished their case from prior precedent, reasoning that the plaintiffs would likely have suffered similar social standing loss and mortification even if their names had been omitted. The court stated that sustaining the complaint would require a 'far-reaching extension of the law of libel' which it was not persuaded was dictated by justice or expediency.
Dissenting - Finch, J.
Yes, a libelous publication concerning a deceased person, which names his surviving relatives and describes him as a notorious criminal, should give those relatives a cause of action for defamation because it holds them up to ridicule and contempt. Justice Finch argued that to publish that a man was a notorious criminal and then identify one plaintiff as his wife and others as his children implies they are 'possessed of his blood,' which would subject them to ridicule and contempt, similar to a charge of illegitimacy. He distinguished this case from Sorensen v. Balaban because here the plaintiffs' names did appear in the publication. Justice Finch asserted that the mere failure to attribute personal fault to the plaintiffs does not negate the libel, and that a respectable family should receive relief for damages suffered when a newspaper falsely blackens their deceased member and thereby the family itself, especially given the ease of verification.
Analysis:
This case firmly reiterates and upholds the traditional New York position that defamation claims generally cannot be brought on behalf of a deceased person, nor can living relatives bring such claims based solely on their association with a defamed decedent. The ruling highlights the judiciary's reluctance to expand the scope of libel law to include indirect reputational harm to relatives, emphasizing the need for a direct reflection upon the plaintiff's own character or reputation. This decision draws a clear line, distinguishing New York law from jurisdictions that might allow such claims, and thus limits the avenues for recovery for emotional distress or social mortification resulting from a deceased relative's posthumous defamation.
